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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a long-standing debate in the religious and ethics literature
about whether or not people can be evil.1  The answer, at first, seems 
obvious.  Of course they can—all the people who commit violent crimes! 
The skeptic’s response to this point, however, is that violent criminals 
are not evil.  Instead, they split into three nonevil groups: bad-act 
performers who are (1) “mad”—sick, insane, mentally ill—not “bad”; 
(2) victimized by adverse environmental forces, usually severe neglect
or abuse (physical or sexual); or (3) convinced that their bad act is not
bad but inherently or instrumentally good.2  The skeptic’s response, 
then, denies the existence or possibility of a fourth category: (4) bad-act
performers who are not mad, abused, or ideologically subjugated. Such
people perform bad acts not because they do not know any better or 
have not been given proper guidance, instruction, or incentives.  Rather, 
they perform bad acts knowing full well that these acts are bad simply
because they enjoy performing them.
So-called psychopaths—people who cannot feel compassion and so are
fully indifferent to the harm that they cause others—would seem to be
the paradigmatic example of evil.  Still, those who deny the possibility
of evil agency would say that psychopaths are victims—victims of a 
neurological disorder, of environmental forces, or of misguided beliefs. 
1. Compare K.M. ROGERS, STAINED GLASS JESUS 72 (2010) (“The world is 
troubled and people can be evil.”), with GLENN KOHRMAN, REFLECTIONS OF A CATHOLIC 
PRIEST 104 (2008) (“People cannot be evil, no one can be evil.”).
2. I include this third category only because some believe that a person is evil
only if that person knows that her bad acts are bad, in which case bad-act performers who 
fall into the third group would not be evil.  While I myself believe that people who fall 
into this third category—for example, terrorists who murder in the name of some
supposedly higher good—are evil, there does seem to be some intuitive merit to the 
notion that they are still less evil than knowing bad-act performers.  As Ron Rosenbaum 
explains: 
By characterizing Hitler’s apparently implacable hatred of Jews as merely
an actor’s trick, by thus denying him the ‘virtue’ of passionate sincerity . . . 
[Emile] Fackenheim deflects, even derails one entire project of Hitler
explanation . . . by contending that the passion was not white hot but pure, 
cold, calculated invention.
And, thus, all the more evil.  Evil for evil’s sake, evil inexplicable by
pathology or ideology and all the more inexcusable.  “Radical evil”: a term
Fackenheim uses to define a phenomenon that goes beyond the quantity of the 
victims, a new category of evil.
RON ROSENBAUM, EXPLAINING HITLER: THE SEARCH FOR THE ORIGINS OF HIS EVIL 290– 
91 (1998). 
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This debate has now reached deep into criminal law as well.  On the 
one hand, many judges, lawyers, lawmakers, and scholars tend to think 
of psychopaths as ranging between bad and evil because they frequently
commit crimes, lack compassion for their victims, are generally thought
to be incurable, and are (therefore) likely to repeat similar or worse 
crimes.  For these reasons, the criminal law often treats psychopathy as 
an aggravating factor, a factor that warrants increased punishment.3  On
the other hand, a very strong case can be made that psychopathy is actually 
a mitigating, if not exculpatory, factor.4  Empirical studies increasingly 
confirm the proposition that psychopaths are themselves victims of 
neurological abnormalities that make them incapable of empathy,
impulse control, and emotional or affective understanding of moral
principles and the criminal law.5  To date, we have been unable to find a 
3. See Stephen D. Hart, Psychopathy, Culpability, and Commitment, in  MENTAL
DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW: RESPONSIBILITY, PUNISHMENT AND COMPETENCE 159,
169 (Robert F. Schopp et al. eds., 2009) (“[T]he law’s view of psychopathy is 
unambiguously negative: It causes chronic functional impairment that is serious enough
to be considered a potential aggravating factor for the purposes of some commitment 
decisions . . . .”); Christina Lee, The Judicial Response to Psychopathic Criminals:
Utilitarianism over Retribution, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 125, 133–35 (2007) (arguing
that psychopathy should be treated as an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating 
factor because this approach “better responds to the inability to rehabilitate psychopaths 
and acknowledges the continual threat [that psychopaths pose] to society”); Samuel H. 
Pillsbury, Misunderstanding Provocation, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 143, 159 (2009)
(“Psychopathy nowhere provides an excuse from liability; its only legal relevance may 
be as an aggravating factor in sentencing.  Nor are there . . . any credible efforts in the
political realm in this country to grant excuse or mitigation based on psychopathy.”); 
O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1265, 1339 (2007) (“[T]he aggravating factor of future dangerousness [is] no
friend to the capital defendant.”).
4. See Lee, supra note 3, at 133 (“[O]ne [c]ould argue that a mental disorder
(here psychopathy in particular) effectively decreases the culpability of the criminal . . . .
Notably, this argument closely parallels the rationale of the insanity defense.  This 
approach . . . plac[es] blame not on the criminal but on the inevitable effects of
psychopathy.  In other words, the individual should not be judged as fully responsible as
his or her actions were controlled by the inherently violent and dangerous traits of 
psychopathy.” (footnotes omitted)). 
5. See  ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE 126–34, 166, 168–69 (1993)
(attributing psychopathy to faulty brain organization); DANIEL GOLEMAN, SOCIAL
INTELLIGENCE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 128–29 (2006) (“When it
comes to empathy, psychopaths have none; they have special difficulty recognizing fear
or sadness on people’s faces or in their voices.  A brain imaging study with a group of 
criminal psychopaths suggests a deficit in circuitry centering on the amygdala, within a 
brain module essential for reading this particular range of emotions, and deficits in the 
prefrontal area that inhibits impulse. . . .  [Psychopaths’] neural wiring deadens them to 
the range of emotions in the spectrum of suffering. . . .  [T]hey are literally numb in the
face of distress, lacking the very radar for detecting human agony.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Carla L. Harenski, Robert D. Hare & Kent A. Kiehl, Neuroimaging, Genetics, and
Psychopathy: Implications for the Legal System, in RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHOPATHY:
INTERFACING LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY 125, 139–40 (Luca Malatesti & John
McMillan eds., 2010) (“[N]euroimaging studies . . . suggest that psychopathy is 
1302
KEN LEVY DANGEROUS PSYCHOPATHS REPLACEMENT122411 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/2012 9:56 AM      
  
    
 
 






   
 
 






   
 














        




   
 
[VOL. 48:  1299, 2011] Dangerous Psychopaths 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
successful treatment for these psychological deficits.6  As a result,  
psychopaths who are not caught and treated at a very early age are
associated with a wide range of neural deficits . . . .  [N]eurology studies indicate that
there exists no single region to which damage leads to the complete manifestation of
psychopathy.”); id. at 147 (“Neuroimaging studies have identified a network of brain
regions, primarily centring in limbic and paralimbic cortex, which show structural and 
functional deficits in psychopaths.  These deficits have been associated with
abnormalities in basic cognitive and affective processing . . . .  These brain regions also 
show substantial overlap with those that have been implicated in social cognition.”); 
Kent A. Kiehl, Without Morals: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Criminal Psychopaths, 
in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY: EMOTION, BRAIN 
DISORDERS, AND DEVELOPMENT 119, 149 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008) 
(concluding from data that “the relevant functional neural architecture implicated in
psychopathy is the paralimbic system”); Neil Levy, Psychopathy, Responsibility, and the 
Moral/Conventional Distinction, in RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHOPATHY: INTERFACING 
LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 213, 223 (“There is independent evidence 
that psychopaths show weaker rACC [rostral anterior cingulate cortex] activation when
defecting in a social cooperation game.” (citation omitted) (citing James K. Rilling et al.,
A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation, 35 NEURON 395 (2002))); Luca Malatesti & John
McMillan, Defending PCL-R, in RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHOPATHY: INTERFACING LAW,
PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 79, 87–89 (suggesting that although there is 
increasing scientific evidence to suggest that psychopathy is caused by brain damage, “a 
widely accepted theory of the neural causes of psychopathy is not in sight”). 
6. See HARE, supra note 5, at 94, 193–94, 195–97, 198–201, 205, 217 (suggesting
that, as of 1993, no method had been found for treating psychopaths); id. at 174 (“No
amount of social conditioning will by itself generate a capacity for caring about others or
a powerful sense of right and wrong. . . .  [P]sychopathic ‘clay’ is much less malleable 
than is the clay society’s potters usually have to work with.”); Lee, supra note 3, at 134
(“Researchers have agreed: ‘Whether or not psychopathy is a disorder, it is an enduring 
aspect of a person, and . . . cannot be expected to change as a result of either time in 
prison or treatment.’  The failure of treating psychopaths is further illustrated in that ‘no
sound treatment or re-socialization programs have been demonstrated to be effective.’  In
fact, treatment often brings about the undesired effect as it can result in significantly
higher rates of violent recidivism.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Grant T. Harris et al.,
The Construct of Psychopathy, in 28 CRIME AND JUSTICE 197, 239 (Michael Tonry ed., 
2001); Robert F. Schopp et al., Expert Testimony and Professional Judgment:
Psychological Expertise and Commitment as a Sexual Predator After Hendricks, 5 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 120, 140 (1999))); Richard L. Lippke, No Easy Way Out:
Dangerous Offenders and Preventive Detention, 27 LAW & PHIL. 383, 396 (2008) (“The
evidence suggests that [psychopaths], many of whom appear to comprise some of the 
most serious and intractable criminal offenders, are nearly insusceptible to character 
change.  There is no known effective treatment of psychopathy and psychopaths engage 
in criminal conduct well past the point at which other offenders tend to desist.”); Paul 
Litton, Responsibility Status of the Psychopath: On Moral Reasoning and Rational Self-
Governance, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 349, 388 (2008) (“[A]t present, no effective treatment 
exists for psychopathy.  Actually, not only is there no treatment, but mental health 
treatment seems to increase recidivism rates among psychopaths exhibiting the most 
severe emotional dysfunction.”); Stephen J. Morse, Psychopathy and the Law: The
United States Experience, in  RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHOPATHY: INTERFACING LAW,
PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 5, at 41, 53 (“At present, there is no effective
 1303


































   
 
 
      
 
generally determined to be psychopathic for the remainder of their 
lives.7  They are typically destined to lead a life that is emotionally 
impoverished, lacking in enriching human relationships, and doomed to
occupational failure.8 
So how should we resolve this dilemma?  How should we judge 
psychopaths, both morally and in the criminal justice system?  This Article 
will argue that psychopaths are often not morally responsible for their 
bad acts simply because they cannot understand, and therefore be guided 
by, moral reasons.  Scholars and lawyers who endorse the same 
conclusion automatically tend to infer from this premise that 
psychopaths should not be held criminally punishable for their criminal
acts.9  These scholars and lawyers are making this assumption (that just 
treatment for adult psychopaths . . . .”); James R. P. Ogloff & Melisa Wood, The 
Treatment of Psychopathy: Clinical Nihilism or Steps in the Right Direction?, in
RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHOPATHY: INTERFACING LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY, 
supra note 5, at 155, 157 (“Regardless of the success of offender-rehabilitation
programmes, a particular subgroup of offenders—those with psychopathy—have 
demonstrated a lack of responsiveness to a variety of treatment attempts, and continue to
be considered by many to be essentially untreatable.” (citation omitted)); id. at 170
(“[W]e still know very little about whether, and how, psychopaths can be successfully
and appropriately treated.”). 
7. See  HARE, supra note 5, at 160, 164, 200 (“If intervention is to have any
chance of succeeding, it will have to occur early in childhood. . . .  [Psychologist Rolf] 
Loeber notes that there are several well-established pathways to criminality and that it
would be illogical and foolish not to do everything in our power to disrupt these
pathways as early as possible.  The same reasoning applies, with even greater force, to
psychopathy. . . .  Logically, our best chance of reducing the impact of adult psychopathy
on society is to attack the problem early. . . .  The situation may [improve] as we learn 
more about the roots of psychopathy. Further, psychologists have developed
intervention programs that are quite successful in changing the attitudes and behaviors of 
children and adolescents who have a variety of behavioral problems. . . .  If used at a 
very early age, it is possible that some of these programs will be useful in modifying the 
behavioral patterns of ‘budding psychopaths,’ perhaps by reducing aggression and
impulsivity and by teaching them strategies for satisfying their needs in more prosocial
ways.” (footnotes omitted)); Lee, supra note 3, at 129 (“Early detection provides an 
optimistic outlook towards treatment.  While it is accepted that psychopathy in adults is 
generally untreatable, researchers remain optimistic that early intervention in these 
instances may either prevent or lessen the manifestation of psychopathy.” (footnote 
omitted)); David T. Lykken, The Case for Parental Licensure, in  PSYCHOPATHY:
ANTISOCIAL, CRIMINAL, AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 122, 129 (Theodore Millon et al. eds., 
1998) (“[R]eally talented parents (or, more likely, a truly fortuitous combination of 
parents, neighborhood, peer group, and subsequent mentors) can sometimes socialize
even [budding psychopaths].”). 
8. See HARE, supra note 5, at 2 (“[A psychopath is] a self-centered, callous, and 
remorseless person profoundly lacking in empathy and the ability to form warm
emotional relationships with others, a person who functions without the restraints of
conscience. . . .  [W]hat is missing in this picture are the very qualities that allow human 
beings to live in social harmony.”). 
9. See, e.g., Charles Fischette, Psychopathy and Responsibility, 90 VA. L. REV. 
1423, 1449–69 (2004) (offering arguments for the position that psychopaths are not 
criminally responsible because they are not morally responsible); Kimberly Kessler 
1304
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criminal punishment requires moral responsibility) on the basis of one of
two deeper assumptions: that either (1) criminal punishment directly
requires moral responsibility or (2) criminal punishment requires 
criminal responsibility, which itself requires moral responsibility.  I will 
argue, however, that the virtually universal assumption that just criminal 
punishment requires moral responsibility—whether or not through the
middle term of criminal responsibility—is false; that although 
psychopaths are not morally responsible, they are still criminally
responsible and criminally punishable.10 
The reason why just criminal punishment does not require moral 
responsibility is because criminal law is a fail-safe, last-ditch option
to use against those who, for whatever reason, are not sufficiently motivated 
by morality and respect for the law to comply with the law.  And one 
reason for insufficient motivation may just be inability to be sufficiently
motivated.  But even if certain people are unable to be sufficiently
motivated by morality and respect for the law, they are still criminally 
responsible, and therefore criminally punishable, for breaking the law as 
Ferzan, Foreword, Living on the Edge: The Margins of Legal Personhood, 39 RUTGERS 
L.J. 237, 245 (2008) (“[P]rofound defects in rationality may leave the psychopath utterly
outside the moral community, yielding the result that they should be exempt from the
criminal law.”); Lippke, supra note 6, at 386 (“[M]oral control over their actions . . . is
the basis for condemning [recidivists] through punitive confinement.”); id. at 389–90
(“Without such moral competence, [the individual] would not properly be subject to 
retributive punishment, with its distinctive censuring dimension.”). 
10. Stephen Morse comes very close to asserting the same proposition when he 
says: 
Now, suppose that the predator lacks the capacity for empathy, guilt, and 
remorse. . . .  If these capacities are lacking, it is plausible to argue that the
agent lacks moral rationality and is not responsible, even if the agent is in
touch with reality otherwise and knows the moral rules in the narrowest sense. 
In criminal law, of course, lack of these capacities is not an excusing
condition, although such a defect surely predisposes an agent to do wrong. 
Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025,
1072–73 (2002) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Litton, supra note 6, at 
384, 392 (“I have [argued that] the psychopath [] is not a fully [morally] responsible
agent . . . .  I have yet to address whether the criminal law should treat the psychopath as 
criminally responsible, despite the conclusion that he is less than fully morally
blameworthy for wrongdoing. . . .  Even if it is true that psychopaths have a diminished 
capacity for rational self-governance or practical reasoning, psychopathy alone does not
appear to represent the kind of mental defect that normally disqualifies an individual 
from being held criminally responsible. . . .  [T]he psychopath is not morally responsible 
or, at least, not fully morally responsible for his wrongdoing and criminal conduct. 
Nevertheless, there may be stronger reasons, from the perspective of both persons with
and without psychopathy, to maintain the status quo in which individuals with
psychopathy are held criminally responsible for their criminal wrongdoing.”). 
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long as they knew that they were breaking the law and that breaking the 
law would likely mean getting punished if they were caught.
If I am correct, then contrary to many scholars but consistent with the
current law, psychopaths are not in fact insane11 and should therefore
continue to be criminally punished for their criminal acts.  One drawback of
this position is that it will be slightly more difficult for the state to justify 
preventively detaining psychopaths who have not committed any criminal
acts but have signaled in one way or another that they are inclined in this 
direction. Still, this drawback is hardly a reason to call psychopaths 
something that they are not—again, insane.  Moreover, slightly more 
difficult does not mean too difficult.  Even if dangerous psychopaths are 
not insane, the state still can, and should, preventively detain them. The
reason is that the state is allowed to involuntarily commit people who are
both mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or others.  And although
psychopathy is not currently considered to be a mental illness, no less a 
form of insanity, I will argue that it should be. 
II. PSYCHOPATHY DEFINED
In order to understand what psychopathy is, we need to understand
how the term is ordinarily understood, how it is defined by the
psychological community, and how it differs from Antisocial Personality
Disorder (ASPD). 
A.  A Working Definition of Psychopathy
A psychopath is essentially a person who is unable—lacks the
psychological capacity—to feel concern or compassion for others.12 
From this simple definition, three points follow. 
11. See HARE, supra note 5, at 5 (“Psychopathic killers . . . are not mad, according 
to accepted legal and psychiatric standards.”); id. at 143 (“[P]sychopaths do meet current
legal and psychiatric standards for sanity.  They understand the rules of society and the 
conventional meanings of right and wrong.  They are capable of controlling their 
behavior, and they are aware of the potential consequences of their acts.”); Hart, supra 
note 3, at 166 (“[P]sychopathy is recognized in the law as a mental disorder that can
impair cognitive or volitional functions.  But is the nature and severity of functional 
impairment associated with psychopathy sufficient to mitigate culpability?  Many
different courts have grappled with this question over the years, and most have 
concluded that the answer is no.” (citations omitted)); John McMillan & Luca Malatesti, 
Responsibility and Psychopathy, in  RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHOPATHY: INTERFACING
LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 5, at 185, 186 (“[T]he McNaghten rule 
for criminal insanity is generally interpreted so as to include psychopaths and those with 
personality disorders within the scope of those punishable by law, although it may be 
deemed a factor relevant to a defence of diminished responsibility.”). 
12. A psychopath is “a person having a character disorder distinguished by amoral 
or antisocial behavior without feelings of remorse.”  RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S 
1306
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First, contrary to some sensationalist websites and tabloids, a person can 
engage in violence without being psychopathic;13 conversely, a psychopath 
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1052 (2d ed. 1997) (emphasis added).  As this definition also 
suggests, the psychopath’s absence of remorse is not merely an accident or a sporadic 
phenomenon but rather a constant condition—again, a “character disorder.”  Id.; HARE, 
supra note 5, at 6 (“[There is] a frightful and perplexing theme that runs through the case 
histories of all psychopaths: a deeply disturbing inability to care about the pain and 
suffering experienced by others—in short, a complete lack of empathy. . . .”); id. at 129 
(“[T]he psychopath lacks an important element of experience—in this case, emotional 
experience—but may have learned the words that others use to describe or mimic
experiences that he cannot really understand.”); id. at 132 (“It is the emotionally charged
thoughts, images, and internal dialogue that give the ‘bite’ to conscience, account for its 
powerful control over behavior, and generate guilt and remorse for transgressions.  This
is something that psychopaths cannot understand.  For them, conscience is little more 
than an intellectual awareness of rules others make up—empty words.  The feelings
needed to give clout to these rules are missing.”); JASON MOSS, THE LAST VICTIM:
A TRUE-LIFE JOURNEY INTO THE MIND OF THE SERIAL KILLER 8 (1999) (“I imagined what 
it would be like to stalk and kill.  I put aside all I’d been taught about right and wrong.
I tried to pretend I was someone without a conscience.  I tried to get to that level of
consciousness where one exults in being truly evil.”); Ferzan, supra note 9, at 238–39; 
Harenski et al., supra note 5, at 141 (“Psychopaths show deficits in empathy, interpreting
facial expressions, and moral cognition and behaviour.” (citation omitted)); Levy, supra 
note 5, at 221 (“I think that the most plausible explanation for the psychopaths’
performance on the moral/conventional task is that they fail to grasp moral norms . . . . 
They are incapable of moralizing conventional transgressions, because they do not have
the capacity to grasp core moral wrongness at all.”); id. at 223 (suggesting that 
psychopaths “are not in the morality game” and are “morally blind”); Lippke, supra 
note 6, at 402 (“[P]sychopaths [are not] responsive at all to moral
considerations. . . .  [T]he morally unresponsive . . . . may be capable of acknowledging
their violent tendencies, but they are presumably incapable of understanding and 
accepting the moral reasons against the conduct that results from those tendencies.”); 
Litton, supra note 6, at 372–76 (arguing that psychopaths suffer from a “diminished 
capacity for moral reasoning”); McMillan & Malatesti, supra note 11, at 190–91 
(suggesting that psychopaths either cannot form moral reasons or can form them but 
cannot be “moved” or sufficiently motivated by them); Morse, supra note 6, at 51 (“Most
people can use empathy, conscience, understanding of the reason underlying a criminal law’s
prohibition, and prudential reasons to guided behaviour.  Psychopaths . . . . cannot grasp or be 
guided by the good reasons not to offend, which could be expressed either as a cognitive or 
control defect.”); Alix Spiegel, Can A Test Really Tell Who’s a Psychopath?, NPR (May 26, 
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/05/26/136619689/can-a-test-really-tell-whos-a-psychopath
(referring to psychopaths as “emotionally deaf”).
13. See HARE, supra note 5, at 22 (“For most people, the confusion and uncertainty
surrounding th[e] subject [of psychopathy] begin with the word psychopathy itself.
Literally it means ‘mental illness’ (from psyche, ‘mind’; and pathos, ‘disease’), and this
is the meaning of the term still found in some dictionaries.  The confusion is 
compounded by the media use of the term as the equivalent of ‘insane’ or ‘crazy’: ‘The 
police say a “psycho” is on the loose,’ or, ‘The guy who killed her must be a
“psycho.”’”); Dave Cullen, The Depressive and the Psychopath: At Last We Know Why 
the Columbine Killers Did It, SLATE (Apr. 20, 2004), http://www.slate.com/id/2099203/
(“In popular usage, almost any crazy killer is a ‘psychopath.’”). 
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does not necessarily engage in violence.14  Instead, this absence of concern 
or compassion can be exhibited through nonviolent behavior such as theft or 
sudden abandonment. 
Second, a person who lacks concern or compassion on a given occasion 
is not necessarily a psychopath.  Indeed, while most people have the 
capacity to feel compassion, some, if not many, of these ordinarily 
compassionate people are also able to “turn off” their compassion in 
certain situations.  Some of the worst kinds of wrongdoers exemplify these
dual capacities: mafia hit men, drug lords, school bullies, death squad 
commanders, corporate executives, and terrorists.  Most people who fall 
into these categories are capable of both great violence and great love
and concern for their family and friends.15  What applies to these
14. See HARE, supra note 5, at 5–6 (“[T]he fact is that the majority of psychopaths 
manage to ply their trade without murdering people. . . .  We are far more likely to lose 
our life savings to an oily-tongued swindler than our lives to a steely-eyed killer.”); id. at
45 (“[V]ery few psychopaths commit [torture]. Their callousness typically emerges in 
less dramatic, though still devastating, ways: parasitically bleeding other people of their
possessions, savings, and dignity; aggressively doing and taking what they want;
shamefully neglecting the physical and emotional welfare of their families; engaging in 
an unending series of casual, impersonal, and trivial sexual relationships; and so forth.”);
id. at 174 (“[A]n individual with a mix of psychopathic personality traits who grows up
in a stable family and has access to positive social and educational resources might
become a con artist or a white-collar criminal, or perhaps a somewhat shady
entrepreneur, politician, or professional.  Another individual, with much the same
personality traits but from a deprived and disturbed background, might become a drifter,
mercenary, or violent criminal.”); Scott O. Lilienfeld & Hal Arkowitz, What 
‘Psychopath’ Means: It Is Not Quite What You May Think, SCI. AM. MIND (Nov. 28, 2007),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=what-psychopath-means (“[M]ost
psychopaths are not violent, and most violent people are not psychopaths.”); Hans Toch,
Psychopathy or Antisocial Personality in Forensic Settings, in  PSYCHOPATHY:
ANTISOCIAL, CRIMINAL, AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, supra note 7, at 144, 151 (“[T]he
typical psychopath, as I have seen him, usually does not commit murder or other 
offenses that promptly lead to major prison sentences.” (quoting HERVEY CLECKLEY, 
THE MASK OF SANITY 262 (5th ed. 1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Still, 
although most psychopaths are not violent, many of the violent crimes are committed by
psychopaths.  See HARE, supra note 5, at 87 (“Psychopaths are responsible for more than 
50 percent of the serious crimes committed.”); id. at 88 (“[Psychopaths] commit more 
than twice as many violent and aggressive acts, both in and out of prison, as do other
criminals.”); id. at 93 (“Perhaps half of the repeat or serial rapists are psychopaths.”). 
15. See HARE, supra note 5, at 175 (“[Nonpsychopaths] also learn violent 
behaviors . . . but because of their greater ability to empathize with others and to inhibit
impulses, they do not act out as readily as do psychopaths.”); Litton, supra note 6, at 374 
(“[I]t is not the case that psychopathic individuals . . . provide unpersuasive justifications 
for their wrongdoing, in the way that mafia or gang members or neo-Nazis might offer
reasons for their wrongful violence that reasonable people find unpersuasive.  A non-
psychopathic mob boss is not incapable of grasping and being guided by moral 
considerations in virtue of the fact that he rejects some fundamental aspects of common
morality.  He is capable of grasping moral principles, for he endorses those of his group 
and tries to live up to them. He can empathize, as he does with his fellow members.  [A 
psychopath], on the other hand, endorses no moral principles.”); Lykken, supra note 7, at 
126 (“[T]he people doing [drug] violence are people who have grown up to be
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wrongdoers arguably applies to the vast majority of human beings.
Although they are normally capable of love and concern for others, they
are also capable of deliberately hurting their fellow human beings if they
are put into situations that either elevate their power to a level that is
without ordinary moral constraints or cause them abnormally high stress,
pressure to conform or obey, fear, anger, or exhaustion.16  Still, despite 
the inhumanity that such people exhibit toward their victims, none of
them is necessarily psychopathic because, ex hypothesi, they still can feel
deep concern for other people—usually family and friends.17 
Third, the psychopath’s inability to care for others may be either
genotypical or caused by physical or sexual abuse.18  Regarding the
former, some children seem to be indifferent to others from birth, no 
matter how decent and normal their upbringing.  These are the “classic”
psychopaths.19  Regarding the latter, people who characteristically lack 
unsocialized, aggressive, feral, and violent.  A few of them are psychopaths, but most are 
phenocopies of psychopathy—sociopaths.”). 
16. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY passim (1st ed. 1974)
(using experimental data to show that a majority of ordinary people are easily
intimidated by authority figures into acting contrary to their moral values and society’s 
expectations); PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD
PEOPLE TURN EVIL, at vii (2007) (“[P]owerful situational forces . . . . that exist in many
common behavioral contexts are more likely to distort our usual good nature by pushing 
us toward engaging in deviant, destructive, or evil behavior when the settings are new 
and unfamiliar.  When embedded in them, our habitual ways of thinking, feeling, and
acting no longer function to sustain the moral compass that has guided us reliably in the 
past. . . .  [W]hile most people are good most of the time, they can be readily seduced 
into engaging in what would normally qualify as ego-alien deeds, as antisocial, as 
destructive of others.”); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A 
Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 7–8, 170–79 (2004)
(arguing that social psychology, or “situationism,” is generally more accurate and 
explanatorily powerful than personality psychology, or “dispositionism”). 
17. See supra note 15. 
18. See Harenski et al., supra note 5, at 142–47 (arguing that although “studies 
suggest a genetic contribution to psychopathy,” the “aetiological nature of neural deficits 
in psychopathy remains largely unknown”); Hart, supra note 3, at 162 (“The etiology of 
psychopathy is unknown.  Most theoretical models have focused on the potential causal 
influence of biological factors, as research has failed to identify any childrearing
experiences, familial dysfunctions, or other adverse life experiences that are found both 
frequently and specifically in people with psychopathy compared to people with other
mental disorders.”).
19. See HARE, supra note 5, at 6 (“It is true that the childhoods of some
psychopaths were characterized by material and emotional deprivation and physical 
abuse, but for every adult psychopath from a troubled background there is another whose
family life apparently was warm and nurturing . . . .  Furthermore, most people who had 
horrible childhoods do not become psychopaths or callous killers.”); id. at 84 (“Some
criminals can be understood as largely the products of what is known as ‘the cycle of 
 1309
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concern for others as a result of abuse are more correctly referred to as
“sociopaths” than “psychopaths.”20  For better or worse, however, the two
terms are often used interchangeably,21 if only because observers of
antisocial behavior generally do not know its ultimate cause.
B.  Psychological Community’s Definition 
Once again, according to the ordinary understanding, the essential 
attribute of psychopathy—what makes the psychopath a psychopath—is his
constitutive lack of concern for others.22  It is not clear, however, whether or 
not the psychological community agrees that this characteristic is essential.
In 1941, Hervey Cleckley published a book, The Mask of Sanity, in which 
he listed sixteen symptoms that he considered to be the defining 
characteristics of a psychopath.23  In the early 1990s, Robert D. Hare, Ph.D.,
violence.’  Evidence is emerging to show that victims of early sexual, physical, or 
emotional abuse frequently become perpetrators of the same as adults.”); id. at 170 (“On
balance . . . I can find no convincing evidence that psychopathy is the direct result of 
early social or environmental factors.”); id. at 172 (“While some assert that psychopathy
is the result of attachment difficulties in infancy, I turn the argument around: In some
children the very failure to bond is a symptom of psychopathy.  It is likely that these
children lack the capacity to bond readily, and that their lack of attachment is largely the
result, not the cause, of psychopathy.”); see also HARE, supra note 5, at 158–59, 165–66, 
170, 172–75, 177–78, 215.  Hare does suggest that the particular expression of
psychopathy—whether it is violent or nonviolent—does depend on the psychopath’s 
upbringing.  See HARE, supra note 5, at 165–66, 173–75, 178. 
20. See id. at 23–24 (“[S]ome clinicians and researchers—as well as most
sociologists and criminologists—who believe that the syndrome is forged entirely by
social forces and early experiences prefer the term sociopath, whereas those . . . who feel 
that psychological, biological, and genetic factors also contribute to development of the 
syndrome generally use the term psychopath.”); DAVID T. LYKKEN, THE ANTISOCIAL
PERSONALITIES, at viii (1995) (“[A]ny persistent offender is likely someone whose innate 
temperament made him or her unusually difficult to socialize.  These are the people I call 
psychopaths. . . .  The feral products of indifferent, incompetent or overburdened parents 
are the people I refer to as sociopaths.”); id. at 7 (“I use the term sociopath to refer to
persons whose unsocialized character is due primarily to parental failures rather than to
inherent peculiarities of temperament.  The psychopath and the sociopath can be 
regarded as opposite endpoints on a common dimension with difficult temperament 
maximized at the psychopathic end and inadequate parenting maximized at the
sociopathic end.”); Lykken, supra note 7, at 124–25 (describing psychopaths as
“individuals whose innate temperaments make them intractable to socialization” and 
sociopaths as “the larger fraction [of criminals] who have grown up unsocialized
primarily because of environmental rather than genetic reasons”).  An example of a
sociopath, a person whose psychopathic condition was likely caused by severe abuse, is 
Robert Alton Harris.  See Miles Corwin, Icy Killer’s Life Steeped in Violence, L.A.
TIMES, May 16, 1982, at 1.
21. See JON RONSON, THE PSYCHOPATH TEST: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE MADNESS
INDUSTRY 112–13 (2011) (“Psychologists and psychiatrists around the world tend to use 
the terms [psychopath and sociopath] interchangeably.”).
22. See supra note 12. 
 23. CLECKLEY, supra note 14, at 337–38. 
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revised the list and gave it the name “Psychopathy Checklist-Revised” or
“PCL-R.”24  The symptoms listed in the PCL-R include not only specific
kinds of antisocial behavior but also several other personality traits as well. 
Here is the complete list25:
• glib and superficial charm 
• grandiose self-worth 
• need for stimulation or proneness to boredom 
• pathological lying
• conning and manipulativeness 
• lack of remorse or guilt 
• shallow affect
• callousness and lack of empathy 
• parasitic lifestyle
• poor behavioral controls 
• promiscuous sexual behavior 
• early behavior problems 
• lack of realistic, long-term goals 
• impulsivity
• irresponsibility 
• failure to accept responsibility for own actions 
• many short-term marital relationships 
• juvenile delinquency 
• revocation of condition release 
• criminal versatility26 
24. See  HARE, supra note 5, at 32–70 (explaining how the PCL-R originated and
describing several of the more central items in the checklist).
25. See id. at 34–56; RONSON, supra note 21, at 97–98.  Hare also developed a list 
of symptoms for diagnosing twelve- to eighteen-year-old juveniles with psychopathy.
This list is called the PCL-YV, where YV stands for “Youth Version.”  The list is similar 
to the PCL-R except for some minor differences in labels and in method of scoring.  See
THE CAL. SCH. OF PROF’L PSYCHOLOGY, HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY
302 (Neil G. Ribner ed., 2002).  For an alternative, overlapping list of psychopathic 
traits, see Hart, supra note 3, at 160. 
26. Hare categorizes seven of these symptoms under the heading “Factor1: 
Personality ‘Aggressive narcissism’”: glibness and superficial charm, grandiose sense of 
self-worth, pathological lying, conning/manipulative, lack of remorse or guilt, shallow 
affect, callous/lack of empathy, and failure to accept personal responsibility.  Hare
categorizes nine of the symptoms under the heading “Factor2: Case history ‘Socially
deviant lifestyle’”: need for stimulation/proneness to boredom, parasitic lifestyle, poor 
behavioral control, lack of realistic long-term goals, impulsivity, irresponsibility, 
juvenile delinquency, early behavior problems, and revocation of conditional release. 
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This list raises at least two important questions.  First, what if a person
satisfies only some or most but not all of these criteria?  Is that 
person still considered a psychopath?  Second, what if a person satisfies 
some or all of these criteria to a small degree?  Again, is that person still
considered a psychopath?  Hare’s response to both questions is that
psychopathy is a continuum condition, a condition that admits of 
degrees.27 Instead of suggesting that certain people either are psychopaths
or are not psychopaths, Hare suggests that the extent to which different
psychopaths exhibit any of the twenty symptoms above will vary.  So, for
the purposes of diagnosis, psychiatrists using the PCL-R rate subjects on 
a scale of 0–2 within each category.  Zero represents no exhibition, 1
some exhibition, and 2 full exhibition of a given symptom.  Subjects 
who receive a score of 30 or above are classified as psychopathic; subjects
who receive a score of 29 or below are classified as nonpsychopathic.
Within the psychopathic class—within the 30- to 40-point range—the 
higher the score, the more psychopathic that subject is considered to be. 
So a subject who receives a 38 is considered to be more psychopathic 
than a subject who receives a 33.28 
Given this approach, however, it is not clear whether or not lack of 
concern for others—an absence that splits into two attributes above, lack
of remorse or guilt and callousness/lack of empathy—is essential to 
psychopathy.  A person might receive 0 in both of these categories and
still receive a total score of 30 or above simply by receiving enough 1s
and 2s in the eighteen other categories.  Yet it is difficult to see how 
such a person would qualify as a psychopath because, again, according 
to the ordinary understanding, what seems essential to psychopathy is an
inability to feel remorse and empathy.  If a person were to score 0 in the 
remorse and empathy categories but still highly enough in the other 
Finally, Hare suggests that three factors are not correlated with either Factor1 or Factor2:
promiscuous sexual behavior, many short-term marital relationships, and criminal 
versatility. See ROBERT D. HARE, THE HARE PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST-REVISED: PCL-R
(2d ed. 2003); see also Lee, supra note 3, at 127 (“[T]he [psychopathy] test is comprised
of two factors: ‘Factor 1 captures the affective/interpersonal dimension of psychopathy,
measuring things like “egocentricity, manipulativeness, callousness, and a lack of
remorse,” while Factor 2 captures an unstable or antisocial lifestyle component typified
by behavior like juvenile delinquency, a parasitic lifestyle, proneness to boredom, 
impulsivity, and irresponsibility.’  Simplified, the first factor measures narcissism and
egocentrism, while the second factor correlates with substance abuse and criminal 
behavior.” (footnote omitted)).
27. See also Ferzan, supra note 9, at 239 (referring to psychopathy as “an 
admittedly degreed category”); Harenski et al., supra note 5, at 145 (suggesting that 
psychopathy is a “dimensional” disorder rather than a “categorical” disorder).
28. The cutoff in Europe is 25 rather than 30.  See Malatesti & McMillan, supra
note 5, at 80 n.2. 
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categories to receive a 30 or above, the person would qualify only
technically, not intuitively or conventionally, as a psychopath.
Even the “father” of the PCL-R, Robert Hare, seems to have conflicting
commitments here.  On the one hand, as far as I am aware, Hare never
says that a person who receives a 0 in three categories—lack of remorse
or guilt, lack of empathy, and shallow affect—and still receives a total 
score of 30 or above on the PCL-R is not a psychopath.  On the other 
hand, Hare states repeatedly that a constitutive absence of conscience is
the essential attribute of a psychopath, a point that implies that receiving 
a 0 in the three categories just mentioned would automatically disqualify
a person from being a psychopath.29 
C.  Possible Problems with the PCL-R 
The PCL-R is generally considered to be a reliable tool for diagnosing
psychopaths.30  In recent years, however, some lawyers and scholars
29. See  HARE, supra note 5, at 1 (“[Psychopaths’] hallmark is a stunning lack of 
conscience . . . .”); id. at 40 (“Psychopaths show a stunning lack of concern for the 
devastating effects their actions have on others.”); id. at 44 (“[Psychopaths] seem unable 
to ‘get into the skin’ or to ‘walk in the shoes’ of others, except in a purely intellectual 
sense.  The feelings of other people are of no concern to psychopaths.”); id. at 89 
(“[Psychopaths’] violence is callous and instrumental . . . and the psychopath’s reactions 
to [another person’s suffering] are much more likely to be indifference, a sense of power, 
pleasure, or smug satisfaction than regret at the damage done.”).
30. See id. at 181 (“Not only does [the Psychopathy Checklist] provide clinicians 
and decision makers with a reliable and valid diagnostic procedure, it provides others—
including members of the criminal justice system—with a detailed description of 
precisely what goes into a diagnosis of psychopathy.”); id. at 183–84 (“Accurate 
diagnoses that also have predictive validity can be extremely useful to the criminal 
justice system. The success of the Psychopathy Checklist in predicting recidivism and 
violence attests to this. . . .  [A]ccurate assessments can be very useful in the 
classification of offenders . . . .  The review assists [prison] staff in the difficult and
nerve-racking task of trying to strike a reasonable balance between the need to reduce
violence and the needs and rights of each patient to receive appropriate treatment.”); id.
at 189–90 (“[T]here is ample evidence that a careful diagnosis of psychopathy . . . 
greatly reduces the risks associated with decisions in the criminal justice system.
Properly used, it can help to differentiate those offenders who pose little risk to society 
from those who are at high risk for recidivism or violence.”); Hart, supra note 3, at 171 
(“Psychological tests with established reliability and validity have been developed to 
provide a comprehensive assessment of psychopathic symptomatology.  The most
widely used tests for assessing psychopathy in the context of civil long-term 
commitment evaluations are the PCL-R and PCL:SV.”); Lee, supra note 3, at 135 
(“[S]cientific data indicates that public safety can be better protected by basing 
sentencing decisions ‘on more comprehensive information about offenders, including 
measures of psychopathy.’” (quoting Harris et al., supra note 6, at 238)); Litton, supra
note 6, at 371 (“[U]se of the PCL-R instrument produces strong inter-rater reliability.”).
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have criticized the checklist.  These critics have offered at least six 
different objections.31 
The first objection is that most diagnoses based on the PCL-R are
unreliable because they vary too much from one psychiatrist to another. 
Hare or a supporter of Hare’s approach to psychopathy might respond 
that even if there is variation in these cases, we can still rely on
psychopathy scores in all of the other situations, the situations in which 
one psychiatrist’s psychopathy score is independently confirmed by at 
least one other psychiatrist.32  But this point does not help us determine 
31. See generally David DeMatteo & John F. Edens, The Role and Relevance of 
the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised in Court: A Case Law Survey of U.S. Courts (1991–
2004), 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 214, 215, 219–21 (2006); John F. Edens, Melissa
S. Magyar & Jennifer M. Cox, Taking Psychopathy Measures “Out of the Lab” and into 
the Legal System: Some Practical Concerns, in HANDBOOK ON PSYCHOPATHY AND LAW
(Kent A. Kiehl & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong eds., forthcoming 2012); John F. Edens, 
Marcus T. Boccaccini & Darryl W. Johnson, Inter-Rater Reliability of the PCL-R Total 
and Factor Scores Among Psychopathic Sex Offenders: Are Personality Features More
Prone to Disagreement than Behavioral Features?, 28 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 106, 106–09, 
116–18 (2010); John F. Edens & Gina M. Vincent, Juvenile Psychopathy: A Clinical
Construct in Need of Restraint?, 8 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 186, 194 (2008); John F. 
Edens, David K. Marcus, Scott O. Lilienfeld, & Norman G. Poythress Jr., Psychopathic, 
Not Psychopath: Taxometric Evidence for the Dimensional Structure of Psychopathy, 
115 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 131, 131, 141 (2006); John F. Edens, Unresolved
Controversies Concerning Psychopathy: Implications for Clinical and Forensic Decision 
Making, 37 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 59, 60–63 (2006); Robert Prentky et al., 
Sexually Violent Predators in the Courtroom: Science on Trial, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 357, 360, 370–72 (2006).  But see Malatesti & McMillan, supra note 5, passim
(responding to various objections against the validity or usefulness of the PCL-R). 
32. In all fairness to Hare, he recognizes this problem.  See HARE, supra note 5, at 
189 (“Even under the most ideal conditions, with access to high-quality information and 
using strict diagnostic criteria, psychiatric diagnosis and predictability are not error-
free. . . .  We must also be aware of the fact that even if perfect diagnoses were possible 
(and they are not), their ability to accurately predict recidivism or violence is limited.”);
RONSON, supra note 21, at 214–15 (“‘I do worry about the PCL-R being misused,’ Bob
[Hare] said. . . .  ‘I tried to train some of the people who administer it.  They were sitting 
around, twiddling their thumbs, rolling their eyes, doodling, cutting their fingernails— 
these were people who were going to use it.’ . . .  In the executive bar, Bob Hare
continued.  He told me of an alarming world of globe-trotting experts, forensic 
psychologists, criminal profilers, traveling the planet armed with nothing much more
than a Certificate of Attendance, just like the one I had.  These people might have 
influence inside parole hearings, death penalty hearings, serial-killer incident rooms, and
on and on.  I think he saw his checklist as something pure . . . but the humans who
administered it as masses of weird prejudices and crazy dispositions.”); see also Lee,
supra note 3, at 131 (“While there is an increased use of the PCL-R in court, critics 
continue to take issue with the accuracy of the test and its occasional undue weight in
capital cases.  Specifically, critics warn that studies ‘provide little support for the ability
of the PCL-R to predict violent institutional behavior among capital murderers facing 
death sentences.’  As such, critics contend that there is ‘virtually no support for using the 
PCL-R to predict institutional violence in the high-stakes context of a capital case.’
Consequently, many scholars are seriously concerned about the potential misuses or 
questionable applications of instruments such as the PCL-R in legal contexts, contending
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what to do, how to label the individual, in situations where the variation 
among evaluators is too great.  Indeed, the fact that psychiatrists can
vary so much in some cases casts great doubt on their evaluations not 
only in those cases but also in all of the other cases as well, including the
cases where they happen to agree.  Their agreement in the latter
cases could just be a happy coincidence of similar error, not a genuine 
reflection of anything about the individual whom they are evaluating.
The second objection is that the PCL-R does not actually measure what 
it purports to measure—the mental disorder of psychopathy. Rather, it
measures nothing more than a tendency toward criminal behavior.33  It  
should be noted that Hare adamantly opposes this criticism and, at one 
point, demanded that Skeem and Cooke eliminate this point (among 
others) from a draft of their article before publishing it.  When Skeem 
and Cooke refused to comply with Hare’s demand, he threatened to sue 
them for defamation.  And this move itself spawned a flurry of literature 
over not only the merits of the PCL-R but also academic freedom more
generally.34 
The next few objections concern not the PCL-R per se but rather key 
assumptions that underlie the PCL-R.  The first of these objections—and 
the third objection overall—is that the term psychopathy does not “pick 
out” any real disorder in the real world.35  In other words, there is no 
that psychopathy may be afforded too much weight in determining sentencing.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
33. See generally Jennifer L. Skeem & David J. Cooke, Is Criminal Behavior a 
Central Component of Psychopathy? Conceptual Directions for Resolving the Debate, 
22 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 433 (2010). 
34. See generally David Baxter, Psychopath Guru Blocks Critical Article: Will
Case Affect Credibility of PCL-R Test in Court?, PSYCHOPATH RESEARCH (May 30, 
2010), http://www.psychopath-research.com/forum/ubbthreads.php/topics/10614/Psychopath
_Checklist_Debate; Karen Franklin, Psychopathy Brouhaha: It’s a Wrap (I Hope!), IN 
THE NEWS: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY CRIMINOLOGY & PSYCHOLOGY-LAW (June 17, 2010), 
http://forensicpsychologist.blogspot.com/2010/06/psychopathy-brouhaha-its-wrap 
-i-hope.html; Norman Poythress & John P. Petrila, PCL-R Psychopathy: Threats To Sue, 
Peer Review, and Potential Implications for Science and Law. A Commentary, 9 INT’L J.
FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 3 (2010); Charlie Smith, UBC Psychopathy Expert Robert 
Hare Responds to Academic Criticism over Lawsuit Threat, STRAIGHT (June 13, 2010), 
http://www.straight.com/article-328927/vancouver/ubc-psychopathy-expert-robert-
hare-responds-academic-criticism-over-lawsuit-threat; John Travis, Paper on Psychopaths,
Delayed by Legal Threat, Finally Published, SCIENCEINSIDER (June 10, 2010, 2:08 PM), 
http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2010/06/paper-on-psychopaths-delayed-by-.html. 
35. See Malatesti & McMillan, supra note 5, at 82 (“[S]ome have argued that 
PCL-R is not valid.  A notion of absolute validity requires that PCL-R cuts objective 
reality at ‘its joints.’  In other words, PCL-R should refer to some unitary and
 1315







     














    
  





     
 
distinct disorder corresponding to the word psychopathy in the same way 
that there is a distinct disorder corresponding to the words anorexia
nervosa.  Instead, what we call psychopathy “picks out” an arbitrary 
collection of attributes that do not constitute a disorder any more than 
having a cold, dark hair, and a bad temper at the same time constitutes a 
disorder.  Indeed, the twenty different attributes that are supposed
to constitute psychopathy no more naturally belong together as 
attributes of a real psychological entity than do happiness, curiosity, a 
tendency to oversleep, and an inclination toward romantic movies. We
could call the phenomenon of weighing over 100 pounds, wearing blue 
jeans, and carrying at least two books a disorder, but calling this random 
group of attributes a disorder would not make it so.  It would not make it 
a disorder not only because there is nothing wrong with this combination
but because this combination is arbitrary and therefore does not refer to a
distinct entity in the real world to which disorder or a more specific term
refers or should refer.36 
The fourth objection is that many psychiatrists are not at all
dispassionate or objective when they evaluate individuals for psychopathy.37 
On the contrary, they tend to diagnose individuals as psychopaths on 
either subjective grounds (usually fear or dislike38) or utilitarian grounds
independent reality. . . .  [I]t has been argued that specific different neural underpinnings 
might accompany the different dimensions of the construct of psychopathy, thereby
showing that PCL-R is a heterogeneous collection of disparate neurological bases that 
should be abandoned.” (citations omitted)).
36. Hare responds to this objection as follows: 
[F]ailing to recognize that a child has many or most of the personality traits 
that define psychopathy may doom the parents to unending consultations with
school principals, psychiatrists, psychologists, and counselors in a vain attempt 
to discover what is wrong with their child and with themselves.  It may also 
lead to a succession of inappropriate treatments and interventions—all at great
financial and emotional cost. 
If you are uncomfortable applying a formal diagnostic label to youngsters, 
then avoid doing so.  However, do not lose sight of the problem: a distinct 
syndrome of personality traits and behaviors that spells long-term trouble, no 
matter how one refers to it. 
HARE, supra note 5, at 161. 
37. See Toch, supra note 14, at 151–53 (providing evidence of biases and
subjectivity in clinicians’ diagnoses of inmates with ASPD). 
38. See id. at 152 (“[T]he experience ‘I sense an effort to manipulate me, and I 
resent it’ can translate into a patient’s adjudged trait of ‘manipulativeness,’ and ‘I feel
frustrated because you won’t confess your culpability when I cross-examine you’ can 
become ‘lack of remorse’; similarly, ‘I can’t get you to discuss your feelings with me
when I invade your privacy’ translates into ‘You can’t have any feelings since you won’t 
discuss them with me,’ ergo, ‘callousness.’  Other inferences can be drawn from 
personal reactions to the offense, or from perceptions of uncongeniality or
uncooperativeness with authorities.”).
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(for example, to prevent them from gaining admission to their facilities).39 
As a result, the label is too often misapplied and misused.  People who
are not really psychopathic are still labeled this way and then treated
accordingly.40 
The fifth objection is that, like the label witch in seventeenth-
century America, the label psychopath is dangerous.  It is supposed to be 
objective and scientific—indeed, a clinical diagnosis such as what a 
patient with a bad cough receives from a lung doctor—but is in fact 
thoroughly tinged with negative moral judgment and pessimism.41  For  
most people, including psychologists, the term psychopath signifies a
person who is both morally reprehensible—ranging from very bad to
evil—and untreatable.  These two inferences are dangerous for four
reasons.
The first reason: the label psychopath is dehumanizing and confining. 
Because it is generally interpreted to mean “a very dangerous guy who 
cannot be controlled,” it reduces psychopaths to the status of wild
animals.  Indeed, psychopaths are often compared, if not identified, with 
39. See id. (“Because psychopathy is generally equated with untreatability,
offenders that clinicians do not want to deal with can be turned away by adjudging them 
psychopathic, and hence unamenable to treatment.  In other words, psychopathy is 
featured in . . . the ‘diagnostic game’—the use of diagnoses to shuttle clients from one’s
own turf to other jurisdictions.  Psychopathy (or antisocial personality disorder)
unsurprisingly becomes a salient diagnosis in the discharge summaries of hospitals who
send patients back to prison after cursory review.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
40. See HARE, supra note 5, at 181 (“[I]mproper use of the label [psychopath] has 
powerful destructive potential for the misdiagnosed individual.”); id. at 191 (“Diagnoses 
yield sticky labels; faulty predictions based on inaccurate diagnoses can result in 
confusion and disaster.”); John Gunn, Psychopathy: An Elusive Concept with Moral 
Overtones, in  PSYCHOPATHY: ANTISOCIAL, CRIMINAL, AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, supra
note 7, at 32, 35 (“The term ‘psychopathic disorder’ . . . is a trigger for rejection. 
Patients labeled in this way are excluded from all sorts of arrangements and are often
dealt with via punitive rather than therapeutic responses.”). 
41. See Gunn, supra note 40, at 34 (“‘Psychopathic’ is almost synonymous with 
‘bad’—a powerful subjective concept that is unhelpful in medical science.  Patients may
be harder to treat if they are called ‘psychopaths’ or any other name that is synonymous 
with ‘badness’ and that invites rejection.  ‘Oh he’s just a psychopath!’ means ‘I don’t 
like him; I regard him as a bad guy.’ . . .  In medicine, the morality of a patient’s 
symptoms or behavior ought to be irrelevant.”); id. at 35 (“The term ‘psychopathic 
disorder’ [is] a largely moral term.”); id. at 36 (“From both the scientific and the 
therapeutic perspective . . . it would be more helpful if we could describe unpleasant 
patients in more neutral terms.  The value-laden language makes the treatment task even 
more difficult than it is to begin with.”).
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sharks, snakes, wolves, and other dangerous predators.42  And because 
the assumption of incurability is built into this label, the person so 
labeled cannot escape this cavalierly designated subhuman status.  The
label psychopath dooms that person to be perceived—and therefore treated 
indefinitely—as a frightening creature who needs to be caged and isolated 
from society rather than a human being in need of psychological 
assistance.43 
The second reason: jurors will be overly prejudiced by this term.
Once they learn that a psychologist has diagnosed a given defendant to 
be a psychopath, they will infer that the defendant is evil and will be that 
much more likely to find him guilty.44 This result seems unfair; jurors
should judge a defendant solely on the basis of the evidence
regarding the alleged crime, not on the basis of any prejudicial labels 
that designated experts attach to the defendant.  Notice, this unfairness is
42. See Ferzan, supra note 9, at 239–40 (“At a recent conference I attended . . . 
one theorist [compared] the psychopath to a tiger and argu[ed] that we should treat the 
psychopath just as we would treat a tiger—we should put him in a cage.  I demur.  Does 
anyone doubt that we would unapologetically shoot an animal that was as dangerous as
some psychopaths?”); Lee, supra note 3, at 126 (“[Psychopaths] have even been
characterized as ‘cold-blooded “intraspecies predators” that are hardwired to violate 
others, even those to whom they are closest, without guilt or conscience.’” (quoting Lisa 
Ells, Note, Juvenile Psychopathy: The Hollow Promise of Prediction, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 158, 158 (2005))). 
43. See Toch, supra note 14, at 151 (“Psychopathy is a wildly pejorative 
designation because individuals described with this designation are presumptively
sleazy, unsavory, repugnant, and dangerous.”).  Hare responds to this criticism by
defending his use of the term psychopath: 
 [The label psychopath] is a convenience . . . .  If we talk of someone with 
high blood pressure we talk of them as hypertensives.  It’s a term. . . .  Saying 
‘psychopathic’ is like saying ‘hypertensive.’ I could say, ‘Someone who
scores at or above a certain point on the PCL-R Checklist.’  That’s tiresome. 
So I refer to them as psychopaths.  And this is what I mean by psychopathy:
I mean a score in the upper range of the PCL-R. . . . 
 . . . .
. . . [T]he people who [claim that psychopath is a problematic label] . . . are
very left-wing, left-leaning academics.  Who don’t like labels.  Who don’t like
talking about differences between people.  People say I define psychopathy in
pejorative terms.  How else can I do it?  Talk about the good things?  I could 
say he’s a good talker.  He’s a good kisser.  He dances very well. He has good
table manners.  But at the same time, he screws around and kills people.  So
what am I going to emphasize? 
RONSON, supra note 21, at 268–69. 
44. See HARE, supra note 5, at 186–88 (giving an example of the “destructive 
potential of diagnostic labels in court”); Lee, supra note 3, at 132 (“[T]he APA 
[American Psychiatric Association] asserts that ‘mental health expert testimony on the
issue of future dangerousness impermissibly distorts the fact-finding process and causes 
serious prejudice to the defendant, as the “expert” testimony is likely to receive undue 
weight.’” (quoting Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of Dangerousness in
Capital Sentencing: Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious Decision-
Making, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 83 (2005))). 
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only compounded if a psychologist’s diagnosis is incorrect.  In these 
situations, jurors may be assuming that the defendant is a psychopath 
and judging him that much more harshly when this assumption is simply
incorrect. 
The third reason: the fact of the matter is that different kinds of
psychopaths may just be treatable—by medication, different forms of 
therapy, or both.45  So to assume that they are categorically untreatable is
to give up on them unnecessarily early.  It is to deprive them, and ourselves, 
of what is likely a more humane and productive policy approach.46 
The fourth reason: the label psychopath might be particularly pernicious 
because it may turn people who are not otherwise psychopathic into 
psychopaths.  That is, the label may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.47 
45. See  HARE, supra note 5, at 202–05 (describing broad outlines of a potentially
successful treatment program for psychopaths); STANTON E. SAMENOW, INSIDE THE
CRIMINAL MIND 208–42 (Crown Publishers rev. ed. 2004) (1984) (arguing that even the
most hardened criminals can be converted into law-abiding citizens if they are taught 
how to take responsibility for their behavior); J. REID MELOY, THE PSYCHOPATHIC MIND:
ORIGINS, DYNAMICS, AND TREATMENT 309–40 (1988) (delineating several different 
categories of psychopaths and arguing that most of these categories can be helped to one 
extent or another by appropriate psychotherapeutic techniques); Gunn, supra note 40, at
38 (“The treatment of patients with antisocial problems can be a very rewarding activity. 
The patients are fascinating, vary enormously, and respond to a wide variety of treatment 
strategies.  They have very little in common with one another, other than the negative 
feelings they engender in other people.  If such patients are to be helped, they require an 
individual functional analysis based on an understanding of their pathology, as well as an
individualized treatment program.”); Lee, supra note 3, at 130 (“[M]ost remain hopeful 
for prevention in that ‘research may eventually allow for effective, early legal and
psychological intervention with youth who might otherwise proceed inexorably to adult 
psychopathy.’” (citation omitted)); Lilienfeld & Arkowitz, supra note 14 (“Although
psychopaths are often unmotivated to seek treatment, research by psychologist Jennifer
Skeem of the University of California, Irvine, and her colleagues suggests that 
psychopaths may benefit as much as nonpsychopaths from psychological treatment. 
Even if the core personality traits of psychopaths are exceedingly difficult to change, 
their criminal behaviors may prove more amenable to treatment.”); Ogloff & Wood,
supra note 6, at 178 (“Perhaps the question of whether psychopathy can be treated ought 
to be reformulated as whether we can manage psychopaths and their behavior. . . .  More 
success has been realized in trying to reduce their problematic behaviours—including
offending.”). 
46. See Gunn, supra note 40, at 37 (“A negative halo leads directly to a global 
label, which in turn leads to negative ideas about treatment and often to frank rejection.
Once the pejorative label is dropped, once the term ‘psychopathic’ is out of the way, the 
notion of ‘untreatability’ can also be tempered or dropped.”). 
47. See HARE, supra note 5, at 161 (“[I]t is no light matter to apply psychological 
labels to children—or to adults.  Perhaps the issue with the most pressing consequences 
for children is the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy,’ whereby a child who has been labeled a 
troublemaker may indeed grow to fit the mold, while others—teacher, parents, friends— 
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People who are not psychopathic but who have been erroneously 
“slapped” with this label by an authority may actually become entirely
indifferent toward others because the label forces them along this path. 
Initially, after the label has been attached, they may try to prove that the 
label is inapplicable.  But after several failed attempts, attempts that fail
precisely because they are wrongly interpreted through the lens of this 
label, they may give up or actually come to believe that the label is 
indeed correct after all.  At that point, their self-conception and resulting 
behavior actually follow the label rather than deviate from it.
The sixth objection is that labeling certain individuals as psychopaths 
is misleading because it denies individual variation among psychopaths.48 
It falsely implies that all of the individuals to whom this label is attached
exhibit the same symptoms and that these symptoms are caused by the 
same kind of neurological disorder.  This implication is false because the 
PCL-R contains twenty different attributes, each of which can range
from 0–2.  So there is an extraordinarily large number of different 
combinations of attributes and degrees that can result in a score of 30 or 
higher, which means that any two people who have been diagnosed as 
psychopaths might have very different personalities and exhibit very
different behavior. Yet by labeling them both as psychopaths, we render
these differences invisible. 
These differences should not be overlooked for two reasons.  First,
they may be morally relevant.  One psychopath’s behavior might be less 
morally reprehensible than another psychopath’s.  Second, they may be
relevant to treatment.  Different treatments are appropriate for different 
symptoms.
As an analogy, consider the label sick.  This label equally applies to 
the person suffering from a bad cold and the person suffering from
malaria, but its equal application to both would do a great disservice to
both, especially to the latter.  By obscuring the very real differences
between them—the differences in the symptoms, the gravity of these 
symptoms, and the causes of these symptoms—it misleadingly implies
that people in this general category should be regarded, and treated, as 
the same.  If, then, doctors were to act on this label alone, many people
reinforce the process by subtly conveying their negative expectations.”); Christopher 
Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 30 (“[W]hen the 
government chooses to label a miscreant a ‘predator’ or ‘dangerous person’ in lieu of 
punishing him as a ‘criminal offender,’ as sexual predator statutes do, it very powerfully
announces that the individual either cannot or will not control his behavior.  Research on 
motivation suggests that this type of labeling might become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The individual shunted into the ‘predator’ system will come to believe that, unlike those 
who are punished as volitional actors, he is incapable of acting differently.  That belief in
turn could well make him more dangerous.”). 
48. See Litton, supra note 6, at 367–68 (making a similar point about ASPD). 
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suffering from malaria would be both mistreated and undertreated and
many people suffering from a bad cold would be both mistreated and 
overtreated.  The same, then, applies to the diagnosis of psychopathy. By
obliterating the very real differences between different people in this
category, it tends to lead psychologists and the criminal justice system to
treat them all the same when, in fact, these differences call for different 
attitudes and responses.
D.  Differences Between Psychopathy and Antisocial
Personality Disorder 
Historically, psychopathy and ASPD were not distinguished.49  And to
this day, people often use the terms interchangeably.50 Indeed, passages
from the “diagnostic bible”51 of psychological disorders, the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders  (DSM-IV-TR), make it seem as 
though ASPD and psychopathy are identical52: 
 Individuals with Antisocial Personality Disorder also tend to be consistently
and extremely irresponsible . . . . Irresponsible work behavior may be indicated
by significant periods of unemployment despite available job opportunities, or
by abandonment of several jobs without a realistic plan for getting another job. 
There may also be a pattern of repeated absences from work that are not
explained by illness either in themselves or in their family.  Financial 
irresponsibility is indicated by acts such as defaulting on debts, failing to
provide child support, or failing to support other dependents on a regular basis.
Individuals with Antisocial Personality Disorder show little remorse for the
consequences of their acts . . . . They may be indifferent to, or provide a 
superficial rationalization for, having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from someone 
(e.g., “life’s unfair,” “losers deserve to lose,” or “he had it coming anyway”). 
These individuals may blame the victims for being foolish, helpless, or
deserving their fate; they may minimize the harmful consequences of their
 49. HARE, supra note 5, at 24 (“A term that was supposed to have much the same 
meaning as ‘psychopath’ or ‘sociopath’ is antisocial personality disorder . . . .”); id. at 
25 (“[There] has been confusion during the past decade, with many clinicians mistakenly
assuming that antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy are synonymous terms.”). 
50. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 3, at 159 (“Psychopathy or psychopathic personality
disorder is referred to as antisocial personality disorder in the fourth edition of the DSM-
IV . . . .” (citations omitted)).  But see  HARE, supra note 5, at 159 (comparing 
psychopathy with Disruptive Behavior Disorder rather than with ASPD).
51. This is Hare’s term.  See HARE, supra note 5, at 24.
 52. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS-TEXT REVISION 701–02 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].  The DSM-
IV-TR authors recognize as much when they state that ASPD “has also been referred to 
as psychopathy, sociopathy, or dyssocial personality disorder. . . .  [D]eceit and 
manipulation are central features of Antisocial Personality Disorder.” Id. at 702. 
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actions; or they may simply indicate complete indifference. They generally fail
to compensate or make amends for their behavior.  They may believe that 
everyone is out to “help number one” and that one should stop at nothing to
avoid being pushed around. 
 . . . .
 Individuals with Antisocial Personality Disorder frequently lack empathy and
tend to be callous, cynical, and contemptuous of the feelings, rights, and 
sufferings of others.  They may have an inflated and arrogant self-appraisal 
(e.g., feel that ordinary work is beneath them or lack a realistic concern about
their current problems or their future) and may be excessively opinionated, self-
assured, or cocky.  They may display a glib, superficial charm and can be quite 
voluble and verbally facile (e.g., using technical terms or jargon that might 
impress someone who is unfamiliar with the topic).  Lack of empathy, inflated
self-appraisal, and superficial charm are features that have been commonly 
included in traditional conceptions of psychopathy that may be particularly
distinguishing of the disorder and more predictive of recidivism in prison or
forensic settings where criminal, delinquent, or aggressive acts are likely to be 
nonspecific.  These individuals may also be irresponsible and exploitative in
their sexual relationships.  They may have a history of many sexual partners and 
may never have sustained a monogamous relationship.  They may be
irresponsible as parents, as evidenced by malnutrition of a child, an illness in the 
child resulting from a lack of minimal hygiene, a child’s dependence on
neighbors or nonresident relatives for food or shelter, a failure to arrange for a 
caretaker for a young child when the individual is away from home, or repeated
squandering of money required for household necessities.  These individuals
may receive dishonorable discharges from the armed services, may fail to be 
self-supporting, may become impoverished or even homeless, or may spend
many years in penal institutions.  Individuals with Antisocial Personality
Disorder are more likely than people in the general population to die prematurely by
violent means (e.g., suicide, accidents, and homicides).53 
Still, ASPD and psychopathy are thought to be different in at least two 
respects.  First, lack of empathy is not essential to ASPD.54  Second, 
more generally, although the diagnostic criteria of ASPD are primarily
behavioral, the diagnostic criteria of psychopathy are both behavioral 
and psychological (or “internal” or “affective”).55  As the  DSM-IV-
TR indicates, ASPD is an antisocial pattern of behavior: 
53. Id. at 702–03. 
54. See Morse, supra note 6, at 41 (“All but one of the criteria for ASPD are 
repetitive antisocial behaviours, and the one psychological criterion, lack of remorse, is 
not necessary to make the diagnosis.”); Morse, supra note 10, at 1072 (“Th[e] lack of 
capacity [for empathy, guilt, and remorse] is a necessary feature of psychopathy but not 
of A[S]PD.”). 
55. See  HARE, supra note 5, at 25 (“‘Psychopathy’ . . . is defined by a cluster of
both personality traits and socially deviant behaviors.”); Malatesti & McMillan, supra
note 5, at 80–81 (noting that the DSM’s emphasis of behavior over internal causes results 
from its requirement “that psychiatric disorders [be] classified without any emphasis on
underlying traits or aetiological hypotheses.”); Morse, supra note 6, at 50–51
(“According to the strict language of [MPC § 4.01(2)] . . . psychopaths . . . are [not]
excluded [from the insanity defense] because [psychopathy] is [not] manifested only by
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.  Psychopathy, as clinically described
and as measured by the [PCL-R], includes many psychological criteria and is not
1322
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 The essential feature of Antisocial Personality Disorder is a pervasive pattern
of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or
early adolescence and continues into adulthood. 
 . . . .
For this diagnosis to be given, the individual must be at least age 18 years . . . 
and must have had a history of some symptoms of Conduct Disorder before age
15 years . . . . Conduct Disorder involves a repetitive and persistent pattern of
behavior in which the basic rights of others or major age-appropriate societal
norms or rules are violated. The specific behaviors characteristic of Conduct
Disorder fall into one of four categories: aggression to people and animals,
destruction of property, deceitfulness or theft, or serious violation of rules. . . . 
The pattern of antisocial behavior continues into adulthood. Individuals with
Antisocial Personality Disorder fail to conform to social norms with respect to
lawful behavior . . . .  They may repeatedly perform acts that are grounds for 
arrest (whether they are arrested or not), such as destroying property, harassing
others, stealing, or pursuing illegal occupations.  Persons with this disorder
disregard the wishes, rights, or feelings of others.  They are frequently deceitful 
and manipulative in order to gain personal profit or pleasure (e.g., to obtain
money, sex, or power) . . . .  They may repeatedly lie, use an alias, con others, or 
malinger.  A pattern of impulsivity may be manifested by a failure to plan
ahead . . . .  Decisions are made on the spur of the moment, without forethought, 
and without consideration for the consequences to self or others; this may lead
to sudden changes of jobs, residences, or relationships.  Individuals with
Antisocial Personality Disorder tend to be irritable and aggressive and may
repeatedly get into physical fights or commit acts of physical assault (including
spouse beating or child beating) . . . .  Aggressive acts that are required to
defend oneself or someone else are not considered to be evidence for this item.
These individuals also display a reckless disregard for the safety of themselves
or others . . . . This may be evidenced in their driving behavior (recurrent
speeding, driving while intoxicated, multiple accidents).  They may engage in
sexual behavior or substance use that has a high risk for harmful consequences. 
They may neglect or fail to care for a child in a way that puts the child in 
danger.56 
Contrast this behavioral focus with several criteria from the PCL-R:
• grandiose self-worth 
• need for stimulation or proneness to boredom 
manifested solely by repetitive criminal or antisocial behaviour.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Ogloff & Wood, supra note 6, at 172 (“While the DSM-IV-TR indicates that [ASPD] is
also known as Psychopathy or Dissocial Personality Disorder, the fact is that the criteria 
for each of these disorders are sufficiently different such that they are all quite distinct 
constructs.  With respect to ASPD in particular, it is largely a disorder characterized by
antisocial behaviour and criminality rather than fundamental personality deficits. . . .  In
point of fact, the prevalence of ASPD is much higher in the population than the
prevalence of psychopathy.” (citation omitted)); see also RONSON, supra note 21, at 239– 
40 (offering a brief account of Hare’s failed attempt to persuade the authors of the DSM
to include psychopathy). 
 56. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 52, at 701–02. 
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• lack of remorse or guilt 
• shallow affect
• callousness and lack of empathy 
• lack of realistic, long-term goals 
• impulsivity
• irresponsibility 
• failure to accept responsibility for own actions57 
In this way, ASPD might be regarded as “psychopathy light”—psychopathic 
behavior without necessarily a psychopathic personality behind it. 
The difference between ASPD and psychopathy is not merely theoretical.
Many people who suffer from ASPD are not psychopaths.  Indeed, although 
up to 90% of the current prison population have ASPD,58 only up to 25%
of this same population are psychopathic.59  What this means is that 
although up to 90% of prisoners repeatedly engage in antisocial behavior,
up to 75% of them do not exhibit the list of psychological problems 
above to a significant enough degree.60  The causes of their antisocial 
behavior, then, are not psychopathy but other psychological factors such as 
peer pressure, temptation, greed, or poor anger management; situational 
factors such as “hanging with the wrong crowd”; and poverty in
conjunction with the opportunity for a “quick buck.”  Still, for the
approximately 20% of prisoners who suffer from both conditions, their
psychopathic nature is most likely what causes or motivates their ASPD.
III. THREE CONSEQUENTIALIST REASONS FOR CRIMINALLY
PUNISHING PSYCHOPATHS
Suppose that a person has committed a violent crime and has been
diagnosed by independent psychiatrists as psychopathic.  Should that 
person be criminally punished?  At first, it seems that the answer is
57. See HARE, supra note 5, at 34; see also supra notes 24–26 and accompanying 
text.
 58. See Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Psychopathy, Treatment Involvement, and 
Subsequent Violence Among Civil Psychiatric Patients, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 577, 
578 (2002).  For other estimates of the rate of ASPD among prison inmates, see Ells, 
supra note 42, at 182 n.154 (75%–90%); Grant T. Harris et al., supra note 6, at 218 
(50%–75%); Litton, supra note 6, at 390 (50%–80%); Morse, supra note 6, at 41 (40%– 
60%); Ralph C. Serin, The Clinical Application of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised
(PCL-R) in a Prison Population, 48 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 637, 637 (1992) (50%–80%). 
59. See HARE, supra note 5, at 87.  For different estimates, see RONSON, supra note 
21, at 60 (citing Essi Viding’s estimate that 25% of inmates are psychopathic); Harenski 
et al., supra note 5, at 145 (15%–25%); Lee, supra note 3, at 127 (15%–25%); Morse,
supra note 6, at 41 (25%). 
60. See HARE, supra note 5, at 83–85 (listing some causes other than psychopathy
for criminal activity).
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obviously yes.  There are three reasons—all consequentialist—that make
this conclusion seem obvious. 
The first consequentialist reason for finding psychopaths criminally
responsible for their behavior is that it will help to gratify victims’ and 
society’s vengeful impulses.  The fact that a diagnosed psychopath has 
inflicted serious harm on the victim and is indifferent to the victim’s
suffering will lead the victim, his family, and most others who hear 
about the incident to become angry and vengeful toward the perpetrator. If,
then, a court were to rule that the perpetrator was psychopathic and
therefore not guilty (by reason of insanity), this decision would meet with
great resistance.  The court’s refusal to quench society’s thirst for righteous
vengeance would provoke mass outrage.  Society would insist that the
defendant knew what he was doing, that he was either amused by or
indifferent to the victim’s suffering, and therefore that the defendant 
should have been (severely) punished.61 
The second consequentialist reason for finding psychopaths criminally 
responsible for their behavior is that it will help to promote at least
general deterrence and possibly specific deterrence.  By convicting
psychopaths along with nonpsychopaths, the courts will be sending the 
message that psychopathy is not an excuse; that even if you are, or 
consider yourself, psychopathic, you will still be convicted and punished
if you commit this kind of crime and get caught.  This message will 
likely discourage many people, whether or not psychopathic, from
committing this kind of crime in the first place.  It might also help to 
deter people who have committed this kind of crime and been punished 
for it from committing the same kind of crime again. 
The third consequentialist reason for finding psychopaths criminally 
responsible for their behavior is that it will tend to make society feel 
more secure.  If psychopaths are deemed criminally responsible, then they
will be convicted rather than acquitted.  Conviction, at least for violent
crimes and serious white collar crimes, is usually followed by incarceration.
61. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(“The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in
the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the 
stability of a society governed by law.  When people begin to believe that organized
society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they
‘deserve,’ then there are sown the seeds of anarchy—of self-help, vigilante justice, and 
lynch law.”); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 98–99 (1997) (suggesting that our outrage at stories about clear underpunishment is 
“intuitive” and “what we believe on instinct”).
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And one of the central purposes of incarceration is to protect society 
from convicted criminals, from people who have been proved to be
dangerous to one degree or another. Naturally, the longer their prison 
sentence, the longer society will be protected from them. 
Now, one might very well argue that society is also—equally— 
protected from defendants who are found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Rather than being locked up in prisons, they are instead locked up in 
psychiatric hospitals.  So the third consequentialist reason does not
necessarily support finding psychopaths to be criminally responsible for
their behavior.  Instead, it is equally consistent with finding psychopaths 
to be nonresponsible and then civilly committing them. Indeed, 
defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity often end up being 
committed for a longer time in psychiatric hospitals than they would 
have been incarcerated had they been found criminally responsible.62 
Still, the general public, rightly or wrongly, worries that civil commitment
suffers from the following flaws in comparison with incarceration: it is 
easier for patients to escape from psychiatric hospitals than it is for
inmates to escape from prisons; many patients in psychiatric hospitals will
be released back into society earlier than they would have been had they
been incarcerated; patients will fool the hospital officials into thinking that
they are no longer dangerous when they really are; and patients will
actually be less dangerous upon release but sooner or later resume their old,
antisocial ways.63 I will return to the issue of civil commitment in Part X. 
IV. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE EXAMPLE OF
JOHN WAYNE GACY
The three consequentialist considerations just provided for criminally 
punishing psychopaths who break the law may be very strong, but they
62. See John Matthew Fabian, Rethinking “Rational” in the Dusky Standard: 
Assessing a High-Profile Delusional Killer’s Functional Abilities in the Courtroom and 
in the Context of a Capital Murder Trial, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 363, 367 (2006)
(“While there may be a substantial number of incompetent defendants charged with
serious violent offenses, there is empirical support indicating that such incompetent 
defendants will spend longer periods of time in the psychiatric hospital for competency
restoration than their competent counterparts.”); Litton, supra note 6, at 391 
(“[I]ndividuals with psychopathy, themselves, may not, from their own perspective, have 
good reason to object to being treated as criminally responsible. . . .  [B]eing excused 
would not mean going free; it could mean indefinite civil confinement, possibly worse
than being sent to prison for a defined period.”).
63. According to one study, although 70% of patients diagnosed with schizophrenia 
and 70% to 80% diagnosed with mood disorders improve with the use of medication, 
only 36% of inmates continue taking medication after release.  See Jennifer L. Morris,
Comment, Criminal Defendants Deemed Incapable To Proceed to Trial: An Evaluation
of North Carolina’s Statutory Scheme, 26 CAMPBELL L. REV. 41, 49–50 (2004). 
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are not necessarily dispositive.  Indeed, there are some cogent 
consequentialist reasons for punishing the insane, children, and even 
innocent people.  But these reasons are generally thought to be 
outweighed by moral considerations.  Perhaps the most significant of 
these moral considerations is injustice.  It is a foundational axiom of 
criminal law that the state should not prosecute and punish people 
whom it knows to be innocent.  To knowingly punish an innocent 
person is the very definition of injustice.  Innocent people, by definition, 
did not commit a crime and therefore do not deserve criminal punishment.
A similar, but not identical, argument may be made against punishing 
children or the insane.  Even if they have caused serious harm, most
believe that they should still not be criminally punished. Again, the
reason is that (1) they are not considered morally responsible for their 
behavior and (2) criminal punishment requires moral responsibility. 
Consequentialist considerations aside, should psychopaths be held
responsible and therefore criminally punishable for their criminal
wrongdoing?  Do they deserve this treatment?  Consider, for example, 
John Wayne Gacy, who tortured and killed thirty-three teenage boys and
young men and never felt or expressed any remorse for these horrific 
acts.64  Clearly, once society learned of Gacy’s brutal murders, it needed 
to take immediate steps to protect itself from further harm by locking 
him up somewhere—either in a prison or a psychiatric hospital.  But this
need to remove Gacy from society does not answer the question whether
or not Gacy deserved to be criminally punished for his brutal murders. 
At first, the answer seems to be an obvious yes.  He tortured and killed
all of these boys for his own pleasure.  Still, the question remains: was 
he morally responsible for these acts?  If not, it is generally thought that 
he was an eligible candidate not for criminal punishment but only for 
involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital.65 
Our answer to this question depends on two things: (1) what we mean
by morally responsible and (2) whether or not criminal responsibility
requires moral responsibility.  Regarding (2), the distinction between
criminal responsibility and moral responsibility is rarely recognized. 
Most assume that either (1) moral responsibility is necessary for criminal
punishment without ever considering the notion of criminal responsibility or
64. See generally CLIFFORD L. LINEDECKER, THE MAN WHO KILLED BOYS (1980); 
MOSS, supra note 12. 
65. See Lippke, supra note 6, at 391 n.16 (“I take it to be fairly well established
that psychopaths are not appropriate subjects of retributive legal punishment.”).
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(2) moral responsibility and criminal responsibility are one and the same 
thing.  I will argue in Part IX, however, that neither is the case; that there
is an important distinction between moral responsibility and criminal 
responsibility; and that, as it turns out, criminal responsibility—and
therefore criminal punishment—does not require moral responsibility.  If 
this (radical!) position is correct, then it is possible to hold both that
Gacy was not morally responsible for his criminal acts and that he was 
still criminally responsible, and therefore criminally punishable, for them.
Regarding (1), what is this moral responsibility that most adults at
most times are presumed to have?66  And why might one think that Gacy 
lacked this attribute?67  Perhaps the least controversial way to characterize
moral responsibility is this: the set of conditions an agent bears that 
make it genuinely fair to blame or praise and possibly punish or reward
that agent for a given act.  If an act has no moral implications—brushing
one’s teeth or reading one’s mail—then it is not quite right to say that
one is morally responsible for these acts.  This elocution would be 
correct only if these acts could be construed as injuring or supporting 
another person’s rights or interests. 
Because I am not concerned in this Article with praiseworthy acts,
only (ultimately) with psychopathy and its implications for the insanity 
defense, I will consider only the conditions necessary and sufficient for 
judging a given act—call it A—to be blameworthy.68  There are four of 
them: 
66. Some theories of moral responsibility suggest that moral responsibility is
simply impossible and therefore that not only Gacy but all of us are not morally
responsible for any of our behavior.  According to one—perhaps the most popular—such
skeptical theory, moral responsibility is metaphysically impossible because there are 
only two logically possible alternatives, determinism and indeterminism; and both 
alternatives are equally incompatible with what is required for moral responsibility: 
ultimate self-determinism. See generally RICHARD DOUBLE, THE NON-REALITY OF FREE 
WILL (1991); DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL (2001) (arguing for hard 
incompatibilism); BRUCE N. WALLER, FREEDOM WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1990); Galen 
Strawson, The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility, 75 PHIL. STUD. 5 (1994).  Whatever 
one concludes about this skeptical argument, it cannot decide whether or not we should
find Gacy morally responsible because we are asking this question against the
background of a semipragmatic, semimetaphysical assumption that most adults are 
morally responsible for most of their behavior, an assumption that itself rests on a second 
deeper assumption: that moral responsibility is indeed metaphysically possible. 
67. See McMillan & Malatesti, supra note 11, at 190 (“[E]ven if it is the case that
[skeptics about the metaphysical possibility of moral responsibility] are right, there still
remains an interesting question about whether the control that psychopaths have over
their actions is different from the rest of us.  Even if none of us is morally responsible we 
should still be interested in that question.”). 
 68. Notice, A need not be a positive action; it can also be an omission.  As I have 
argued in a previous article, the distinction between a positive action and an omission is 
this:
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MR1: knowledge, or a threshold capacity to know, that A is 
morally wrong;69 
MR2: a threshold capacity to refrain from A-ing; 
MR3: control over A-ing;70 and 
MR4: an absence of circumstances that excuse this performance.
It is a person’s satisfaction of these four conditions that makes that
person blameworthy and, if the wrongfulness or harm caused by the
act is serious enough, punishable.71 
Regarding the first condition (MR1), the threshold capacity to know 
the moral status of A naturally requires the capacity to know (1) that one 
is A-ing, (2) A’s “nature,” (3) the difference between right and wrong, 
and (4) that A falls on the “wrong” side of this divide.  For this reason, a 
person who is delusional because of a mental disorder and consequently
has false beliefs about his action (either that it has a different nature or 
that it is morally right when it is, in fact, criminal) does not satisfy MR1 
and is therefore not blameworthy for his otherwise wrongful action.72 
The second condition (MR2) amounts to “reasons-sensitivity,” which 
itself contains three subconditions: (1) a threshold capacity to entertain 
reasons against performing A, (2) a capacity to then act on these reasons,
An omission is either (a) a deliberate failure to perform a certain positive
action or (b) a failure, whether deliberate or not, to fulfill a moral or legal duty 
or reasonable expectation. . . .
. . . A positive action is any agent-caused event that does not essentially
involve a failure or not-doing in its description. 
Ken Levy, Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism, 44 
GA. L. REV. 607, 632–33 (2010) (footnotes omitted). 
69. See Antony Duff, Psychopathy and Answerability, in  RESPONSIBILITY AND 
PSYCHOPATHY: INTERFACING LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 5, at 199, 
201–08 (arguing that responsibility requires the ability to grasp and be guided by
reason—that is, by reasons that are minimally coherent and connected with reality); 
Litton, supra note 6, at 354–55, 359–60 (arguing that moral responsibility requires a 
capacity to grasp and be guided by moral reasons qua moral); McMillan & Malatesti,
supra note 11, at 188 (calling MR1 the “epistemic precondition” of moral responsibility). 
70. See McMillan & Malatesti, supra note 11, at 188 (calling MR3 the “‘control’
precondition” of moral responsibility). 
 71. Cf. Duff, supra note 69, at 199–200 (“[A] responsible agent is one who can be 
called to answer for her actions; to say that A is responsible for an action or an outcome 
is to say that A can properly be called to answer . . . for that action or outcome.”
(footnote omitted)).
72. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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and (3) an opportunity to act on these reasons.73  To have this opportunity
itself requires that there be no internal or external force or compulsion, 
nothing independent of the agent’s own reasons making or necessitating 
that the agent A instead of refrain from A-ing.
The third condition (MR3) will be discussed in greater detail in Parts 
V.C–D and IX.B.  But, for starters, control is agency or self-determination.
I have control over a given state of affairs S when I determine whether or
not S is the case.  So I have control over my arm when I determine
whether or not (and how) it moves.  Likewise, I have self-control when I
control myself, when I determine whether or not (and how) I act.
Conversely, I do not have control over the flowers across the room
because my attempts to make them move to the right or to the left simply
do not work.  Likewise, I do not have control over a twitch or spasm
because, although it is my body moving, this movement does not 
originate with me, with my agency, but rather with some physical cause
within my body.74  An intermediate case might be my control over the
trajectory of a rock that I drop off the side of a cliff.  I certainly control
whether or not it falls and approximately where given the motion with
which I release it, my knowledge of the surrounding conditions, and the 
law of gravity.  But once I let go, my attempts to make it move this way
or that do not have any effect. 
It might be thought that MR3 entails MR2,75 in which case MR2 is 
redundant.  But this assumption is false.  So-called Frankfurt-style situations 
show that these two conditions are compatible: (1) the agent willingly As 
without being compelled to A; and (2) the agent could not have done
otherwise.  In Frankfurt-style situations, the agent cannot do otherwise— 
cannot refrain from A-ing.  But the agent is still not forced or compelled
to A because, given the very peculiar hypothetical circumstances
(involving a “counterfactual intervener”), the agent’s inability to refrain
from A-ing is not causally relevant to her A-ing.  She As not because
73. See generally  JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND 
CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 28–91 (1998); John Martin Fischer, 
Recent Work on Moral Responsibility, 110 ETHICS 93, 127–28 (1999). 
74. See McMillan & Malatesti, supra note 11, at 189 (“When . . . agent[s] ha[ve] 
no control over what they are doing, their actions and behaviour do not originate in the 
causality of the agent.”); Slobogin, supra note 47, at 36 (“Truly ‘involuntary’ acts are 
rare.  Illustrated by epileptic seizures and perhaps some dissociative states, they require a 
disjunction between mind and body that seldom occurs even in people with severe 
mental illness, much less in sexual predators and like offenders.” (footnote omitted)).
75. See, e.g., Litton, supra note 6, at 352 (“Responsibility requires control.  An 
agent whom we may appropriately hold responsible has a certain kind of control over
what she does.  But what kind of control is required?  On one traditional view, control
requires the ability to act otherwise.  An agent exercises the requisite control over an
action and thus is responsible for it only if she truly had alternative possibilities for
action at the time.” (footnote omitted)).
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she has to but because she wants to.  So she still has control over her
action even though she could not have refrained from performing it.  In 
this way, control does not entail the power to do otherwise.76 
Of course, one might respond that, given that control does not entail 
the power to do otherwise, only control (MR3), not the power to do
otherwise (MR2), is necessary for moral responsibility.  This point may
have merit, but—to be on the safe (or traditional) side—I will simply
continue to assume that MR2 is also necessary for moral responsibility.
Should this assumption turn out to be false, the various positions that I
take in this Article would remain mostly, if not entirely, unaffected.
The fourth condition (MR4), an absence of circumstances that excuse 
an agent’s A-ing, means an absence of circumstances, internal or
external to the agent, that make it reasonable for us (society in general) 
to expect the agent to have refrained from A-ing.  In the criminal law,
these circumstances, the circumstances that make it unreasonable to 
expect the agent to have refrained from A-ing, include insanity, duress,
infancy, hypnotism, involuntary intoxication, automatism, necessity, 
mistake (of fact or of law), and entrapment.77  There are other excuses as 
well, other circumstances that are recognized not as excuses in the
criminal law but as excuses in everyday life. Whether or not a given
condition excuses depends on the specific circumstances and the
moral norms of the relevant community.  For example, the fact that
one’s car breaks down on the highway might excuse her for being late to 
a business meeting later that day but does not excuse her for being late to
a business meeting the following day. We can generally understand or
accept the former but not the latter. Likewise, contracting the flu may
excuse one from occupational duties but not from continuing to take care 
of a dependent child.  Once again, we can generally understand or accept
the former but not the latter. 
76. See Ken Levy, Why It Is Sometimes Fair To Blame Agents for Unavoidable 
Actions and Omissions, 42 AM. PHIL. Q. 93, 93 (2005) (making the same point in terms 
of responsibility rather than control). 
77. Duff suggests that excuses split into two kinds—those that the agent can 
answer for and those that the agent cannot answer for (exemptions).  An example of the
former is duress; the agent can answer for her wrongful action by pointing to situational
factors, specific circumstances that render her blameless for the action.  An example of
the latter—an exemption—is insanity; the agent is exempt from answering for the 
wrongful action in the first place because answering for presupposes a minimal level of
rationality, something that the insane person lacks (by definition).  See Duff, supra note 
69, at 201. 
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V. THREE ARGUMENTS THAT PSYCHOPATHS ARE NOT MORALLY 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
Given the four conditions of moral responsibility in Part IV above— 
again, MR1 (knowledge, or a threshold capacity to know, that A is 
morally wrong), MR2 (a threshold capacity to refrain from A-ing), MR3
(control over A-ing), and MR4 (an absence of circumstances that excuse
this performance)—at least three arguments may be made that psychopaths
like John Wayne Gacy are not morally responsible and therefore
blameworthy for the crimes that they commit.  I believe that these 
arguments are compelling.78  Still, I will argue in Part IX that even if
these arguments are correct—even if Gacy was not morally responsible 
for his crimes—he was still criminally responsible, and therefore criminally
punishable, for his crimes.  Controversial as this point may sound, criminal
responsibility does not require moral responsibility.  Again, I will defend 
this very controversial point in Part IX. 
A.  First Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for 
Their Criminal Behavior: Inability To Grasp Moral Reasons 
The first argument splits into two parts.  First, Gacy did not know that 
it was wrong to torture and murder.  Second, a capacity for this kind of 
knowledge is necessary for moral responsibility (MR1).79 
78. In contrast, some scholars argue that psychopaths are indeed morally
responsible for their behavior.  See  HARE, supra note 5, at 5 (“Psychopathic killers . . .
are not mad . . . .  Their acts result not from a deranged mind but from a cold, calculating
rationality combined with a chilling inability to treat others as thinking, feeling human 
beings.”); id. at 22 (“Unlike psychotic individuals, psychopaths are rational and aware of 
what they are doing and why.  Their behavior is the result of choice, freely exercised.”);
SAMENOW, supra note 45, at 187 (“Clinical descriptions of the psychopath are 
incomplete and in some important ways erroneous.  For example, to call him impulsive 
is to assert that he lacks self-control, whereas he actually has a rational, calculating mind 
that enables him to delay gratification if he deems it in his best interest.  The criminal has 
moral values, but he shuts off considerations of conscience long enough to do what he 
wants.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 251–52 (“Decisions are not made for the criminal. . . . 
[T]he specific decision is up to the individual. . . .  Eventually, he chooses his life’s work 
and advances as far as his talents and effort allow. . . . Within the limits of responsibility
lie countless opportunities and variations in life style. . . .  [T]he change process calls for
criminals to acquire moral values . . . .  The objective is to teach them to live without 
injuring others.”); LINEDECKER, supra note 64, at 244 (“[I]t seems possible that some
people are so vicious and devoid of feeling for others that they become thieves,
murderers, and rapists merely because they choose to.”).  Hare, however, seems a bit
conflicted when he states, in implicit opposition to his quotation above, that psychopathy
is a “life-threatening disease.”  HARE, supra note 5, at 163 (emphasis added).  This
passing reference implies that psychopaths are victims and their behavior an inevitable, 
and therefore unchosen, symptom of the condition that victimizes them. 
79. See Levy, supra note 5, at 219 (“I [previously] argued that for psychopaths all 
offences were merely conventional, and that they therefore were not due the full blame 
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Regarding the first part, one might argue that Gacy did know that it 
was wrong to torture and murder because he knew that the criminal law 
prohibits torturing and killing.  He also knew that society has criminalized 
these acts because it wants to minimize their occurrence.  He might even 
have understood that society wants to protect citizens from these acts 
ultimately because they cause physical harm, emotional harm, and death. 
What he did not understand, however, is why society would care about
these things.80  To psychopaths like Gacy, laws against the torture and 
murder of human beings are like laws against the torture and murder of 
weeds.  A law punishing the torture of plants is perfectly clear; it says 
that if one is caught torturing weeds (perhaps by randomly twisting and
cutting its leaves and branches), one will face arrest, prosecution, and—if 
convicted—prison time.  But few of us would understand why this law 
was passed. Most people would say that there is nothing wrong with
torturing, no less killing, weeds; that they probably cannot feel pain, and 
that even if they can, their pain is simply too unimportant to worry 
about, no less to merit criminal punishment.  And because this law is 
nonsensical, a person should not be criminally punished for breaking it.
Gacy regarded laws punishing the torture and murder of human beings
the same way we would regard a law punishing the torture and murder 
of weeds.  He understood that these activities were unlawful and that, if
caught, he would face serious punishment. But he did not understand 
the ultimate moral basis of these laws.  To Gacy, the boys he tortured 
and killed were no more important than weeds are to most of us.81  He 
that attaches to moral transgressions (or, indeed, any significant amount of blame); since
psychopaths do not grasp the fact that it is moral norms they transgress, they cannot be
properly morally responsible.”); Litton, supra note 6, at 351, 360–65 (arguing that moral 
responsibility requires the “capacity for practical reasoning or rational self-governance” 
and that the latter condition “entails the capacity to comprehend and act on moral 
considerations”); Morse, supra note 6, at 52–53 (arguing that the capacity for emotional 
knowledge is necessary for rationality, which is itself necessary for moral responsibility);
Tony Ward, Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility in Historical Perspective, in
RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHOPATHY: INTERFACING LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY, 
supra note 5, at 7, 18 (agreeing with Hervey Cleckley’s and Jerome Hall’s notion that 
“the emotions ma[k]e an important contribution to moral responsibility”).  But see
Lippke, supra note 6, at 403 (arguing that rationality does not “compel[] the acceptance 
of morality” and noting “the history of failed attempts to establish a necessary link
between rationality and the acceptance of moral standards”).
80. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
81. See LINEDECKER, supra note 64, at 168 (noting Gacy’s justification for killing
over thirty people was that “[t]hey were blackmailing me . . . .  They were baaaad 
people” (internal quotation marks omitted)); MOSS, supra note 12, at 213–14, 225– 
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understood that they could experience pain, that they had their whole 
lives ahead of them, that they had families that loved them, and that their 
families would suffer serious emotional pain over losing them.  But he 
did not understand why he should care—and, indeed, why the rest of us
do care—about any of this.  After all, it was not his death or his pain.
And except for the families involved, it was not their deaths or pain. 
And even for the families involved, losing a family member does not
cause that much pain.  Families all over the world lose family members.
That is just the way life goes.  Like weeds.  Gacy, then, simply did not get 
it.  A boy’s being tortured was no more cause for concern than a weed’s
being tortured; and the boy’s death was no more cause for concern than 
a weed’s death. 
The reason that Gacy did not get it is because he could not get it. 
Gacy lacked the capacity to care about any particular victim as a boy, as 
a human being, as something much more—and other—than a mere 
object for his pleasure.  And because Gacy lacked the capacity to care
deeply about others, he just could not understand what it means, and 
how it feels, for others to lose their son or grandson or brother.  Even if 
he understood that they might exhibit all of the behavior that goes along
with grieving, he simply could not relate to the inner experience that
goes along with this behavior.82 
The same cannot be said of most mafia hit men, drug lords, school
bullies, death squad commanders, corporate executives, or even terrorists.83 
Even though people in all of these categories deliberately harm others,
they are not generally considered psychopathic because they still have 
the capacity for empathy and therefore the capacity to know or
understand why their harmful behavior is morally wrong.
The second part of the first argument (that psychopaths are not morally 
responsible for their bad acts) suggests that the capacity to grasp moral 
reasons is necessary for moral responsibility.  I will now defend this
second assumption. 
Suppose four-year-old Dolly hits three-year-old Jeffy.  If Dolly’s
parents witness this aggressive act, they will likely scold Dolly. They 
will say something like, “No hitting!  How would you like it if Jeffy hit
29 (summarizing conversations in which Gacy admitted that he killed over thirty people 
and asserted that his victims deserved their fate); see also HARE, supra note 5, at 88–93 
(using several examples to illustrate psychopaths’ complete lack of compassion for their 
victims).
82. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
83. See Lippke, supra note 6, at 396–97 (“We might hold out more hope for 
terrorists [than for psychopaths, sexual predators, pedophiles, or hardened professional 
criminals].  They may have highly developed moral sensitivities of narrow or distorted 
kinds that the right combination of maturation, education, and reflection will be able to 
draw upon to generate sincere repentance and efforts at moral rebirth.”). 
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you??!!”  The parents are trying to teach Dolly not merely an arbitrary
social convention, such as a rule of etiquette (for example, “no belching” 
or “no licking your plate”), but a moral principle.  And precisely because
this principle is not arbitrary or conventional, they do not merely instruct 
Dolly to blindly obey it but instead try to give her the reason why she 
should obey it.  This reason—“How would you like it if Jeffy hit
you??!!”—really contains both an argument and an appeal.  The argument 
is that the no-hitting rule is designed to protect all of us, including Dolly, 
from being hit.  The appeal is to Dolly’s compassion or concern for
others.  By giving Dolly the reason for the no-hitting rule, and not just
the no-hitting rule itself, Dolly’s parents are trying to inculcate in her a 
concern for others that will, in the course of development, motivate her 
to comply with the no-hitting rule above and beyond the fear of 
punishment for noncompliance.  Dolly’s parents are, in essence, asking 
her to project the kind of suffering that she feels when she is hit on to
Jeffy in the hopes that she will vicariously feel Jeffy’s pain and thereby 
develop an inhibition toward hitting others that parallels her own desire
to avoid being hit.  On this view, our development of empathy ultimately 
begins with self-concern.  And, once again, the vehicle through
which we are initially able to develop concern for persons other than 
ourselves is projection.
Suppose, however, that because of a neurological problem, Dolly
cannot project her own suffering on to Jeffy.  All Dolly will learn from
her parents is the no-hitting rule, not the reasons for the no-hitting rule. 
She will not be able to understand their point that she should not hit 
Jeffy for the same reason that she does not like to be hit.  Although she 
will agree that she does not like to be hit, she will not see why this
fact—the suffering that she feels when she is hit—should prevent her 
from hitting Jeffy.  After all, she is not him; so why should she care about 
his pain? Her inability to project her own suffering on to Jeffy and 
thereby empathize with Jeffy will prevent her from understanding the
moral basis of the no-hitting rule.  The most that she will learn is that if 
she hits others and gets caught, she will be punished.  So fear of
punishment is the only reason that she has—and that she believes she 
has—to comply with the rule.  Because she cannot feel empathy, she cannot 
understand this reason for compliance. Because she cannot understand
this reason for compliance, it cannot motivate her to comply. And
because it cannot motivate her to comply, she cannot be held morally
responsible for failing to comply on this basis. 
 1335
KEN LEVY DANGEROUS PSYCHOPATHS REPLACEMENT122411 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/2012 9:56 AM      
 
 
   
  





















   
 
 
More generally, nonpsychopaths’ ability to care about others gives
them reasons for refraining from intentionally harming others.  Although
these reasons do not always prevail, they usually do.  And even when
they do not, they are still present, just too weak to overcome other, 
stronger (weightier, not necessarily morally better) reasons.  If, however,
psychopaths lack the capacity to care, then they also lack the capacity to 
form reasons that will counterbalance their reasons for inflicting harm— 
whether they be anger, sadism, or callous indifference.  If one cannot form
these counterbalancing reasons, then one cannot act on these reasons.
And if one cannot act on these reasons, then we cannot blame the agent
for failing to act on these reasons.  It follows, then, that we cannot hold 
Gacy morally responsible for failing to treat others with concern if he 
was incapable of feeling and therefore understanding such concern.84 
B.  Second Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for 
Their Criminal Behavior: Inability To Do Otherwise 
The second argument for the conclusion that Gacy was not morally 
responsible for his criminal behavior is that he simply could not have 
done otherwise.  On the one hand, because he could not care about his 
victims, he had no moral reasons against torturing and killing.  On the 
other hand, Gacy was the kind of person who derived sadistic pleasure
from torturing and killing.  Given both (1) this reason for torturing and 
killing and (2) the absence of countervailing reasons, Gacy could not 
have wanted otherwise.  His desire for pleasure had to prevail because it
faced no competing desires.  And because he could not have wanted
otherwise, he could not have done otherwise.  In other words, because he 
could not care for others, he could not form or possess a reason strong 
enough to outweigh his desire to harm others. 
84. See Duff, supra note 69, at 210 (“Someone who is . . . an outsider to our moral 
practices . . . is not a morally . . . responsible agent. We cannot expect him to be guided
by the moral reasons that bear on the situations in which he acts, since he cannot 
understand those reasons as reasons . . . .  We cannot call him to answer for the wrongs 
he commits . . . .  [S]ince he cannot grasp those reasons, he cannot explain how he acted 
against them.” (footnote omitted)); Levy, supra note 5, at 213 (“[I]t is reasonable to
conclude that psychopaths are blind to central moral considerations.  It follows . . . that
they cannot be held responsible for failing to respond to these moral considerations.”);
id. at 224 (“Psychopaths lack [affective] capacities.  For them it is not easy to grasp core 
moral norms; it is, I suspect, impossible.  Since they cannot understand the moral
significance of guiding their behaviour by these norms, and they are not responsible for 
that fact, they are excused [from] moral responsibility for violations of those norms.”);
Morse, supra note 10, at 1072–73 (“For most citizens, conscience and empathy are the
most powerful prophylaxes against wrong conduct and are much more powerful than
fear of the criminal sanction.  If these capacities are lacking, it is plausible to argue that 
the agent lacks moral rationality and is not responsible, even if the agent is in touch with 
reality otherwise and knows the moral rules in the narrowest sense.”). 
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There is empirical support for this conclusion as well.  First, once 
again, we still have not found an effective treatment for psychopaths, at 
least not psychopaths who score very highly on the PCL-R.85  Second, as
a result, this same group recidivates at an abnormally high rate.86  Third,
psychologists have concluded from various studies of psychopaths that 
they suffer from impaired practical reasoning, moral reasoning, or both.87 
85. See supra note 6.
86. See HARE, supra note 5, at 96 (“The recidivism rate of psychopaths is about 
double that of other offenders.  The violent recidivism rate of psychopaths is about triple
that of other offenders.”); RONSON, supra note 21, at 85 (“In regular circumstances, 60
percent of criminal psychopaths released into the outside world go on to re-offend.”); 
Lee, supra note 3, at 127–28 (“The notorious difficulty in dealing with psychopathic 
criminals has brought this mental disorder to the forefront of crime: ‘Psychopathic 
offenders are responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime . . . [t]hey are more
difficult to manage in correctional and institutional settings . . . [t]hey re-offend and 
violate conditions of release faster and more often and are at higher risk to re-offend
violently than other offenders.’  While psychopathy serves as an overwhelming obstacle 
for justice, it also doubles as a helpful indicator of likely offenders.  In fact, ‘the score on 
the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised . . . was the single best predictor of violent 
recidivism.’  Having established that psychopathy is highly-related to violence, this 
mental disorder serves as a ‘robust predictor of recidivism and violence among criminal, 
forensic, and psychiatric populations.’” (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Harris et al., supra note 6, at 198–99)); Lippke, supra note 6, at 396 (“The 
evidence suggests that [psychopaths], many of whom appear to comprise some of the 
most serious and intractable criminal offenders, are nearly insusceptible to character 
change.  There is no known effective treatment of psychopathy and psychopaths engage 
in criminal conduct well past the point at which other offenders tend to desist.”); Litton,
supra note 6, at 382 (“The inability to resist temptation is perhaps one reason the 
recidivist rate for psychopaths is startling higher than that for non-psychopathic
offenders.  According to a meta-analysis of existing data, researchers found that ‘within 
a year of release, individuals with psychopathy are three times more likely to recidivate, 
and four times more likely to recidivate violently.’” (quoting JAMES BLAIR ET AL., THE
PSYCHOPATH: EMOTION AND THE BRAIN 16 (2005))); Morse, supra note 6, at 41
(“[P]sychopathy . . . is a substantial risk factor for crime.”); id. at 54 (“[Psychopathy] is 
. . . . an undoubted risk factor for future dangerousness.”); Ogloff & Wood, supra note 6,
at 157 (“[P]sychopathy is a risk factor given the strong and consistent relationship shown
between psychopathy and reoffence risk . . . .  Psychopathy has been found to be 
associated with . . . poor treatment outcome, in terms of reoffending.” (citations
omitted)).  See generally James F. Hemphill & Robert D. Hare, Some Misconceptions 
About the Hare PCL-R and Risk Assessment: A Reply to Gendreau, Goggin, and Smith, 
31 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 203 (2004). 
87. See supra notes 12 and 79 and accompanying text.
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C.  Third Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for 
Their Criminal Behavior: No Self-Control 
The third argument for the conclusion that Gacy was not morally
responsible for his criminal behavior is similar to the second. Once 
again, Gacy could not do otherwise. But the third argument offers a 
different reason.  While the second argument suggested that Gacy could
not have done otherwise because of the relative strengths of his desires,
the third argument suggests that Gacy could not have done otherwise not 
merely because one desire outweighed the other but because it significantly
outweighed the other.  One desire was so much stronger than its only 
competitor that he simply could not bring himself to act on the weaker 
desire; he just had to act on the much stronger one.  In this way, Gacy
really did not have any self-control.  Instead, his strongest desire controlled 
him.
One might argue that psychopaths—and everybody else—must
have control over their behavior because otherwise it would not be
behavior—or conduct or action—in the first place.  Instead, it would be 
nothing more than involuntary bodily movements like spasms, twitches,
and convulsions, which are not behavior at all.  To be an action, a given
event must be caused or chosen by an agent, a self.88  But to say that a
given event is caused or chosen by an agent is just to say that the agent
had control over this event.  It follows, then, that there cannot be
involuntary actions, behavior over which a person does not have control.
The mere fact that a given event constitutes an action is sufficient to 
show that the person who performed this action had control over it.
This argument is actually quite compelling.  Still, even if it is correct, 
it leaves open a “loophole.”  One might concede this argument and still 
maintain that it does not decide the issue; that even if, by definition, an 
agent has control over every action that she performs, the agent may still 
have varying degrees of control over different actions.  And moral
responsibility for a given action requires a higher level of control than 
that which is definitionally entailed by the event’s being an action.  It 
requires a threshold level of control, a level of control above the
minimal degree that every action satisfies and without which it would be 
not an action but a nonaction, an involuntary bodily motion like a twitch, 
spasm, or convulsion.89 
88. See supra Part IV.
89. See McMillan & Malatesti, supra note 11, at 188 (distinguishing between 
voluntary and nonvoluntary actions, which correspond to my distinction between actions 
above the control threshold and actions below the control threshold); Morse, supra note 
10, at 1055 (“If an agent’s body is literally forced to move, say, by operation of a 
1338
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What kinds of actions might not reach this threshold?  I concede that it 
is very difficult to answer this question.90  And this difficulty can be
demonstrated apart from psychopaths; psychopathy just further complicates
an already complicated issue.  Still, I contend that we can make some
progress here once we recognize that control actually splits into three levels. 
The highest level or threshold must be attained in order to be morally
responsible; the middle level or threshold must be attained in order to be 
criminally responsible; and the level between the middle threshold and
no control at all is the minimal level of control that every action qua
action satisfies and without which it would be a nonaction like a twitch or
convulsion.  What is controversial about this tri-level schema is the
implication that one can be criminally responsible without being 
morally responsible; that one can achieve a level of control sufficient
for criminal responsibility but not sufficient for moral responsibility.91 
genuine reflex, then the agent, for legal purposes, has not acted at all, because the law’s 
concept of action requires intentional bodily movement.”).
90. See Morse, supra note 6, at 49 (“A fraught question for the law is how to
understand claims that the defendant could not help or control himself in situations in 
which no one is threatening the defendant. . . .  Difficulties conceptualizing and assessing 
such problems are central reasons why ‘control’ tests for excuse in these one-party cases
are less common than tests for lack of rational capacity.”); id. at 59 (“There are . . . 
difficult obstacles to conceptualizing and measuring ‘serious difficulties’ controlling
oneself.”); Slobogin, supra note 47, at 35 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s “inability-
to-control standard [in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)] is vacuous to the 
extent it suggests the state must show some type of ‘involuntary’ behavior or criminal 
impulse caused by overwhelming urges”); id. at 38 (“[G]auging the strength of criminal 
desires, or the weakness of the will to resist them, is a scientific impossibility at this 
point.  Despite repeated attempts to develop instruments that measure impulsivity, there 
is no generally accepted, or even partially accepted, formulation of the construct. . . . 
[I]nstruments for assessing volitional impairment are in a very primitive state.”
(footnotes omitted)). 
91. Although it is unlikely that Lippke would agree with my point here or its 
implications, he does offer a similar “levels” account of responsibility:
[T[here may be some individuals who have exceedingly strong, if not 
irresistible, predilections toward violence in certain kinds of circumstances.
They may be dimly aware of the moral considerations weighing against their 
acting on these predilections but largely unable to make their conduct conform 
to them.  It may be that we are unsure how to conceptualize such weakly
morally responsible agents for the purposes of punishment theory.  They do
not seem as blameworthy (and so subject to punitive confinement) as those
with more normal or even robust moral personalities.  Yet it is hard to 
convince ourselves that such individuals are so out of touch with reality that 
the alternative of involuntarily civilly confining and treating them is in order. 
Lippke, supra note 6, at 405–06. 
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Still, I will argue in Part IX that this is precisely the psychopath’s
situation. 
In the remainder of this section, I will try to describe what is going on 
at this middle level.  Once again, actions at this middle level involve 
agency sufficient for criminal responsibility but not sufficient for moral 
responsibility.  
Suppose that Charlie loves chocolate cake but is on a diet, is at a party 
where chocolate cake is being served, and is feeling very conflicted
between resisting the chocolate cake and giving in to his temptation.  If 
Charlie gives in, did he lose control—threshold control?  This question 
is hard enough to answer.92  It is just as hard—if not harder—when we 
consider addiction.  Does Helen, a heroin addict who has been through a
rehabilitation program and successfully resisted heroin for several months,
lose threshold control if she takes advantage of the next opportunity that
arises?  Or would it be more correct to say that Helen chose to do heroin 
again and that she had full or significant control over this choice?93 
Finally, these questions are just as difficult, if not more so, when
we add a moral dimension.  This additional moral dimension makes the 
92. Regarding weakness of will, most philosophers hold that Charlie is still fully
responsible for his failure to hold out. The assumption underlying this position is that
Charlie could have tried harder—indeed, sufficiently hard—to resist temptation.  See, 
e.g., FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 73, at 41–46, 69–73 (arguing that an agent is fully
responsible for weak-willed action because the agent could have acted on a stronger
reason for refraining had it been presented); JOHN MARTIN FISCHER, 14 THE
METAPHYSICS OF FREE WILL:  AN ESSAY ON CONTROL 168 (1994) (“[C]ertain kinds of
hypothetical irrationality are compatible with moral responsibility; a tendency toward
weakness of the will need not point to any defect in the actual mechanism leading to
action. Moral responsibility requires some connection between reason and action, but 
the fit can be quite loose.”); Litton, supra note 6, at 354 (“[W]e sometimes are weak-
willed yet remain responsible for such moments of weakness . . . .  When I am weak-
willed and eat that extra-large piece of chocolate cake despite the fact that I do not want 
my first-order desire for the cake to be motivationally effective (I have a higher-order 
desire to stay healthy), I may not be acting freely on [one] account of free will. 
However, the fact that I acted with a weak will does not seem to undermine the judgment 
that I am and should hold myself responsible for acting on my first-order desire for the
cake, given that I had the capacity to refrain.”); François Schroeter, Endorsement and
Autonomous Agency, 69 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 633, 654 (2004) (“[I]n the
case of minor weakness of will . . . the agent’s intention-forming capacities are not
subjected to any . . . constraints that would limit the agent’s responsibility over his 
action. Unlike irresistible addictions, minor weakness of will does not absolve an agent 
from responsibility over his actions. [And even if weakness of will means no
autonomous control,] the fit between autonomy and responsibility does not need to be
perfect.  One may well be responsible for some actions even if one does not have 
autonomous control over them.” (footnote omitted)).  But see Gary Watson, Reasons and
Responsibility, 111 ETHICS 374, 380–82 (2001) (critiquing Fischer and Ravizza’s 
“reasons-responsiveness” account of why agents are fully responsible for their weak-
willed actions).
93. Regarding addiction, philosophers will split into three general camps.  Some
will still hold Helen fully responsible, some less responsible, and some not responsible at all. 
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presence or absence of threshold control all the more important because
the possibility of blame and punishment now enters the picture.  If a 
person does not have threshold control over her actions, then she is not 
morally responsible for them.  Suppose, then, that Gacy felt just as 
tempted to torture and murder as Charlie felt before giving in to the 
chocolate cake and Helen felt before giving in to the heroin.  If we think 
that Charlie and Helen lack threshold control over their actions, then we 
seem committed to the same conclusion if Gacy gave in to his temptation, 
in which case we would be committed to the conclusion that Gacy should
have escaped blame and criminal punishment for torturing and murdering.
So where does this leave us?  Once again, as I stated in Part V.A–B, 
Gacy could not form or possess a moral reason for refraining from 
violent behavior. Still, he not only could—but did—possess a prudential or
self-interested desire to avoid getting caught and punished.  But this
desire, while supplying him with a reason for refraining from violent 
behavior, was not nearly strong enough.  It was far outweighed by the 
strength of his desire to engage in violent behavior, which itself was 
motivated by the pleasure that he anticipated from exercising cruel
power over his helpless prey.94  Gacy’s inclination to torture and kill was 
so much stronger than his only counterbalancing reason, knowledge that 
he might get caught and be punished, that the latter did not stand a 
chance.  The former simply steamrolled the latter—much as an addict’s
desire for the next “fix” can be said to overpower the desire to “go
clean.”95 
94. See HARE, supra note 5, at 100 (describing a psychopath, “Earl,” as someone 
who is obsessed “with absolute power” and who “values people only insofar as they
bend to his will or can be coerced or manipulated into doing what he wants” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); LINEDECKER, supra note 64, at 218 (“After the horror [of
Gacy’s many murders] was discovered . . . Dr. Marvin Ziporyn, an authority on mass 
murder . . . said . . . . ‘[Gacy] had the love of power that we all have and he almost has 
gone berserk, gone wild, gone out of control . . . because he has killed and tasted flesh.’ 
Ziporyn continued that, having killed once, a murderer might be surprised at how easy 
the act is, and be pleased with his ability and power to make life-and-death decisions.” 
(footnote omitted)); MOSS, supra note 12, at 158 (“The power [of killing an innocent 
woman with my bare hands] is indescribable. . . .  [Y]ou can feel the draining of their
energy, the total ecstasy.  Get your mind into it.  Savor it.” (quoting passage from
personal letter from serial killer Richard Ramirez) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
95. See LINEDECKER, supra note 64, at 213–15 (describing the uncontrollable-
impulse defense that Gacy’s attorneys used during his trial).  Hare presents conflicting
accounts of the psychopaths’ inner experience when engaging in antisocial behavior.  On
the one hand, he quotes two psychopaths who compare the thrill that they get from 
committing crimes to the “fix” or “high” one gets from taking drugs.  See HARE, supra
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(Incidentally, the reader will notice that I have characterized an
overpowered will as a will that is overpowered by reasons or desires.  In
this sense, I may be accused of reducing the volitional to the cognitive, 
diminished self-control to diminished ability to reason well.  I recognize 
that this is a controversial approach, but at least I am in good company.
For example, Stephen Morse argues that the notion of losing control is
best explained in terms of irrationality or defective practical reasoning.96) 
Yet another example might help drive the point home.  Consider 
“Smoker.”  Smoker wants to quit smoking but just cannot resist the urge 
when it comes upon—and over—her.  After satisfying the urge on a
given occasion, Smoker exercises various measures such as drugs,
cigarette substitutes, a nicotine patch, psychotherapy, or just sheer effort 
of will to help prevent herself from succumbing again.  But as the urge 
reapproaches, Smoker still finds herself changing her mind, radically 
discounting all the reasons motivating her desire to quit. Just before
smoking another cigarette, she says things to herself like, “It’s just one
cigarette. . . .  I’ll stop smoking after that. . . .  Maybe smoking isn’t such
a bad thing after all. . . .  It really calms me down, and I’m under too much
stress to quit now. . . .  Anyway, there’s always tomorrow. . . .”97  Based on 
these thoughts alone, one might conclude that Smoker is fully in control 
of her choice to smoke again.  But that would be the wrong inference to 
note 5, at 40, 61.  On the other hand, Hare states, “In most instances it is egocentricity,
whim, and the promise of instant gratification for more commonplace needs, not the 
drooling satisfaction of bizarre power trips and sexual hungers, that motivate the 
psychopath to break the law.”  Id. at 74.  In support of the latter point, see Slobogin, 
supra note 47, at 37, arguing that recidivism rates do not correlate with, and are not 
therefore caused by, compulsive desires.
96. See Morse, supra note 10, at 1064 (“Lack of capacity for rationality is almost 
always the most straightforward explanation of why we colloquially say that some
people cannot control themselves when they experience intense desires.”); id. at 1075
(“[L]ack of capacity for rationality is . . . the best explanation of what we really mean 
when we say that an agent cannot control himself.  Control standards should be 
understood in terms of rationality defects.”); Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1625–28 (1994) (arguing that a supposedly “internally
coerced” act is performed not because the agent’s psychological state leaves the agent no 
other alternative but because his defective practical reasoning makes this act seem 
preferable to other, more rational acts); see also Slobogin, supra note 47, at 39–40 
(“[M]any cases of volitional impairment can be re-characterized as deficits in cognition. 
For instance, the kleptomaniac who steals for no apparent reason (because he merely
hides what he steals without attempting to make money from it) could be said to have an 
irrational thought process, as could the person with mania who carelessly spends money
in grandiose schemes because of inaccurate beliefs about himself and the world.” 
(footnote omitted)).
97. See Morse, supra note 10, at 1070 (suggesting that desires that are “so
powerful and insistent” may compromise or negate rationality by (1) making it difficult
or impossible for the agent to think “straight” or “clearly” and (2) causing “further 
distracting and often unpleasant feeling states, such as anxiety, irritation, excitement, 
tension, and the like”).
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draw.  Smoker is clearly trying to rationalize the inevitable, trying to 
justify to herself her failure to exert self-restraint.  She knows at a deeper 
level that she is powerless to resist her craving.  And rather than make
this damaging admission, she deludes herself into thinking that the next 
cigarette will be the product of her autonomous choice. 
Just as Smoker discounts her reasons for quitting when the urge to
smoke comes upon her, psychopaths like Gacy tend to discount or 
disregard the prospects of apprehension and punishment to a greater 
extent than do people who are not psychopathic.98  They continue to do
the wrong thing even with the knowledge that the likely long-term cost— 
punishment—will outweigh the short-term benefit—momentary pleasure. 
And this kind of unrealistic attitude and self-destructive behavior is
either constitutive, or evidence, of diminished or absent control.99 
98. For a clear account of discounting in the context of self-control, see HOWARD
RACHLIN, THE SCIENCE OF SELF-CONTROL 27–56, 150–55 (2000). 
99. See, e.g., HARE, supra note 5, at 77–78 (“Concrete rewards are pitted against
vague future consequences—with the rewards clearly the stronger contender.  The
mental image of the consequences for the victim [is] particularly fuzzy.”); id. at 143 
(“[Psychopaths’] problem is that th[eir] knowledge [of the potential consequences of 
their acts] frequently fails to deter them from antisocial behavior.”); Hart, supra note 3, 
at 165 (“There is also considerable evidence indicating that psychopathy is associated
with impairment of volitional functioning.  The findings from experimental research here
indicate that psychopathic offenders have problems evaluating the potential 
consequences of their actions, inhibiting impulses, implementing plans, and learning
from punishment. . . .  The corpus of relevant research is even older and larger than that 
supporting cognitive impairment, comprising hundreds of studies over almost 50 years.” 
(citations omitted)); Lippke, supra note 6, at 405 (rejecting the proposition “that most
dangerous offenders have control over their conduct in the sense that they are able to 
refrain from violence where the risk of arrest and prosecution is especially high” and 
stating “such nonmoral control does not suffice for the retributive punishment of crimes 
with its distinctive blaming function”); Litton, supra note 6, at 381 (“If individuals
regularly make claims about what they will do in the future, yet there is no connection at 
all between these claims and what they actually do (and it is apparent to everyone but
such agents that there is no connection between these expressed plans and subsequent
actions), we have reason to see such agents as having a diminished capacity for rational 
self-governance.”); Malatesti & McMillan, supra note 5, at 85 (“There are [research]
results that appear to show that psychopaths are impaired in certain forms of learning 
that are taken to be correlated or enabled by certain emotional responses. . . . 
[P]sychopaths appear to have deficits in a type of instrumental learning that involves
learning both to respond to stimuli that give rise to reward and to avoid responding to 
stimuli that give rise to punishment. . . .  All of these impairments suggest that the 
practical reason of psychopaths might be damaged. . . .  Psychopathy associates with
reduced emotional responses.”); Morse, supra note 6, at 53 (“They say that they have
goals, but act in ways inconsistent with understanding what having and achieving a goal 
entails.  They do not consistently follow life plans and are impulsive. . . .  Much of their 
conduct appears unintelligible because we cannot imagine what good reason would
 1343





      




    
 
   




















Whether or not Gacy, for example, deliberated about what to do or 
attempted to resist his perverse desires (for whatever reason—fear of
getting caught or some glimmering sense of conscience), the result was
inevitable: when an opportunity presented itself, Gacy’s desires were
so far apart that he was simply powerless to act on his weaker desire
(to avoid punishment) and stop himself from taking advantage of this 
opportunity.  The same is true if Gacy created the opportunity; he was 
not only powerless to stop himself from taking advantage of this
opportunity but also, given the great gap between his desires, powerless to
stop himself from creating this opportunity in the first place.100  In  
sum, then, precisely because of his psychopathy, Gacy was unable to
resist his temptation to commit brutal crimes.  And because of this 
inability, he lacked moral responsibility for these crimes.
VI. THE INSANITY DEFENSE
Once again, I generally accept the arguments in the last Part for the 
conclusion that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their criminal 
acts.  Yet I still contend that psychopaths should be held criminally 
responsible for these acts.  In the remainder of this Article, I will explain 
why I believe that the latter conclusion is consistent with the former 
conclusion. I will further argue that the latter conclusion is not inconsistent 
with involuntarily committing dangerous psychopaths before they commit
crimes. 
motivate it.  In brief, psychopaths have a generally diminished capacity for rational self-
governance that is not limited to the sphere of morality. They cannot even reason 
prudentially.” (footnote omitted)); Ward, supra note 79, at 13 (“[Criminals who 
habitually commit unprofitable crimes suffer from] a form of criminality that is itself
insane . . . .  The quality that distinguishes their criminality and marks it as insane is the 
conspicuous want of prudence and wisdom. . . .  [T]he whole criminality is unnecessary
and supererogatory.” (quoting CHARLES ARTHUR MERCIER, A TEXT-BOOK OF INSANITY
134–35 (2d ed. 1914)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
100. See Morse, supra note 10, at 1073–74 (“In some cases . . . we may plausibly
infer that sexual predators may have a general, rather than an intermittent, time-limited
defect in the capacity for rationality that might genuinely undermine responsibility for
sexually predatory behavior. . . .  Even in the absence of psychotic cognition, in some
cases continued predation simply may not make rational sense either to the predator or to
anyone else.  The predator may have no reasonable explanation for why he did not tie 
himself to the mast, did not take the preventive measures necessary to avoid hated
imprisonment.  The agent simply cannot think straight about what to do, even when not 
aroused, and continues to put himself in harm’s way without, apparently, the rational 
capacity to deliberate about how to avoid such situations.”). 
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
A.  Assumptions Underlying the Insanity Defense
The insanity defense is designed primarily to prevent persons deemed
legally insane from being criminally punished.  The three assumptions
motivating the insanity defense are: (1) people who are insane are not 
morally responsible for their actions, (2) moral responsibility is a necessary
condition of criminal responsibility, and (3) criminal responsibility is
necessary for just criminal punishment.  Therefore, by transitivity, people
who are insane may not be justly criminally punished. 
Each of these assumptions—(1), (2), and (3)—requires a brief
explanation. We have already seen why (1) is the case in Part IV.  Once
again, people who are insane lack at least one of the first three conditions of
moral responsibility—usually MR1 (knowledge, or a threshold capacity
to know, that A is morally wrong) and less frequently some variation of 
MR2 (a threshold capacity to refrain from A-ing) or MR3 (control over 
A-ing).
Assumption (3) is also easy enough to explain.  Very simply, there are
two reasons why criminal responsibility is necessary for criminal
punishment: justice and deterrence.  To punish a person who is not 
criminally responsible for his actions would be unjust and would fail to
deter that person from recidivating and similarly situated (that is, 
nonresponsible) persons from performing the same or similar crimes.101 
Assumption (2) is also easy enough to explain, but I will argue here 
and in Part IX that it is false.  There are two reasons why most, if not all,
scholars and participants in the criminal justice system (attorneys and
judges) subscribe to (2).  First, moral responsibility is thought to be
necessary for criminal responsibility because criminal responsibility is 
just a subset of moral responsibility—namely, moral responsibility for a 
given criminal act.  Second, suppose that a person is not morally responsible
for a given act. This means that MR1, MR2, MR3, or MR4 is not the case.  
And it seems unfair to blame, stigmatize, and punish an individual
under this circumstance.102 
Still, there are two problems with this conclusion. First, contrary to 
the second reason above (with specific regard to MR1), there are two
101. See  MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. at 166 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985) (“Those who are irresponsible under the [M’Naghten] test are plainly 
beyond the reach of the restraining influence of the law, and their condemnation would 
be both futile and unjust.”). 
102. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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ways in which people may be guilty of committing a crime even if
they did not know that their act was criminal: (1) the jurisdiction
requires only knowledge of the act or likely consequences, not 
knowledge of the criminal nature of the act or consequences; or 
(2) the mens rea for the crime was less culpable than knowledge: 
recklessness, criminal negligence, or strict liability.
Second, for both consequentialist and retributivist (desert) reasons, the 
criminal justice system should leave open the possibility that some 
people are criminally responsible even though they are not morally 
responsible.  It is easy to see why some might wish to maintain this
position with respect to psychopaths.  Even if they are persuaded by the
arguments in Part V above that psychopaths are not morally responsible 
for their behavior, they might still feel that they are responsible
enough—that the gravity of the psychopath’s crimes in conjunction with 
the psychopath’s sadism and remorselessness merits punishment for the
purposes of both exacting retribution and maximizing deterrence of
others who would commit crimes of similar gravity.
B.  Different Versions of the Insanity Defense
The first version of the insanity defense was the M’Naghten rule, 
which was issued by a British court in 1843.103 According to the
M’Naghten rule, a person is legally insane and therefore not guilty of the 
crime with which he is accused if, at the time of the crime, he was
“labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as 
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did 
know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.”  So
under the M’Naghten rule, a person is considered insane and therefore 
not criminally responsible if, at the time of the alleged crime, (1) the 
person had a mental disorder (or “disease of the mind”), (2) the person’s
mental disorder caused him to suffer from severe ignorance (to “labour[]
under such a defect of reason”), and (3) this ignorance took one of two 
forms—either ignorance of what the person was doing or ignorance of 
the fact that what he was doing was wrong.104  Thirty jurisdictions in the
103. M’Naghten’s Case, [1843] 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 722. 
104. Id.; see Ward, supra note 79, at 9 (“What was needed to create legal obligation
. . . was that the putative legal subject knew what he was doing and was able to
understand that he had an obligation not to do it, so that whether or not he knew the law,
he knew his action was wrong.  Those two tests were the core of what came to be known
as the McNaghten rules.”). 
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
United States still employ this version, in whole or in part, of the
insanity defense.105 
Five of these jurisdictions106 have supplemented their versions of the
insanity defense with what is typically known as the “irresistible 
impulse rule” (IIR).  According to IIR, defendants are legally insane and
therefore not criminally responsible or punishable for their otherwise
criminal conduct if a mental defect or disorder made it impossible for 
them to control their behavior and avoid committing the criminal act for 
which they are being prosecuted.107  The reasoning behind this volitional
supplement is simple: if the insanity defense is designed to excuse
defendants who are not morally responsible for their behavior because of
a mental disorder, then it should excuse defendants whose mental disorder 
renders them not only unable to know the nature or wrongfulness of their 
behavior but also unable to control their behavior.  The latter (volitionally 
impaired) are just as nonresponsible by virtue of their mental condition 
 105. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (2008) 
(in part); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-301(5)(A) 
(2006) (in part); CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-18-101.5
(2010) (in part); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.027 (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2
(2007) (in part); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-400 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-2-2
(LexisNexis 1998) (in part); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.4 (West 2003); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:14 (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.026 (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-
13-3 (West 2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 552.030 (West 2002) (in part); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 29-2203 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 194.010 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West
2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 2009) (in part); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2901.01 (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152 (West 2002) (in part); 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 315 (West 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2 (1988); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (2006) (in part); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (West 2011) (in
part); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.12.010 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15
(West 2007) (in part); see also State v. Hartley, 565 P.2d 658, 660 (N.M. 1977); State v.
Bonney, 405 S.E.2d 145, 155 (N.C. 1991); Morgan v. Commonwealth, 646 S.E.2d 899, 
902 (Va. Ct. App. 2007). 
106. See, e.g., Lipscomb v. State, 609 S.W.2d 15, 17–18 (Ark. 1980); Hartley, 565 
P.2d at 660; Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531, 540–41 (Tenn. 1977); Morgan, 646 
S.E.2d at 902.  Although Indiana rejects IIR as a form of insanity, it still regards IIR as a
possible means of demonstrating insanity.  See Benefiel v. State, 578 N.E.2d 338, 350
(Ind. 1991) (“The legislature . . . amended the statute in 1984 to confine the definition of
insanity to the inability to differentiate right from wrong.  This, of course, does not 
exclude the showing of irresistible impulse to show such inability, but it excludes
irresistible impulse as a separate independent excuse for the commission of a criminal 
act.”).
 107. ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 67 (1967) (“[IIR] tells jurors 
to acquit by reason of insanity if they find the defendant had a mental disease which kept 
him from controlling his conduct.”). 
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as the former (cognitively impaired) and therefore should be just as 
eligible for acquittal. 
In 1962, the American Law Institute (ALI) proposed an alternative 
version of the insanity defense in its Model Penal Code (MPC):
“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”108  Fifteen jurisdictions
now implement this MPC version or a similar variation.109  The MPC  
version of the insanity defense differs from the M’Naghten rule in three 
main respects.  First, it changes inability to know (or unavoidable
ignorance) to a lack of “substantial capacity . . . to appreciate.”  The 
latter phrase suggests that a broader range of people might be found 
insane—not only those who simply cannot know but also those who
have significant difficulty knowing; and not only those who cannot know 
but also those who have significant difficulty doing something less than
knowing—namely, appreciating (or understanding).110  Second, it 
eliminates the nature of one’s act from the object of this inability. While 
the M’Naghten rule suggests that people are insane if they cannot know 
the nature or wrongfulness of their behavior, the MPC suggests that
people are insane if they cannot know or appreciate (only) “the 
criminality [wrongfulness]” of their behavior.  Third, it incorporates a 
 108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)
(alteration in original).
109. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 401 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-400; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-2 (West
2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.020 (LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 39 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-109 (LexisNexis 2008); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 768.21a (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-01(1) (1997); OR.
REV. STAT. § 161.295(1) (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10(A) (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 13, § 4801(a)(1) (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-304(a) (2009); State v. Johnson,
399 A.2d 469, 476 (R.I. 1979); State v. Massey, 359 S.E.2d 865, 871 (W. Va. 1987). 
Several jurisdictions have adopted hybrid versions of the M’Naghten rule and the MPC 
version of the insanity defense.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010(a); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-2-312(a)(1) (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-6 
(LexisNexis 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 552.030(1); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-11-501; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(1).  Four of these hybrid
jurisdictions have adopted IIR.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-3 (2007); Hamilton v. 
United States, 475 F.2d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 1973); Smith v. State, 397 N.E.2d 959, 962
(Ind. 1979); Kwosek v. State, 100 N.W.2d 339, 345–46 (Wis. 1960).  Several MPC
jurisdictions have also adopted IIR.  See, e.g., People v. Lowhone, 126 N.E. 620, 626
(Ill. 1920); People v. Russell, 173 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); Hartley, 565
P.2d at 661; State v. Goyet, 132 A.2d 623, 651 (Vt. 1957). 
110. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. at 180 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985) (“[I]t is doubtful if any other single term [than substantial] that does
not implicitly require an unrealistic total lack of capacity can better catch the notion of 
very considerable incapacity.”).
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relaxed version of IIR.  While IIR requires a complete inability to control
one’s behavior, the MPC version of volitional insanity requires merely a 
“lack [of] substantial capacity . . . to conform [one’s] conduct to the 
requirements of the law.”  Again, just as an inability to know is a more 
rigorous, harder-to-satisfy standard than a lack of “substantial
capacity . . . to appreciate,” so too an inability to control one’s behavior 
is a more rigorous, harder-to-satisfy standard than a lack of “substantial 
capacity . . . to conform one’s conduct to the requirements of the law.”111 
Finally, there is the third and virtually extinct version of the insanity 
defense, what is known as the “Durham” or “Product” rule.  Only one 
jurisdiction—New Hampshire—still subscribes to it.112  As stated in the
Durham case itself, “[A]n accused is not criminally responsible if his 
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.”113 
This version of the insanity defense is generally rejected because it
conflicts with the widely held view that mental illness is consistent with 
111. See id. § 4.01 cmt. at 171–72 (“A test requiring an utter incapacity for self-
control imposes a comparably unrealistic restriction on the scope of the relevant inquiry. 
To meet these difficulties, it was thought that the criterion should ask if the defendant, as
a result of mental disease or defect, was deprived of ‘substantial capacity’ to appreciate
the criminality (or wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law, meaning by ‘substantial’ a capacity of some appreciable magnitude 
when measured by the standard of humanity in general, as opposed to the reduction of
capacity to the vagrant and trivial dimensions characteristic of the most severe afflictions
of the mind.” (footnote omitted)).
112. See State v. Fichera, 903 A.2d 1030, 1034 (N.H. 2006) (“A defendant asserting 
an insanity defense must prove two elements: first, that at the time he acted, he was  
suffering from a mental disease or defect; and, second, that a mental disease or defect 
caused his actions.” (citing State v. Abbott, 503 A.2d 791, 794 (N.H. 1985))).  The 
District of Columbia subscribed to the Durham test until United States v. Brawner, 471 
F.2d 969, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc), where the court noted, “The more we have 
pondered the problem the more convinced we have become that the sound solution lies 
not in further shaping of the Durham ‘product’ approach in more refined molds, but in 
adopting the ALI’s [MPC] formulation as the linchpin of our jurisprudence.”  Likewise, 
Maine subscribed to the Durham test until 1981, when it adopted half of the MPC test. 
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 39(1) (“A defendant is not criminally responsible 
by reason of insanity if, at the time of the criminal conduct, as a result of mental disease 
or defect, the defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the 
criminal conduct.”). 
113. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (citing State 
v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 398 (1871)).  There was precedent for this proposition in State 
v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 402 (1870), overruled by Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N.H. 227 (1875). 
See also  ROYAL COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT, 1953, [Cmd.] 8932, ¶ 333 
(U.K.) (rejecting the M’Naghten rule). 
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moral responsibility and therefore with criminal responsibility.114  The  
Durham rule suggests that anybody suffering from mental illness is not 
morally responsible for behavior resulting from this mental illness.115 
But we generally reject this proposition because mental illness and moral
responsibility are both considered to be continuum concepts.  As we 
move along the mental illness continuum from lesser to more severe,
a person increasingly loses moral responsibility.  At some point, then, a 
person is considered to be so severely mentally ill that the person is no 
longer morally responsible for his behavior.  This dividing line between
responsibility and nonresponsibility occurs somewhere toward the far 
end of the mental-illness continuum.  What this means is that individuals 
who fall along the continuum prior to this dividing line are morally 
responsible for their behavior at least to some significant degree.  Again, 
the Durham rule is not at all consistent with this view; it regards
anybody along the mental-illness continuum as entirely nonresponsible. 
VII. FOUR ARGUMENTS THAT PSYCHOPATHS ARE INSANE
I do not believe that any American court has ever found a psychopath
to be insane strictly on the grounds that he was psychopathic.  If I am 
correct, part of the reason for this universal omission may be that many
psychopaths do not invoke the insanity defense in the first place.  They
would be well advised not to because, if they were actually to
succeed and persuade a court that they are insane, they would likely be
committed for a longer period of time than they would be imprisoned if 
they were found guilty.116 Still, for the sake of showing the complete 
picture and the cogency of both sides in this debate, I will offer in this 
Part four arguments for the conclusion that psychopaths are insane and
therefore should be eligible for the insanity defense.  The reader should
be aware that this is not my final conclusion.  On the contrary, I will
argue in Part IX that psychopaths are, in fact, not insane but rather
criminally responsible for their behavior and therefore should be ineligible
for the insanity defense. 
114. See Ken Levy, Moral Responsibility, Excuses, and Situationism (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).
115. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. at 173 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985) (“Under the Durham rule . . . ‘an accused is not criminally responsible 
if his unlawful conduct was the product of mental disease or defect.’” (quoting Durham, 
214 F.2d at 874–75)). 
116. See Morse, supra note 6, at 53 (arguing that “virtually no psychopath would 
. . . raise the insanity defence” because, given the absence of any effective treatment for 
psychopathy, “any psychopath acquitted by reason of insanity would be facing a lifelong
commitment to an essentially prison-like facility” as compared with the potential for a
shorter time in prison if found guilty). 
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A.  First Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane 
The fact that the drafters of MPC § 4.01 put wrongfulness in brackets 
after criminality highlights a difficulty that many courts and jurisdictions 
have been forced to confront.  The difficulty is determining what kind of
wrongfulness people must appreciate in order to be criminally responsible
for their behavior.  Ten jurisdictions hold that criminal responsibility
requires only an appreciation of criminality or criminal wrongfulness,
not necessarily an appreciation of moral wrongfulness.117  Call these
“Appreciation-of-Criminality” jurisdictions.  Twenty jurisdictions hold that
criminal responsibility requires an appreciation not only of criminality
but also of moral wrongfulness.118  Call these “Appreciation-of-
Moral-Wrongfulness” jurisdictions.  The remaining jurisdictions have
not made it clear which standard they adopt.
There are two reasons why the Appreciation-of-Criminality jurisdictions
believe that substantial appreciation of the moral wrongfulness of one’s
act is not necessary for criminal responsibility.  First, not all violations 
of the criminal law are morally wrong.  Violations of malum prohibitum, 
as opposed to malum in se, laws are arguably no more morally wrong 
than violations of traffic rules. So requiring knowledge of the
moral wrongfulness of malum prohibitum laws would preclude criminal 
responsibility for violating these laws, a result that many would regard 
117. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312(a)(1) (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. 
§ 3-109 (LexisNexis 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 194.010 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 161.295 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10 (2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01
(2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801 (2009); Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495, 501 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1996); State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Iowa 1979); State 
v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 491 (Wash. 1983). 
118. See  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2 (2007); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2 (1988); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 971.15 (West 2007); State v. Skaggs, 586 P.2d 1279, 1284 (Ariz. 1978)
(citing State v. Malumphy, 461 P.2d 677, 689 (Ariz. 1969) (McFarland, J., concurring)); 
People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 764 (Cal. 1985); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 137 
(Colo. 1992); State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633, 643 (Conn. 1997); Dacey v. People, 6 N.E. 
165, 182 (Ill. 1886); Hill v. State, 251 N.E.2d 429, 437 (Ind. 1969) (citing United States 
v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622 n.52 (2d Cir. 1966)); State v. Brogdon, 426 So. 2d 158, 
168 (La. 1983); State v. Rawland, 199 N.W.2d 774, 788 (Minn. 1972); State v. Long, 
139 N.W.2d 813, 821 (Neb. 1966) (citing Bothwell v. State, 99 N.W. 669, 670–71 (Neb. 
1904)); State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1321 (N.J. 1990); People v. Wood, 187 N.E.2d 
116, 121 (N.Y. 1962); State v. Staten, 616 S.E.2d 650, 658 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); State 
v. Thompson, 402 S.E.2d 386, 390 (N.C. 1991); State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 477 
(R.I. 1979); Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531, 543 (Tenn. 1977); White
v. Commonwealth, 616 S.E.2d 49, 58 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (Elder, J., dissenting), aff’d, 
636 S.E.2d 353 (Va. 2006); Flanders v. State, 156 P. 39, 44 (Wyo. 1916). 
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as nonsensical.  Second, appreciation of the moral significance of the 
criminal law is simply not necessary.  If a person substantially appreciates
that she is violating a criminal law, whether it is malum in se or 
malum prohibitum, then she is not insane.  She is not “out of touch” with 
reality, at least the reality that matters for criminal responsibility.  On the
contrary, the fact that she performed the criminal act even though she
knew that she is not allowed to behave this way, that society has erected
prohibitions against this kind of behavior, is precisely the kind of 
defiance that criminal punishment is directed against.119 
In contrast to the Appreciation-of-Criminality jurisdictions, the
Appreciation-of-Moral-Wrongfulness jurisdictions maintain that mere 
appreciation of the criminality of one’s act is not sufficient for criminal
responsibility, that one must also appreciate that one’s act is morally
wrong as well.120  They tend to limit this “extra” appreciation or
knowledge to malum in se crimes for precisely the reason given
above: requiring knowledge of moral wrongfulness for criminal 
responsibility would lead to the absurd result that nobody could be
criminally responsible for committing a malum prohibitum crime.  But  
with respect to malum in se crimes, why do Appreciation-of-Moral-
Wrongfulness jurisdictions require not only knowledge of criminality but
also knowledge of moral wrongfulness? The assumptions motivating this
position are that (1) criminal responsibility requires moral 
responsibility and (2) moral responsibility for a criminal act requires not 
merely knowledge that one is violating the criminal law but also
knowledge that one is violating the moral law, the moral basis upon
which the criminal law itself is predicated.121 
119. I will defend this point further in Part IX.  Of course, if individuals claim that 
they knew that their behavior violated the law but “could not help it”—felt powerless to 
bring their actions into conformity with their knowledge—then they might still have a
successful insanity defense if that jurisdiction recognizes IIR or the MPC’s volitional-
incapacity prong. See supra Part VI.
 120. By as well, I mean that the Appreciation-of-Moral-Wrongfulness jurisdictions
require, for criminal responsibility, both appreciation of the criminality and appreciation
of the moral wrongfulness of one’s act.  Still, an Appreciation-of-Moral-
Wrongfulness jurisdiction could in principle require only appreciation of the moral 
wrongfulness of one’s act for criminal responsibility.  This kind of jurisdiction would
hold that one’s knowledge of moral wrongfulness and therefore criminal responsibility is
consistent with ignorance of the fact that one’s morally wrongful action is criminally
prohibited.
 121. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. at 166 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1985) (“One shortcoming of [the knowledge criterion of the M’Naghten rule] is that it
authorizes a finding of responsibility in a case in which the actor is not seriously deluded
concerning his conduct or its consequences, but in which the actor’s appreciation of the
wrongfulness of his conduct is largely detached or abstract awareness that does not 
penetrate to the affective level.  Insofar as a formulation centering on ‘knowledge’ does 
not readily lend itself to application to emotional abnormalities, the M’Naghten test 
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The implication of this position is that a person who knows that a 
given crime is malum in se but does not know or believe that this act is 
morally wrongful is insane and therefore not criminally responsible for 
her act.  Suppose, for example, that Debbie knows that firing a loaded
rifle “for kicks” at another person is against the law but does not know 
that this action is morally wrongful.  Of course, it is difficult even to
imagine this situation.  It seems that if Debbie does not have the moral 
knowledge, she will not have the legal knowledge as well.  Conversely, if
Debbie has the legal knowledge, then she should have at least some 
sense—some appreciation—of the moral implications.  But if we put this
consistency concern aside and accept the hypothetical, it stands to reason
that Debbie is so out of touch with moral reality, so out of touch with the 
most basic and obvious moral norms of our society, that she cannot be 
considered morally responsible if she then acts on the basis of this moral
ignorance and fires away.  Her moral knowledge is no more advanced
than a young child’s, in which case she is no more culpable than a young 
child is for its morally reprehensible acts.
As it turns out, the empirical evidence shows that dangerous psychopaths 
are generally in Debbie’s situation.  On the one hand, they know that 
certain malum in se acts such as killing, raping, kidnapping, and stealing 
are against the law.  On the other hand, they do not have an “emotional” 
or “affective” understanding of the moral wrongfulness of these acts.  To 
the extent that they consider them to be morally wrong at all, they 
consider them to be morally wrong only in the sense that they are against
the law.  For them, there is no malum in se.  All moral wrongfulness reduces 
to malum prohibitum, all criminal prohibitions to regulatory restrictions.122 
appears less than optimal as a standard of responsibility in cases involving affective 
disorder.”).
122. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also  MOSS, supra note 12, at
158 (citing a passage in a personal letter from serial killer Richard Ramirez, stating that 
“[m]orals, scruples and all that other shit are just words to make people feel better about 
themselves”); Ferzan, supra note 9, at 238–39 (“[U]nder the traditional understanding, 
the psychopath is an individual who fails to understand moral norms because he lacks the 
capacity to form emotional attachments to others.  Viewed this way, one might imagine
the psychopath to be akin to Data from Star Trek.  Data, an android, does not form any
emotional attachments.  He can only act logically and rationally.  Applied to the 
psychopath, all criminal laws appear to the psychopath as malum prohibitum laws appear 
to us—the only reason we have to follow these laws is because we will otherwise be 
punished.  The laws do not forbid anything morally wrong in and of themselves.” 
(footnote omitted)); Levy, supra note 5, at 219 (“Normal children make the
moral/conventional distinction; so do autistic children. However, psychopaths 
apparently cannot reliably draw the distinction.” (citations omitted)).
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If a given malum in se act—kidnapping—happened not to be against the 
law, they would simply not understand what we meant when we said that
it is still wrong.  For them, it would be like saying that it is still wrong to
drive through an intersection without stopping even though there is no
stop sign or red light.  Legally permissible means morally permissible 
and vice versa. 
The root cause of psychopaths’ moral ignorance is an innate inability
to empathize with the victim, an inability to see the victim’s situation 
from the victim’s own perspective. As I argued in Part V.A, for 
nonpsychopaths who have undergone normal socialization and moral 
development, we may appeal to their compassion, their concern for
others, when we wish to influence their behavior toward other sentient
beings.  We ask them how they would feel if they were on the receiving 
end of the kind of negative behavior that they are exhibiting.  Asking them
to imaginatively displace themselves into the heads of their potential
victims is often, if not usually, sufficient to curb or reverse their negative 
behavior.  But the same is not true of psychopaths.  Because they are
incapable of imaginatively displacing themselves into the heads of others
—because they are incapable of feeling empathy—they are incapable of
feeling sympathy.  They simply cannot care about their victims’ feelings. 
And this inability to care about others renders all moral terms meaningless.
Without a conscience to make them feel guilty about treating others badly,
they simply cannot understand what we mean when we insist that this
negative treatment is simply wrong. 
Given the psychopath’s inability to understand moral wrongfulness, 
one might very well argue that psychopaths should qualify as insane in 
an Appreciation-of-Moral-Wrongfulness jurisdiction.123  Although they
123. See Litton, supra note 6, at 385–86 (“[O]ne could argue that [psychopaths] 
cannot know the true nature of their criminal conduct because their insight into the 
emotional experience of other people is so feeble that they do not understand the real 
harmful consequences of their actions. . . .  The psychopath can know that the law 
punishes and society deems wrong certain kinds of actions, and in that sense he ‘know[s]
the difference between right and wrong.’  But one could argue that ‘formal cognitive 
knowledge’ of right and wrong is insufficient for criminal responsibility; one must also 
be able to ‘internalize the enormity of [his] criminal act’ and appreciate emotionally its
moral wrongfulness.  The case for excusing the psychopath along this rationale is 
stronger under law that follows the Model Penal Code . . . .  The MPC standard does not
require knowledge of the wrongful nature of one’s act for responsibility, but rather
excuses an offender who lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality or 
wrongfulness of his conduct . . . .  If a law requires substantial capacity to appreciate 
moral wrongfulness, the psychopath has a strong argument for excuse.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Morse, supra note 6, at 51 (“Despite the United States law’s exclusion of 
psychopathy as the basis for an insanity defence, the language of the various tests 
permits a reasonable case for inclusion.  In brief, the argument for excusing psychopaths, 
or anyway some of them, is that they lack the strongest reasons for complying with the 
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may have known that their acts were against the law, they did not
understand the moral basis of this prohibition.  And, again,
Appreciation-of-Moral-Wrongfulness jurisdictions require this moral 
understanding for criminal responsibility.  This is the first argument for
the conclusion that psychopathy is a form of insanity. 
B.  Second Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane 
There are three more arguments for the conclusion that psychopaths 
are insane.  Unlike the last argument, which applies only in Appreciation-
of-Wrongfulness jurisdictions, all three of them apply universally. 
The first of these universally applicable arguments suggests simply
that no person “in his right mind” could do the things that Gacy did— 
torture and kill—under his particular circumstances.124  This last part  
about Gacy’s particular circumstances has to be included to avoid the 
implication that people who torture and kill in other situations are 
insane, an implication that is false.  Many people who torture and kill 
under different kinds of circumstances are not insane.  Examples include 
people who torture and kill because they have been indoctrinated, trained, 
terrorized, or severely abused.  Whether or not these conditions— 
indoctrination, training, terror, or abuse—mitigate their responsibility,
most of these agents have lost “only” their compassion—perhaps only on 
certain occasions and only for certain human beings—not their sanity.
People can lose compassion for others and still know the nature of their
actions, know the moral and legal status of their actions, and retain control
over their actions. 
The same, however, cannot be said of people like Gacy, who never
could feel compassion for others.  Somebody with this permanent deficit
is arguably just as “crazy”—just as “out of touch”—as a person who is 
law, such as understanding that what they are doing is wrong and empathic
understanding of their victim’s plight.”). 
124. See HARE, supra note 5, at 22 (“[A] common response to reports of brutal 
crimes, particularly serial torture and killing, is: ‘Anyone would have to be crazy to do 
that.’”); Morse, supra note 6, at 53 (“[S]evere psychopaths are out of touch with ordinary
social reality.”); Ward, supra note 79, at 17 (advocating Hervey Cleckley’s point that 
“the reason the psychopath present[s] such a medico-legal conundrum was that the 
surface appearance of rationality—the ‘mask of sanity’—concealed an inner life from 
which some essential element of rationality was absent”).  But see Litton, supra note 6, 
at 371 (“The fact of psychopaths’ repeated immoralities . . . cannot show that they are 
incapable of moral reasoning or that they should not be held morally responsible for their
conduct.  Evil should not represent its own excuse.”).
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unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality.125  Some scholars put
this argument in terms of rationality.  They argue that rationality requires
“moral competence,” a capacity for moral understanding, which itself 
requires a capacity to value others as more than means to one’s own 
end.126  That is, rationality cannot survive on reason and self-interest alone;
people cannot be minimally rational if they cannot be motivated by reasons
that concern others’ interests and rights, reasons that are informed by
other-concerning values, desires, and emotions.127  It follows, then, 
that psychopaths are fundamentally irrational.  And because fundamental
irrationality is, or causes, insanity, it follows that psychopaths, who lack 
minimal moral competence, are insane.
C.  Third Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane 
According to the second universally applicable argument (and the
third argument overall), Gacy’s inability to understand the moral
wrongfulness of torturing and killing arguably satisfies the M’Naghten
rule, according to which a person was insane at the time of the crime if
that person was “labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease 
of the mind . . . that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.”128 
I say arguably because this conclusion requires three points to be 
established: that (1) Gacy suffered from a “defect of reason” or “disease
of the mind”; (2) know refers not merely to cognitive knowledge but also
to emotional or affective knowledge;129 and (3) wrong means not merely 
legal wrong (illegality) but also moral wrong (immorality).130  In Part IX 
below, I will argue that both (2) and (3) are false.  But for the purposes of
125. See supra notes 69 and 124 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
127. The claim here is that rationality requires a minimal moral capacity.  This 
claim should not be confused with David Hume’s superficially similar claim that 
rationality—or “reason alone”—cannot motivate one to act; that action requires 
psychological states other than reason—namely, “passions” or “emotions.”  DAVID
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 413–18 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., 
2d ed. 1978) (1739–1740); cf. Jana Schaich Borg, Impaired Moral Reasoning in 
Psychopaths? Response to Kent Kiehl, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF
MORALITY: EMOTION, BRAIN DISORDERS, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 5, at 159, 159– 
63 (arguing that studies “cast[] doubt on the view that emotion is unnecessary for 
successful moral reasoning”).
128. But see Ward, supra note 79, at 10 (“Those who today might be called 
psychopaths were the very last people the judges who formulated [the M’Naghten test
and IIR] would have expected to benefit from them.”). 
129. (2) is discussed more fully in Part V.A below and in Ken Levy & Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, Insanity Defenses, in  OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW 299, 315–16 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011). 
130. (3) is discussed more fully in Part VII.A below and in Levy & Sinnott-
Armstrong, supra note 129, at 302–06, 312–13. 
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this argument, we may now assume that (2) and (3) are both true.  And
that is enough to sanction the third argument because (1) is also true. 
To demonstrate that (1) is true, it would have to be shown that Gacy
was a psychopath and psychopathy is a “defect of reason” or “disease of
the mind.”  The literature clearly establishes that Gacy was a psychopath.131 
And the notion that psychopathy is a “defect of reason” or a “disease of
the mind”—a mental illness—was implicitly established in Parts II
and V (and will be further defended in Part X.E).  Given the fact
that psychopathy tends to deprive the individual of key abilities— 
including the ability to care for others, to control one’s impulses, and to 
engage in long-range planning—psychopathy seems to fit right in with 
the family of other conditions that deprive individuals of equally central 
abilities and thereby qualify as mental illnesses.132  Still, the reader
should recognize that this point is controversial.133  Most courts,  
psychologists, and scholars do not accept the proposition that psychopathy 
is a mental illness.134 
131. See generally LINEDECKER, supra note 64; MOSS, supra note 12. 
132. See HARE, supra note 5, at 142 (“[John Wayne] Gacy’s ‘loose associations’ 
and his contradictory statements and lies may reflect little more than mental carelessness,
lack of interest in keeping things straight for the listener, or part of a strategy intended to 
confuse the listener.  However . . . they also may stem from a condition in which 
continuity among mental events and the self-monitoring of speech are defective, perhaps
even disordered: mental Scrabble without an overall script.”).  Examples of other
abilities-depriving mental illnesses include decompensation, dementia, developmental
disability, mental retardation, pedophilia, and various other disorders: Autism, Bipolar 
Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder, Dissociative Disorders, Substance Abuse
Disorder, Eating Disorders, Major Depression, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, Narcissism, 
Panic Disorder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Schizophrenia, Schizoaffective Disorder, 
Seasonal Affective Disorder, and Tourette’s Syndrome.  53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally 
Impaired Persons § 1 (2006); Mental Illnesses: By Illness, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL
ILLNESS (NAMI), http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=By_Illness (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2011). 
133. See HARE, supra note 5, at 21 (“[The question whether a psychopath is mad or 
bad is] a question that has long troubled not just psychologists and psychiatrists but
philosophers and theologians.”); id. at 25 (“[There has been] an argument that spanned
generations and seesawed between the view that psychopaths were ‘mad’ and that they
were ‘bad’ or even diabolical.”).
134. Id. at 22 (“Most clinicians and researchers don’t use the term [psychopathy to 
mean ‘insane’ or ‘crazy’]; they know that psychopathy cannot be understood in terms of
traditional views of mental illness.  Psychopaths are not disoriented or out of touch with 
reality, nor do they experience the delusions, hallucinations, or intense subjective distress 
that characterize most other mental disorders.  Unlike psychotic individuals, psychopaths 
are rational and aware of what they are doing and why.”).
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D.  Fourth Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane 
The fourth overall argument for the conclusion that psychopaths like 
Gacy are insane: for reasons given above, Gacy satisfied (1) both prongs, 
the cognitive and volitional, of the MPC test; and (2) the insanity test in 
jurisdictions that have added IIR.135 
First, the cognitive prong of the MPC test.  Again, the MPC’s cognitive
prong says that a “person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the 
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity . . . to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of 
his conduct.”  As I argued in Part VII.A, Gacy’s psychopathy deprived him
of a substantial capacity to appreciate—to have an emotional understanding
of—what is morally wrongful about torturing and killing and therefore 
would easily satisfy the cognitive prong of the MPC test in
Appreciation-of-Moral-Wrongfulness jurisdictions. 
Second, the volitional prong of the MPC test.  Again, the MPC’s
volitional prong says that a “person is not responsible for criminal 
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease 
or defect he lacks substantial capacity . . . to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law.”  As I argued above in Part V.C–D, Gacy satisfied 
this prong because he could not have done otherwise; given his psychopathy 
and his sadistic desires, he felt overwhelmingly powerful reasons to 
torture and kill and much weaker reasons to resist these desires. So
when the opportunities arose—or when he impulsively created such
opportunities—he simply had to take advantage of them.  He could not 
have resisted.  One set of reasons easily and unavoidably overpowered
the other set of reasons.136 
For the very same reasons, Gacy satisfied the IIR prong of the M’Naghten
test in several jurisdictions.  Again, according to IIR, defendants are
legally insane and therefore not criminally responsible or criminally
punishable for their otherwise criminal conduct if a mental defect or
disorder made it impossible for them to control their behavior.  The 
paragraph above demonstrates that Gacy satisfied this condition.
135. See supra Part VI.B.
136. One danger of this argument is that it may discourage psychopaths from trying
to improve their behavior.  See Ward, supra note 79, at 13 (noting that Havelock Ellis, a
criminological positivist in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “regarded 
the whole enterprise of distinguishing between ‘responsible’ and ‘non-responsible’
criminals as futile and counterproductive, since telling some criminals that they were 
incapable of self-control was likely to be a self-fulfilling prophecy”); see also supra note 
47. 
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VIII. WHY THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM REGARDS PSYCHOPATHS  
AS CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE
Despite all of the reasons in the last Part for judging psychopaths like 
John Wayne Gacy to be insane and therefore nonresponsible for criminal 
acts that result from their psychopathy, no jurisdiction currently regards 
psychopathy as a form of insanity and therefore as a basis for acquittal.137 
On the contrary, psychopathy is almost always regarded as an aggravating 
factor.138  Why, then, is the criminal justice system reluctant to follow
through on the perfectly plausible proposition that psychopaths are insane? 
In this Part, I will offer several reasons.  In Part IX, I will argue that
whether or not these reasons are correct, their conclusion is.  That is, the 
criminal justice system is correct to reject psychopathy as a form of
insanity and therefore as a basis of acquittal. 
Once again, there are several reasons why the criminal justice system
does not regard psychopaths as insane.  The first is consequentialist.  As 
I argued in Part III above, society would simply not tolerate acquitting a 
defendant like Gacy.  It would not understand—nor wish to hear—why a
man who tortured and killed over thirty young males did not receive
severe punishment—either life imprisonment or death.139  Its outrage
would be fueled primarily by a thirst for retribution and secondarily by
the goal of maximizing deterrence of Gacy “copycats.”  It might also 
prefer punishment to acquittal if it believed either that acquittal would 
not be followed by commitment to a psychiatric hospital or that 
commitment is less secure than imprisonment.  Still, as I argued above in 
Part III, it is important to realize that both of these beliefs are false and 
therefore that this reason to prefer punishment to acquittal is misguided. 
Second, psychopaths’ characteristic lack of compassion for their victims 
makes them especially unsympathetic and unlikeable defendants.140  The
137. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
138. See supra note 3.
139. See Litton, supra note 6, at 389 (“[I]f judges were to read current insanity
statutes as authorizing an excuse for psychopathic offenders, then that could lead to
renewed public antagonism or outrage towards the insanity defense, itself.”).
140. See MOSS, supra note 12, at 102 (“Because part of me knew that [Gacy] was
trying very hard to manipulate me, I felt less guilty manipulating him.  I suppose I 
shouldn’t have felt guilty at all.  One could make the argument that Gacy, as someone 
who’d brutally killed thirty-three men and boys, wasn’t entitled to honesty or fair 
play.”); RONSON, supra note 21, at 110 (“Why should we feel sorry for [psychopaths]?
They don’t give a shit about us.” (quoting a fellow conference attendee) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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fact that they callously harmed their victims in the first place and then
never felt (or showed) genuine remorse afterward indicates that they
regard their victims not as fellow human beings deserving of respect but 
rather as means or obstacles—either means for their own use or 
pleasure or obstacles whom they need to remove in order to fulfill their 
own selfish impulses.  We generally react to this cold, unfeeling 
attitude toward others’ suffering with horror and disgust.  So, far from 
being inclined to excuse psychopathic defendants, we are inclined to do 
just the opposite: treat their psychopathy as an aggravating factor.  They
are not mad; they are bad.  Indeed, they are as bad as one can get.  They 
knowingly and willingly harmed their victims.  This is the very 
embodiment of evil, not of insanity.
Third, people like Gacy seem sane.  Yes, Gacy was a person
whose psychology we have a great deal of trouble understanding.  Most 
of us simply cannot imagine how a person could even want to torture 
and kill others, no less carry through on this bizarre desire.  To be sure,
we understand that he had these desires and acted on them—much as
Gacy understood that we are morally opposed to these desires and acts.
What we do not understand is how he wanted and did these things— 
perhaps as much as Gacy did not understand how we do not share his
desires.  But foreign as he is to us, difficult as it is to put ourselves inside
his head and experience the world as he did, it is still reasonable to 
perceive him as sufficiently rational.  He was cognitively and socially 
intelligent, able to communicate as a normal human being, did not suffer 
from any illusions (like many schizophrenics), and was quite adept— 
indeed, too adept—at practical reason (that is, at finding the means to
satisfy his ends).  In short, he walked on two legs and came across as a
normal human in most respects.141  And in the few respects that he did 
141. See  HARE, supra note 5, at 142 (“[W]hy are psychopaths so believable, so 
capable of deceiving and manipulating us?  Why do we fail to pick up the
inconsistencies in what they say?  The short answer is, it is difficult to penetrate their
mask of normalcy . . . [because] they put on a good show.  We are sucked in not by what 
they say but by how they say it and by the emotional buttons they push while saying
it.”); MOSS, supra note 12, at 16 (“John Wayne Gacy . . . . seemed to be the embodiment 
of all evil . . . .  Unlike some of the [other serial killers], he was totally invisible when he 
was operating. There was no way you could tell what he was up to.  He wasn’t a crazed 
lunatic like Manson or a loner like Dahmer; rather, he projected the appearance of a
normal guy whom most anyone would like.”); Borg, supra note 127, at 159
(“[C]ognitive neuroscience data have shown that psychopaths have deficits in emotional
processing, yet they are still able to maintain a ‘mask of sanity’ and rationalize what is 
morally right or appropriate . . . .”); Hart, supra note 3, at 162, 167–68; Lee, supra note 
3, at 126 (“[It is] disturbing . . . that psychopaths usually appear well adjusted and exhibit 
average or better intelligence.  Thus, psychopaths not only possess dangerous traits prone 
to violence, they are capable of masking those characteristics under a façade of
superficial normalcy for unsuspecting victims.” (footnote omitted)); Litton, supra note 6,
at 385 (“Psychopaths are in touch with physical reality: they do not suffer from 
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not come across as normal, he was not mad.  Rather, again, he was bad— 
indeed, pure evil.142 
Fourth, we saw above in Part II.D that psychopathy and ASPD overlap 
significantly.  Once again, the only real differences between them are
that (1) lack of empathy is not an essential criterion of ASPD and
(2) while the diagnostic criteria of ASPD are primarily behavioral, the 
diagnostic criteria of psychopathy are both behavioral and psychological. 
We also saw in Part II.D that up to 90% of the prison population are 
thought to suffer from ASPD.  If, then, the courts were suddenly to shift
course and stipulate that ASPD is a form of insanity, it follows that most
criminal cases would lead to insanity verdicts rather than criminal
convictions.  But this is a shift that society is not at all inclined to
take—for obvious reasons (consequentialist, retributivist, expressivist,
and commonsensical).  Given this reluctance and the fact that
psychopathy and ASPD are so similar, it follows that society is nearly, if
not equally, reluctant to regard psychopathy as a form of insanity.143 
Fifth, the courts are not generally aware of the scientific evidence 
regarding psychopaths’ moral ignorance and incapacity for moral 
knowledge. Moreover, researchers differ in their interpretations of this 
data.  So the courts that are presented with this data are not 
confident enough to conclude from it that a given defendant who has
been diagnosed with psychopathy either (1) genuinely lacked knowledge or 
substantial appreciation that the act was morally wrong or (2) genuinely
lacked the capacity to know or substantially appreciate that the act was 
morally wrong.  Indeed, even if the courts ventured far enough to accept 
(1)—to accept that the defendant did not know that the act was morally 
psychosis, as do persons with schizophrenia.  And they know the general nature of what 
they are doing.  Indeed, they can have insight into other people sufficient to con and 
manipulate them successfully.” (footnote omitted)).
142. See MOSS, supra note 12, at 256–57 (“I began wondering if Gacy had a soul. 
I wondered if someone who was that evil, who’d destroyed so many lives, who was so
willing to be deceptive and manipulative, could possibly have anything resembling a
spiritual side to him.”).
143. See Litton, supra note 6, at 390 (“We must also consider the financial and 
other costs to the criminal justice system in excusing individuals with psychopathy. . . . 
[T]he number of offenders who could possibly raise (although not necessarily with 
success) a psychopathy-excuse defense is very high. . . .  The fact that so many criminal 
defendants would be able to litigate their responsibility-status could carry more than
financial cost: ‘The law wants to reinforce societal assumptions that most of us are 
morally accountable actors but [a psychopathy excuse] would permit most criminal 
defendants to challenge that expectation of accountability.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
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wrongful—they would still likely find criminal responsibility because they 
would not be confident enough in the expert testimony to accept (2) as
well. All else being equal, it seems safer to presume that the 
psychopathic defendant either was not ignorant in the first place or, if he
was, was more willfully than helplessly ignorant. 
IX. WHY PSYCHOPATHS ARE CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE EVEN 
THOUGH THEY ARE NOT MORALLY RESPONSIBLE
In this Part, I will argue that the criminal justice system is right not to 
regard psychopathy as a form of insanity and therefore as a basis for
invoking the insanity defense. 
As we saw in Part V, there are two main reasons for the conclusion 
that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their criminal acts: 
inability to know right from wrong and inability to avoid doing the wrong 
thing.  Scholars typically infer from this conclusion that psychopaths are 
not criminally responsible for their crimes and therefore may not be 
justly punished.  I will argue, however, that this inference is false; that 
even if psychopaths are not morally responsible for their criminal acts, 
they are still criminally responsible—and therefore criminally punishable— 
for them.  In a nutshell, I will argue that Appreciation-of-Criminality
jurisdictions get it right. Even if psychopaths are unable to have a 
moral, emotional, or affective understanding—an understanding of 
the concern for others that underlies most—of the criminal law, they still 
have a cognitive understanding of the criminal law; an understanding that if
they violate the criminal law, they will likely be caught and
punished.144 And although the latter understanding is not sufficient for
moral responsibility, it is sufficient for criminal responsibility, in which
case it is perfectly legitimate to hold psychopaths criminally
responsible and punish them rather than acquitting and then
committing them. 
A.  Why Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require     
Moral Responsibility 
Once again, criminal responsibility is generally thought to require moral
responsibility.  If people are not morally responsible for their behavior,
then it seems unjust to criminally punish them for it.  It is easy to see
why most would subscribe to this proposition.  Responsibility is
144. See H.J. Eysenck, Personality and Crime, in  PSYCHOPATHY: ANTISOCIAL,
CRIMINAL, AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, supra note 7, at 40, 45 (“Research has shown that 
criminals know what is right and wrong as well as anybody—they just prefer the wrong
to the right.”).
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responsibility.  If I am not responsible for a given act, then it is not fair to 
blame me for it.  And if it is not fair to blame me for it, then it is equally
unfair to punish me for it. 
But what this syllogism fails to take into account is a critical—and 
almost entirely overlooked—distinction between two different kinds
of responsibility: moral and criminal.  Although the two clearly overlap, 
the latter simply does not require the former.  One can be criminally
responsible for a criminal act even if one is not morally responsible for 
it.  The explanation is that our reasons for holding people morally
responsible are different from our reasons for holding people criminally
responsible.  On the one hand, we hold people morally responsible 
(blameworthy) when they fail to comply with moral norms and knew or
should have known these moral norms.  On the other hand, we hold
people criminally responsible—and therefore criminally punishable— 
when they fail to comply with the criminal law and knew or should have 
known that these laws were in effect. 
To be sure, criminal laws often follow moral norms.  All malum in se
laws—laws against murder, rape, theft, and kidnapping—are laws that 
derive directly from moral prohibitions.  Still, when we find a defendant
guilty of committing a malum in se crime, we are blaming and punishing 
the defendant not for violating the moral norm per se but for violating
the criminal law.
Criminal blame—the practice of holding a defendant criminally
responsible—assumes that the defendant satisfies four conditions:
CR1: knowledge, or a threshold capacity to know, the (relevant) criminal 
law (C);
CR2: a threshold capacity to refrain from violating C; 
CR3: control over violating C;145 
CR4: an absence of circumstances that excuse this violation, including 
reasonable (or reasonably understandable) ignorance of the possible/ 
likely consequences of violating C. 
Naturally, these four conditions parallel the conditions of moral 
responsibility, presented above in Part IV: 
145. Cf. Vincent Chiao, Action and Agency in the Criminal Law, 15 LEGAL THEORY
1, 16–22 (2009) (arguing that the voluntary-act requirement should be understood as a
“practical-agency condition” rather than a control condition). 
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MR1: knowledge, or a threshold capacity to know, that A is morally 
wrong;
MR2: a threshold capacity to refrain from A-ing; 
MR3: control over A-ing; and
MR4: an absence of circumstances that excuse this performance.
Still, these two lists are only superficially similar.  In fact, the differences 
between them help to explain how a person might be criminally responsible
for A-ing without being morally responsible for A-ing.  Suppose that the 
defendant is, because of a psychological or neurological disorder, incapable
of grasping or understanding moral norms.  Then we cannot (justly) hold 
the defendant morally responsible for A-ing because MR1—one of the 
four conditions required for holding him morally responsible—is simply
not satisfied.  Importantly, however, we might still be able to hold the 
defendant criminally responsible for A-ing.  Even though the defendant 
could not understand the moral basis of the criminal law and therefore 
cannot be blamed for failing to comply with the criminal law qua moral 
norm, the defendant might still have been able to understand the 
possible or likely consequences of violating the criminal law (arrest,
conviction, punishment, and stigma) and therefore still had plenty of 
good reasons for complying with the criminal law qua criminal law.146 
146. See HARE, supra note 5, at 78 (“[P]sychopaths are not completely unresponsive 
to the myriad rules and taboos that hold society together.  After all, they are not 
automatons, blindly responding to momentary needs, urges, and opportunities.  It is just
that they are much freer than the rest of us to pick and choose the rules and restrictions
they will adhere to. . . .  [T]he psychopath carries out his evaluation of a situation—what
he will get out of it and at what cost—without the usual anxieties, doubts, and concerns 
about being humiliated, causing pain, sabotaging future plans, in short, the infinite 
possibilities that people of conscience consider when deliberating possible actions.”); id. 
at 143 (“In my opinion, psychopaths certainly know enough about what they are doing to
be held accountable for their actions.”); Eysenck, supra note 144, at 40, 45 (“Research
has shown that criminals know what is right and wrong as well as anybody—they just 
prefer the wrong to the right.”); Fischette, supra note 9, at 1482 (“[T]he limits on
behavior come not from any emotional connection to the moral import of the law but 
rather from the clear fear of being punished—a purely self-interested motivation. If that 
can be generalized, there may be a class of laws where emotional capacities are
unnecessary to the fairness of attributions of responsibility.”); Hart, supra note 3, at 169
(“According to the law, people with psychopathy may have problems fully appreciating the
emotional meaning or consequences of their actions and using their emotions to make 
choices and plans, but they ought to know better than to commit serious crime and 
violence.”); Lippke, supra note 6, at 394 (“Granted, the criminal law does not set very
high liability requirements with regard to legal punishment.  In particular, it does not 
require that those liable to punishment be capable in any very substantial way of 
regulating their conduct by reference to moral considerations.  It is enough for the
criminal law if individuals are capable of restraining their violent proclivities based
merely on considerations of self-interest.”); Morse, supra note 10, at 1068–69 (“Most
sexually violent agents are firmly in touch with reality, instrumentally rational, and fully
aware of the applicable moral and legal rules. . . .  Furthermore, although predators’
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Consider a violent crime such as murder.  Most people refrain from 
committing murder for four reasons.147  First, they just do not want to.
Angry as they may get at other people, they simply do not want to kill—no
less think of killing—the latter.  Second, a subset of this majority may
think of killing.  But they refrain for one of three reasons.  The first
reason (among this inclined subset) and the second overall reason that
they refrain from murder is that they morally oppose it; their conscience 
would not tolerate it.  Although they may entertain, however briefly, the 
thought of murdering the person whom they hate, they quickly decide 
against it because they believe that it is just wrong, morally intolerable.148 
The second reason (among the inclined subset) and the third overall
reason that they refrain from murder is that they respect the criminal law.
They believe that the criminal law, at least the law prohibiting murder, 
represents the moral ideals of the community; and they have too much
respect for this shared moral code to defy it.  The third reason (among
the inclined subset) and the fourth overall reason that they refrain from 
murder is that they fear the criminal law.  They fear violating it, getting 
caught, and being criminally punished. Importantly, fear need not have 
the affect of fright or dread; it could consist solely in the fright-free
knowledge that unpreferred consequences—especially arrest and punishment
—will likely follow a given criminal act.149 
sexual desires and behavior may be statistically abnormal and morally objectionable,
predators are instrumentally rational when they satisfy those desires. . . .  [I]t appears that 
most mentally abnormal sexual predators are fully responsible for their sexually
predatory conduct, even if they suffer from a serious, recognized disorder, and, thus, they
may fairly be criminally convicted for their sexual crimes.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 
1072 (“[U]nless they have a co-occurring psychotic disorder, people with psychopathy
are entirely in touch with reality, instrumentally rational, and know the applicable moral 
and legal rules.  They simply do not ‘get’ the point of morality and cannot be guided by
it.  They are guided only by the fear of sanctions.”). 
147. See HARE, supra note 5, at 75 (offering a similar list). 
148. See Eysenck, supra note 144, at 45 (“I suggest[] that we behave[] well because 
our consciences would trouble us if we did not; this is not an original notion, because it
agrees with common-sense and religious teaching.”).
149. See HARE, supra note 5, at 54 (“Laboratory experiments using biomedical 
recorders have shown that psychopaths lack the physiological responses normally
associated with fear.”); id. at 56 (“For [psychopaths], fear—like most other emotions—is 
incomplete, shallow, largely cognitive in nature, and without the physiological turmoil or
‘coloring’ that most of us find distinctly unpleasant and wish to avoid or reduce.”); id. at 
76 (“[I]n psychopaths, the links between prohibited acts and anxiety are weak, and the 
threat of punishment fails to deter them.”); id. at 194 (“Psychopaths are always getting 
into trouble, in large part because their behavior is not motivated by anxiety or guided by
cues that warn of danger. . . .  [T]hey miss much of what goes on around them.”); Lee, 
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For most people, the first three reasons above are sufficient to prevent 
them from even attempting to murder.  For a smaller group of people, 
the first three reasons are not sufficient, but the fourth is.  For a tiny
minority of people, however, none of these four reasons is sufficient; in 
spite of all of them, they still murder.  These people are responsible for
murder as long as they knew that they were killing without justification/ 
excuse and that killing without justification/excuse is against the law. 
One might think of it as a sort of contract or “deal” with the state: if I 
commit this act, which I know is criminal, then I expose myself to
arrest, stigma, and criminal punishment if I should be caught and 
found guilty.150  If, for example, I enjoy harming others because of the
sense of control and power it gives me,151 then the “price” that I must
pay for this enjoyment is possible apprehension, conviction,
incarceration, and stigma.152  Importantly, all of this is the case only so
long as I can be reasonably expected to know the consequences of
breaking the law—whether or not I fear these consequences.153 
Assume, for example, that Killer murders Victim and that Killer is 
lawfully caught, arrested, indicted, and tried.  On what grounds should
Killer be found guilty and criminally punished?  It is generally held that 
(1) Killer should be found guilty only if he is criminally responsible for
murdering Victim, and (2) Killer should be found criminally responsible 
only if he is morally responsible for murdering Victim.  Ground (1) is 
correct.  But, despite its nearly universal acceptance, (2) is false.  Suppose
Killer wanted to kill Victim because he hated her; that he simply could 
not grasp or understand any moral reasons not to act on his hatred and 
murder Victim; that he did not respect the criminal law; and that he
understood that murder was against the law and therefore that if he was 
caught, he was likely to be found guilty and punished.  It does not look 
supra note 3, at 126 (“From a judicial perspective, the key psychopathic trait is 
fearlessness, making the psychopath more difficult to socialize using standard threats of
punishment.  Specifically, psychopaths lack a normal fear or anxiety response.  Instead, 
psychopaths tend to act impulsively, which indicates deficient inhibitory control.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
150. Cf. Ken Levy, Solution to the Problem of Outcome Luck: Why Harm Is Just as 
Punishable as the Wrongful Action that Causes It, 24 LAW & PHIL. 263, 285–88 (2005)
(arguing that by voluntarily engaging in criminal conduct, a person is making a deal with
“the gods” or “the casino of morality” that the moral status of that person’s action will be 
determined, in large part, by the degree of harm that the action causes). 
151. See supra note 94. 
152. Indeed, on this contractual view, the criminal’s preferences are largely
irrelevant.  Even if the criminal were masochistic and wished to be caught and punished, 
the deal would remain the same: by committing the criminal act, the criminal would still
be exposed to all of the predictable consequences, consequences that most of us regard
as highly undesirable. 
153. See supra note 149. 
1366
KEN LEVY DANGEROUS PSYCHOPATHS REPLACEMENT122411 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/2012 9:56 AM      
  









   
   
 
 








   
 
                
 
    
 
[VOL. 48:  1299, 2011] Dangerous Psychopaths 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
like Killer is morally responsible for murdering Victim; once again, he 
could not even understand that, or why, murdering her was morally
wrong.  Yet he still seems criminally responsible—guilty of the crime— 
simply because, in spite of his understanding that murder was against the
law and the likely consequences of breaking this law (arrest and
punishment), he still went ahead, assumed the risk of suffering these 
consequences, and murdered her.154 
Indeed, it is mainly because of people like Killer that we have a
criminal justice system in the first place.  If there were no such people— 
if everybody were sufficiently deterred from breaking the law by
morality, respect for the law, or fear of the law—then there would be no 
need for criminal punishment at all.  There would be a need only for 
criminal statutes and the threat of criminal punishment should these 
statutes be violated.  Unfortunately, however, there are such people,
people who, like Killer, are not sufficiently motivated, for whatever
reason, by morality, respect for the law, or fear of the law to comply
with the law.  It is precisely for this segment of the population, tiny as it 
usually is, that we need to maintain and continue implementing the 
practice of criminal punishment.  Indeed, it would be nonsensical to hold
otherwise.  If we could not punish people for whom morality was not
sufficiently motivating, then we could not punish virtually anybody.  By
definition, a criminal is a person who did the criminally wrong thing and 
therefore—with the arguable exception of some malum prohibitum laws 
and a tiny number of arguably unjust criminal laws—the morally wrong 
thing. 
It therefore remains a great puzzle why scholars seem to be unanimous
in holding the opposite belief, in assuming that a person cannot be punished
unless morality could have sufficiently motivated that person to comply. 
Ability to be moral has nothing to do with it.  When it comes to determining 
criminal responsibility, it is only the ability to be noncriminal—the ability
to comply with the criminal law—that matters.155 
B.  Why Moral or Emotional Understanding of the Law Is         
Not Necessary for Criminal Responsibility 
One might argue that Appreciation-of-Moral-Wrongfulness 
jurisdictions get it right; that the reason Killer can be justly punished for 
154. See supra notes 78 and 146 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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murder is not merely because he could have refrained from murdering
but because he had a moral (or emotional or affective) understanding of 
the law against murder.  He understood why murder is against the law.
And this moral understanding—an understanding not merely that murder
is against the law but also the moral basis for this legal prohibition—is 
what entitles us to hold him responsible and punish him.  If Killer lacked
this moral understanding, then it would not be just to hold him responsible 
and punish him.  And because this is the situation that psychopaths are 
in—because they understand only what is against the law, not the deeper
moral basis for any given legal prohibition—we may not justly hold 
them responsible, and punish them, for their crimes. 
This objection, however, is flawed.  There are situations in which
nonpsychopaths, people just like you and me, do not have a moral (or 
emotional or affective) understanding of prohibitions against certain
behavior.  And, despite their temptation to violate these prohibitions, they
still refrain from this behavior for no other reason than that it is
prohibited.  It is not clear, then, why we cannot reasonably expect the 
same (often self-interested) self-restraint from the psychopath.
Consider, for example, cocaine use.  Many people who believe that 
there is nothing morally wrong with snorting cocaine still refrain from 
this activity for at least one of the first four reasons above: absence of
desire, conscience, respect for the law, or fear of the law.  It is not at all 
clear, then, why we cannot expect the same of everybody else, even if 
they happen to lack a moral understanding of this law and are therefore 
not deterred by the first two reasons (absence of desire or conscience). 
Suppose that a person—Connie—has a strong desire to snort cocaine; 
Connie strongly believes that snorting cocaine is not morally wrong;
Connie does not respect the laws prohibiting cocaine use and possession;
and Connie purchases and then snorts cocaine.  The police somehow
get word of this and, after a lawful search and seizure, arrest Connie for 
these criminal acts.  At trial, Connie might claim that she did not really
know about the laws prohibiting purchase, possession, and use of
cocaine because she lacked any moral or emotional understanding of
these laws.  But very few—including even most opponents of cocaine 
laws—would agree that this defense is viable.  Connie knew that cocaine 
purchase, possession, and use were against the law and therefore that she
was assuming the risk of being caught and punished when she violated 
these laws.  The fact that she disagreed with, and therefore lacked a 
moral or emotional understanding of, these laws does not excuse her. 
So much the worse, then, for psychopaths.  Like Connie, they lack
a moral/emotional understanding of laws prohibiting the crimes that they
commit.  For this reason, they might even disagree with these laws.  But, 
for the same reason that this lack of a moral or emotional understanding 
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does not excuse Connie, it does not excuse psychopaths.  Whether or not 
they agree with, or morally/emotionally understand, the law is irrelevant. 
Just as one does not need a moral/emotional understanding of why
purchasing, possessing, or using cocaine is against the law to be criminally 
responsible for committing these crimes, so too one does not need a 
moral/emotional understanding of why violating any other law is
morally wrong in order to be criminally responsible for violating that 
law.156 
Again, all one does need to be criminally responsible for breaking the 
law is knowledge of the law (and sufficient self-control, which will be 
discussed in Part IX.C).  And the fact of the matter is that psychopaths 
generally know the criminal law.  They know what the criminal law
prohibits and what the consequences are if they still violate the law and
get caught. At least there is nothing about their psychopathy that conflicts
with, or removes, this knowledge.  So unless a given psychopathic 
defendant can show that there are other reasons why he did not know 
156. See supra notes 78 and 146 and accompanying text; see also HARE, supra note 
5, at 143 (“[Psychopaths] are capable of controlling their behavior, and they are aware of
the potential consequences of their acts. . . .  They understand the intellectual rules of the 
game but the emotional rules are lost to them.  This modern version of the old concept of 
‘moral insanity’ may make some theoretical sense, but it is not relevant to practical 
decisions about criminal responsibility.  In my opinion, psychopaths certainly know 
enough about what they are doing to be held accountable for their actions.”); Hart, supra
note 3, at 166 (“[Psychopaths’] understanding of the physical consequences of their 
actions is intact; they can use this ability to compensate for or overcome their 
impairment (at least to some extent), and the law expects them to do so. . . .  The law 
typically holds that people with psychopathy are capable of and can reasonably be 
expected to use their intact cognitive skills and abilities to overcome their impairments 
when making decisions with potentially serious consequences.  Similarly, the law 
expects that people with serious color blindness should be aware of and compensate for 
their handicap—knowing they may have difficulty discriminating between red and green 
traffic lights, they should either avoid driving or develop strategies to ensure they can 
drive safely.”); Lippke, supra note 6, at 402 (“[G]iven the unattractiveness of the options 
other than preventive detention available to [psychopaths], the nonmoral reasons to
which such individuals are responsive will likely counsel them to take their chances on
remaining free . . . and attempt to avoid arrest and prosecution.”); Morse, supra note 6, at 
51–52 (“[P]sychopathy does not prevent agents from acting as the law defines action, nor 
does it prevent psychopaths from forming prohibited mental states. . . .  Further, 
psychopaths are not excused because they do possess many rational capacities.  They
usually know the facts and are generally in touch with reality, they understand that there 
are rules and consequences for violating them . . . and they feel pleasure and pain, the 
anticipation of which can potentially guide their conduct. . . .  Finally, psychopaths do
not suffer from lack of self-control as it is traditionally understood.  They do not act in
response to desires or impulses that are subjectively experienced as overwhelming,
uncontrollable, or irresistible.”).
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that an otherwise criminal action was against the law, the defendant’s
argument that he did not know—or understand—the law will, and 
should, fail.157 
C.  Psychopaths Have Sufficient Control over Their Behavior 
In this section, I will argue that contrary to the arguments in Part V.B–C,
psychopaths do have sufficient control over their criminal acts to be
criminally responsible, and therefore criminally punishable, for them. 
Even if they cannot “help” obtaining pleasure from hurting others, they
still can help whether or not they try to obtain this pleasure to a degree
that is sufficient for criminal responsibility even if it is not sufficient for
moral responsibility.
First, if the arguments in Part V.B–C worked, they would lead to the 
highly undesirable result that we would be committed to acquitting 
defendants who proved to the required standard that they were just too 
tempted to engage in criminal activity.  But these are precisely the people 
we should be punishing, not acquitting, if only for consequentialist reasons
—specific deterrence, general deterrence, and incapacitation.
Second, the arguments in Part V.B–C in favor of acquitting Gacy on 
the basis of lack of control just seem wrong—morally wrong.  If defendants 
committed a criminal act because they were simply too tempted to engage
in this kind of activity, then they are more blameworthy, not less, than 
they would be if they engaged in the activity for any other reason.  They
victimized another human being not accidentally or because they were
acting in self-defense but because they wanted to, because they derived 
pleasure from it—as much (or more) pleasure as Charlie derives from
chocolate cake and Helen from heroin!158 Indeed, if—contrary to fact— 
drug addicts directly victimized others merely by possessing or using 
drugs, we would most likely hold them criminally responsible for inflicting 
this harm in spite of the fact that they were addicts.  The same, then,
applies to psychopaths.  The fact that a given person—call him Bill—did 
not resist committing, say, a violent act—V-ing—against another person 
because it brought him such pleasure is the epitome of evil, not of sickness. 
It is why we regard dictators such as Hitler and Stalin as among the 
greatest criminals of the twentieth century; they caused millions to die 
157. See Ward, supra note 79, at 20 (“The notion that people who know they are 
making themselves liable to punishment but break the rules anyway should therefore not 
be punished is not one that many lawyers find persuasive.”).
158. See HARE, supra note 5, at 40, 61–62 (quoting two psychopaths who compared 
the joy that they received from engaging in antisocial behavior to the “fix” or “high” that
one gets from taking drugs). 
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for their own selfish ends.159  Whatever psychological problems they
had, and psychopathy was clearly one of them,160 we regard them as
fully culpable. If they had been tried for their crimes (crimes against
humanity and war crimes), they would have been found guilty and punished
to the maximum degree allowable.161  Regarding Bill, then, we should
treat him accordingly—not by holding him nonresponsible and
committing him to a psychiatric hospital but rather by holding him fully
responsible and punishing him in proportion to the harm that he
enthusiastically inflicted on another human being. 
Third, Bill has a very good reason for refraining from violating the 
law: the prospect of getting caught and punished.  He knows that this is 
one very possible, if not likely, negative consequence of his illegal
behavior.162  If Bill still goes ahead and Vs, he does so with one of two
beliefs: that he is not likely to get caught or punished or that apprehension
159. See ROSENBAUM, supra note 2, at 367 (expressing the preference for a
“contingent vision, which makes individual schemers, flesh-and-blood immoral agents—
Hitler himself—responsible for Hitler’s crimes, rather than impersonal, inexorable forces
of history”). See generally  TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS: EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER
AND STALIN (2010) (offering ample evidence that Hitler and Stalin both deliberately
ordered, with complete indifference, millions of human beings to be killed for strategic, 
political, and ideological reasons); Christian Ingrao, General Chronology of Nazi 
Violence, ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA MASS VIOLENCE (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.mass 
violence.org/IMG/article_PDF/General-Chronology-of-Nazi-Violence.pdf (documenting 
in great detail Hitler’s genocides, crimes against humanity, and war crimes); Nicolas
Werth, Mass Crimes Under Stalin (1930–1953), ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA MASS VIOLENCE
(Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.massviolence.org/IMG/article_PDF/Mass-crimes-under-
Stalin-1930-1953.pdf (describing in great detail Stalin’s genocides, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes).
160. Indeed, one book about Hitler is titled The Psychopathic God. See RALPH G.L.
WAITE, THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER (Da Capo Press 1993) (1977). 
161. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 70
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 5, 2001), available at http://www.
unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4147fcad4.pdf (“[T]here is no per se inconsistency between a 
diagnosis of the kind of immature, narcissistic, disturbed personality on which the Trial 
Chamber relied and the ability to form an intent to destroy a particular protected group. 
Indeed . . . it is the borderline unbalanced personality who is more likely to be drawn to
extreme racial and ethnical hatred than the more balanced modulated individual without 
personality defects.”); see also United States v. Goering (IMT Judgment), in 1 TRIAL OF 
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, at v
(1947) (omitting to acquit any of the twenty Nazi high officials on the grounds of 
insanity).
 162. See supra note 156.  And if this is not the case—if Bill does not know that he 
risks criminal punishment by performing a certain criminal act—then he may be a good
candidate for the insanity defense on the basis of the M’Naghten rule or the appreciation
prong of MPC § 4.01(1) rather than on the basis of IIR or the volitional prong of MPC
§ 4.01(1). 
 1371















   
  




















   
 
  
and punishment are not so bad in the first place.163  Whichever belief is
at work, Bill is voluntarily assuming the risk of apprehension and 
punishment when he Vs.164  And it is this voluntary assumption of risk
that precludes excusing Bill and justifies punishing him instead. 
Fourth, the arguments in Part V.B–C that the psychopath is like the 
addict insofar as both are powerless to resist their overwhelming urges
confuses difficulty with inability.  To be sure, Smoker’s addiction to
nicotine makes it difficult for her to resist the temptation to smoke and, 
as the temptation increases, proportionally causes her to discount all of 
the reasons that she wants to quit smoking. 
But even given her addiction, Smoker is the one who is doing this 
sudden discounting of her values and desire to quit.  Yes, her addiction 
is motivating this discounting.  But, difficult as it may be, it is still 
entirely up to Smoker to resist this discounting and reassert her long-
term reasons for quitting over her short-term reasons for giving in.165 
163. See Lippke, supra note 6, at 402 (“[G]iven the unattractiveness of the options
other than preventive detention available to [psychopaths], the nonmoral reasons to
which such individuals are responsive will likely counsel them to take their chances on
remaining free . . . and attempt to avoid arrest and prosecution.”).
164. See Levy, supra note 150, at 281–93 (explaining why voluntary assumption of
risk justifies greater punishment for greater harm, all else being equal). 
165. See  GENE M. HEYMAN, ADDICTION: A DISORDER OF CHOICE 116 (2009) 
(“Addiction depends on general principles of choice, the unique behavioral effects of 
addictive drugs, and individual and environmental factors that affect decision
making. . . .  For humans, virtually all environments support more than one activity, so 
that in effect most behavior is choice behavior.  Indeed, most of what all mammals do
most of the time is voluntary.”).  There is a second argument that leads to the same
conclusion, in other words, that Smoker is responsible for whether or not she decides to
smoke: Smoker is the one who started smoking way back when.  Presumably nobody
forced her to.  Even peer pressure does not count as force and is perfectly consistent with 
culpable, autonomous choice. Peter de Marneffe, Against Drug Legalization, in  THE 
LEGALIZATION OF DRUGS: FOR & AGAINST 108, 154 (2005) (“It is an error based on
science fiction to think that heroin addiction turns a person into a zombie who is 
completely unable to guide his actions by his own deliberative judgment.  Heroin use 
may be difficult for some people to control . . . but this does not mean that it is entirely 
outside their control.  This is because a person always has the mental capacity to decide
to stop using heroin or to form the intention to do so.  Because heroin is addictive . . .
this intention may not be entirely effective. . . .  But a person also has the mental capacity
to decide what she needs to do in order to succeed in acting in accordance with her 
original intention—to form the intention to get whatever help she needs to stay clean that
day, for example.”); Slobogin, supra note 47, at 36–37 (“Even conduct that the actor
perceives to be the product of strong urges is ‘willed,’ in the sense that the actor decides 
to engage in it.  The addict who steals to feed a habit, the sexual predator who molests a 
child, and the psychotic individual who kills all intend, and often plan, their actions. 
Further, they all probably could have avoided those actions, in the sense that they knew
of and were able to choose other options.  Finally, for many of these individuals the
criminal act is pleasurable, rather than a method of avoiding psychological pain, or is at 
least a combination of the two.  For all of these reasons, identifying precisely how such
actions are ‘compelled’ is difficult.  While such people may seem to have overwhelming
urges, they still choose to act on those urges and they do not seem to be compelled in the 
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This argument, incidentally, leads to the conclusion that Smoker is
responsible for whichever way she decides this inner conflict.166 
In case one still doubts this point, consider the following scenario.  It
is the very first day of Smoker’s attempt to quit smoking “cold turkey.” 
At 10:00 a.m., the urge to smoke first makes an “appearance.”  Smoker
resists it and occupies herself with another activity.  At 10:10 a.m. the
urge to smoke increases in intensity.  Smoker tries harder to distract herself. 
By 10:20 a.m., Smoker decides that she just cannot go on any longer and 
runs to her desk for a cigarette and lighter.  From these facts alone, one
might argue that Smoker lost control over her decision whether or not to
smoke.  Although she tried to resist her ever-increasing desire to smoke,
this desire ultimately overcame Smoker and compelled her to smoke. 
same way a person acting with a gun pointing at his head is compelled.” (footnotes 
omitted)).
166. See SAMENOW, supra note 45, at 40–41 (“[W]e choose which peer group or
groups to belong to. . . .  No criminal I have evaluated or counseled was forced into
crime.  He chose to associate with risk-taking youngsters who were doing what was 
forbidden. . . .  Sometimes alone, but more often with youngsters like himself, he 
commits more and more crimes, bolstering his self-image in the process and finding that 
no one can do anything for very long to bring a halt to his spiraling criminality.”); id. at
41 (“The view that a youngster is led or driven into crime to gain status ignores the role 
of personal choice. . . .  From the time he was little, the delinquent has chosen the 
company he keeps and has determined what kind of status he wants.”).  So Smoker 
brought this addiction upon herself when she could have chosen to avoid it, which means 
that even if she cannot do otherwise now, she is still responsible for her addictive 
behavior because she could have avoided becoming an addict in the first place.  See
Lippke, supra note 6, at 395 (distinguishing between “primary moral control,” which is 
control over behavior at the time of performance, and “secondary moral control,” which 
is indirect control over later behavior, control over the current action only by means of 
control over previous causally relevant actions); Morse, supra note 10, at 1071 (“If an
agent knows from experience that the urges are recurrent and that on previous occasions 
the agent has acted on those urges in a state of diminished rationality, the agent also
knows during more rational moments that he is at risk for acting in such a state in the 
future.  It is a citizen’s duty in such circumstances to take all reasonable steps to prevent
oneself from acting wrongly in an irrational state in the future, including drastically
limiting one’s life activities if such an intrusive step is necessary to prevent serious harm.
If the agent does not take such steps, the agent may indeed be responsible, even if at the 
moment of acting he suffers from substantially compromised capacity for rationality.
The situation would be analogous to the case of a person who suffered from a physical 
disorder that recurrently produced irrational mental states or blackouts during which the 
person caused harm, but who did not take sufficient steps to prevent such harm in the 
future.  We would surely not excuse such an agent.”).  But see Douglas N. Husak,
Addiction and Criminal Liability, 18 LAW & PHIL. 655, 668–71 (1999) (arguing that 
culpability for causing oneself to become an addict does not necessarily mean that
addiction should not be a recognized excuse in criminal law). 
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But this conclusion would be hasty.  The fact pattern above does not
say that Smoker actually ended up smoking.  Instead, as it turns out, 
when she got to her desk, all the cigarettes and lighters were gone.
Smoker’s husband had thrown them all out in order to help her
successfully quit.  Of course, Smoker is not happy about this state of 
affairs.  For the next few hours, she undergoes a roller coaster of feelings 
and emotions—anger, frustration, panic, and despair, alternating with 
brief surges of renewed resolve and optimism.  During this same period, 
she develops the same symptoms that she would have if she contracted
the flu—nausea, sweating, headaches, and fatigue.  After a few more
episodes like this over the next forty-eight hours, Smoker actually succeeds 
in quitting.  She did not, then, have to smoke at 10:20, no less afterward.
She survived perfectly well without it.  And if this had been the
counterfactual scenario, not the actual one, the same conclusion would 
follow.  However she might have felt and whatever she might have 
thought had she ended up smoking at 10:20, the fact that she could have 
gone through this alternative nonsmoking scenario proves that she could 
have resisted smoking.167 
Indeed, most young children are socialized by being denied what they
strongly desire—for example, candy and expensive toys.  They are obviously
disappointed—often angry—when their parents fail to satisfy their
requests or demands.  But they recover quickly and survive just fine,
which proves that they do not have to eat the candy or acquire any given 
toy.  The same, then, applies to adults.  If children can undergo 
nonsatisfaction of their strongest desires, no matter how dissatisfying and 
unpleasant, then certainly adults can as well.
167. See Husak, supra note 166, at 681 (“The desire to avoid the pain of withdrawal 
provides a woefully inadequate explanation of why patterns of consumption among users 
of many drugs . . . tend to be so compulsive.  Many users would continue to report a 
craving, and succumb to drug use, even if no physical withdrawal symptoms occurred. 
Accounts that emphasize the desire to avoid withdrawal distort the phenomenology of 
addiction from the perspective of most addicts.  In particular, the hypothesis that persons 
consume drugs in order to prevent withdrawal cannot begin to explain why current 
addicts find it hard to quit, or why former addicts find it easy to relapse.” (footnotes 
omitted)); de Marneffe, supra note 165, at 153–54 (“Some may believe . . . that heroin 
prohibition is justified by its benefits to mature adults because once a person uses heroin,
whatever his age, he is ‘hooked,’ because he cannot stop using it without agony, and
because habitual heroin use turns a person into a zombie with no capacity for genuine
self-direction.  This picture, however, has little basis in reality.  For one thing, although 
heroin is certainly addictive . . . a large proportion of those who use the drug do not 
develop a self-destructive habit.  For another thing, those who develop a habit may
nonetheless stop without great suffering.  (The discomfort involved in kicking a habit is 
commonly likened to having the flu for a few days.)  Finally, although habitual heroin 
use can be bad for a person in depressing his motivation, it does not turn a person into a 
zombie whose capacities for self-direction are no longer functioning at all.” (footnote 
omitted)).
1374
KEN LEVY DANGEROUS PSYCHOPATHS REPLACEMENT122411 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/2012 9:56 AM      
  







   
 



















[VOL. 48:  1299, 2011] Dangerous Psychopaths 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Likewise with Bill.  Whichever way Bill decides depends on what
relative weights he assigns to his desire to V and his desire to remain free 
from criminal punishment.  And even given his psychopathy, it is up to
him, and therefore a matter of criminally responsible choice, what relative 
weights he assigns here—just as it is when he is not performing criminal 
acts, which in fact is most of the time.168  Bill has the capacity to bring 
other considerations to bear against his desire to V and to act on these
other considerations.  Although Bill’s psychopathy may make it more 
difficult for him to give greater weight to his long-term desire to remain
free from criminal punishment over the short-term satisfaction of V-ing,
more difficult hardly means too difficult, no less impossible.169 
X. SHOULD WE PREVENTIVELY COMMIT DANGEROUS    
PSYCHOPATHS? 
If I am correct in Part IX that psychopaths are criminally
responsible for their behavior, then it follows that they should be 
criminally punished for their criminal acts like most other adults rather 
than acquitted and civilly committed like defendants found to be insane.
But does this position that psychopaths are criminally responsible and 
punishable mean that we cannot commit dangerous psychopaths before 
they do any harm?  If so, isn’t this an undesirable situation?  In this Part,
I will argue that society should be allowed to preventively commit 
168. See HARE, supra note 5, at 60 (“Although psychopaths have a ‘hair trigger’
and readily initiate aggressive displays, their ensuing behavior is not out of control.  On
the contrary, when psychopaths ‘blow their stack’ it is as if they are having a temper
tantrum; they know exactly what they are doing.  Their aggressive displays are ‘cold;’ 
they lack the intense emotional arousal experienced by others when they lose their 
temper.”).
169. See Lilienfeld & Arkowitz, supra note 14 (“Even if the core personality traits 
of psychopaths are exceedingly difficult to change, their criminal behaviors may prove 
more amenable to treatment.”); Hart, supra note 3, at 166 (“People with psychopathy
have fundamental difficulties maintaining attention or interest and exerting effort with 
respect to goal-directed activity. . . .  [A]lthough there is little doubt that volitional 
impairment of this sort influences behavior on a day-to-day basis, it is possible for 
people with psychopathy to perceive alternative courses of action, make choices, and
compensate for or overcome their volitional impairment (at least to some extent) using 
other skills or abilities . . . .  [A]lthough they may want to engage in antisocial activity
more often than do others, people with psychopathy are capable of exercising true 
agency with respect to this decision and the law expects them to do so.”); Morse, supra 
note 6, at 52 (“[P]sychopaths do not suffer from lack of self-control as it is traditionally
understood.  They do not act in response to desires or impulses that are subjectively
experienced as overwhelming, uncontrollable, or irresistible.”).
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people whom it knows to be dangerous and psychopathic even if (1) they
have not yet committed a crime and (2) they would be criminally 
responsible for crimes if they did commit them.170 
A.  Why Defendants Eligible for Criminal Punishment (Post-Crime) Are 
Generally Not Eligible for Preventive Commitment            
(Pre-Crime) and Vice Versa 
The questions above arise from a general assumption that is deeply
rooted in our criminal justice system: generally speaking, all else being 
equal, one and the same person cannot be both eligible for involuntary
civil commitment before committing a crime (what I will refer to as
“preventive commitment”) and eligible for criminal punishment after 
committing a crime.  All else being equal (once again), a person must be
one or the other—either (1) eligible for criminal punishment (after
committing a crime) and not eligible for preventive commitment (before 
committing a crime) or (2) eligible for preventive commitment (pre-
crime) and ineligible for criminal punishment (post-crime).171  The reason 
170. See John McMillan & Luca Malatesti, Introduction: Interfacing Law,
Philosophy, and Psychiatry, RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHOPATHY: INTERFACING LAW,
PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 5, at 1, 1 (noting that “the United
Kingdom . . . and other countries have aimed at making it easier to preventively detain 
those with ASPD who are judged to be a risk to the public”); Slobogin, supra note 47, at 
40 (arguing that “people who are sane” should “be subject to long-term preventive 
detention” when they “signal[] a desire to ignore society’s most significant norms 
regardless of the circumstances”). But see Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness:
Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1432
(2001) (“[T]he trend of the last decade—the shifting of the criminal justice system 
toward the detention of dangerous offenders—is a move in the wrong direction.  The
difficulty lies not in the laudable attempt to prevent future crime but rather in the use of 
the criminal justice system as the vehicle to achieve that goal.  The approach perverts the 
justice process and undercuts the criminal justice system’s long-term effectiveness in
controlling crime.  At the same time, the basic features of the criminal justice system
make it a costly yet ineffective preventive detention system.”).
171. See Morse, supra note 10, at 1069–70 (“[I]t appears that most mentally
abnormal sexual predators are fully responsible for their sexually predatory conduct, 
even if they suffer from a serious, recognized disorder, and, thus, they may fairly be 
criminally convicted for their sexual crimes.  But, for the same reason, most such
predators do not meet the necessary non-responsibility standard that might justify
involuntary civil confinement.  Therefore, I am claiming that, holding the agent’s 
capacity for rationality constant, the eligibility for punishment and the eligibility for
involuntary civil confinement are mutually exclusive.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1073 
(“[I]f an agent is sufficiently rational to deserve criminal conviction and punishment, the 
most intrusive, afflictive actions the state can impose on a citizen, the agent is surely
rational enough to be left at liberty until the agent commits a crime or becomes 
genuinely non-responsible.  Civil commitment should be justified only in cases in which
the agent’s rationality is sufficiently impaired also to avoid criminal responsibility.”).
But see Lippke, supra note 6, at 387 (challenging this dichotomy between criminal 
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for this dichotomy is that if a person is eligible for criminal punishment, 
then that person is not insane.  But if a person is not insane, then she may
not be preventively committed.  Preventive commitment—again, 
involuntary civil commitment—requires people to be both dangerous (to
themselves or others) and insane.172 
The same point can be formulated in terms of degrees rather than
dichotomies.  There is an inverse correlation between the degree to which
agents are morally responsible for their behavior and the ease with which 
society may preventively detain them if they are suspected of being 
dangerous to themselves or others.  The stronger the former, the weaker the
latter; and, conversely, the stronger the latter, the weaker the former. 
Of course, this inverse correlation is no accident.  All else being equal, 
we prefer maximizing the liberty of morally responsible agents despite 
the risks that some of these agents may pose to themselves or others than
punishment and preventive commitment by arguing that there is little material or
symbolic difference between them). 
172. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (“A finding of
dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify
indefinite involuntary commitment.  We have sustained civil commitment statutes when
they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such 
as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’”); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77
(1992) (citing precedent for the proposition that a “committed acquittee is entitled to 
release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous,” and “the acquittee 
may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer. . . . [because]
‘the Constitution permits the Government, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to 
confine him to a mental institution until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no 
longer a danger to himself or society’” (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 
368, 370 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hart, supra note 3, at 167 (“Two
types of commitment are permitted under the civil law of various Anglo-American 
jurisdictions.  The first is traditional civil commitment under mental health statutes.  It 
typically . . . requires they pose an imminent risk for violence due to acute mental
disorder. . . .  The second, newer form of civil commitment is under specialized statutes, 
such as sexually violent predator or (proposed) dangerous and severe personality
disorder statutes, that target offenders nearing release from a custodial sentence for a
violent offense.  It typically requires that people have committed serious violence or
sexual violence in the past, and they also pose a persistent risk for future (sexual)
violence due to chronic mental disorder.” (citations omitted)); Morse, supra note 6, at 45
(“The agent must be dangerous because he or she is suffering from a disease (especially
a mental disorder) . . . .”); id. at 57 (“Every jurisdiction in the United States provides for 
involuntary civil commitment of people who suffer from mental disorder and are 
dangerous to themselves or others as a result.”).  For a detailed summary of earlier 
Supreme Court jurisprudence establishing the constitutional contours of preventive
commitment, see Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of 
Societal Self-Defense Against Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329, 
352–84 (1989). 
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minimizing these risks by confining whomever we suspect is dangerous. 
We accept this position because it is mandated by the Constitution. 
Specifically, the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments protect
“the people” against, among other things, unreasonable searches and
seizures, cruel and unusual punishment, and deprivation of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.173  All of these constitutional 
principles would be violated if the state detained or imprisoned morally 
responsible people without having sufficient grounds to arrest them or to 
imprison them. 
The Constitution grants this general right against groundless detainment 
and imprisonment for several reasons.  First, it is grossly unjust to
confine somebody who does not deserve to be confined.  And individuals 
who are sufficiently responsible for their actions do not deserve to be
confined if they have not been convicted of a crime (after receiving full 
due process) and there is no probable cause for arresting them.174 
Second, if people did not have this right against groundless detainment
and imprisonment, we would be living in a police state.  The police
would have the power to detain and imprison whomever they—or their 
political superiors—wanted and for whatever reasons. History has
repeatedly taught us that when the police have this power—or, conversely, 
when the people lack an enforceable right against this power—then their
supremely valued interests (life, liberty, property, physical well-being, 
and emotional well-being) will be seriously impaired for very bad
reasons—usually baseless prejudice, paranoia, or vengeance.175 
Third, the more responsible individuals are for their behavior, the 
more they can control it; and the more they can control their behavior, 
the more susceptible or “sensitive” they may be to warnings and threats 
of punishment.  Therefore, the more responsible individuals are for their 
behavior, the less need there is for the state to step in and actively
prevent them from hurting themselves or others. 
 173. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VIII, XIV. 
174. See Lippke, supra note 6, at 403–05 (suggesting that “dangerous offenders 
who are somewhat responsive to moral considerations” should not be confined unless 
and until they commit crimes).
175. See, e.g., Paul H. Haagen, A Hamburg Childhood: The Early Life of Herbert 
Bernstein, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 7, 13 (2003) (“Hitler persuaded President 
Hindenburg to sign an emergency decree on February 28, 1933 that suspended most of 
the guarantees of personal freedom contained in the German Constitution in order to
permit the government to defend itself against ‘communist acts of violence endangering 
the state.’” (quoting Verordunung des Reichspräsident zum Schutz von Volk und Staat 
[Decree of the Reich’s President on the Protection of the People and the State], Feb. 28, 
1933, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] at 83 (Ger.), available at http://www.document 
archiv.de/ns.html)).
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Given this last point, and given the premium we place on individual 
liberty, it is generally thought that we must err on the side of (1) hoping
that the threat of punishment will deter the average person rather than on 
the side of (2) detaining her indefinitely.  Position (2) would reduce the 
risk of danger far more than (1) would. But (1) still trumps (2) because,
all else being equal, we prefer maximizing liberty to minimizing danger. 
Indeed, this is the risky tradeoff that a free society generally makes.176 
I will discuss this tradeoff further in Part X.D. 
It matters very much, then, whether or not society—or at least a given
jurisdiction—regards psychopathy as insanity. If it does, then it would 
seem that psychopaths are eligible for preventive commitment (pre-
crime) but not criminal punishment (post-crime).  If it does not, then it
would seem that psychopaths are eligible for criminal punishment. I have
argued above that psychopaths are not insane, do not therefore qualify for 
the insanity defense, and are therefore eligible for criminal punishment. 
It would seem to follow, then, that (pre-crime) they are not eligible for
preventive commitment—no matter how dangerous they may be.
B.  The Middle-Ground Approach: Psychopathy as Mental Illness 
But is this the right conclusion?  Or should we opt for the opposite: 
psychopaths are insane and therefore not criminally punishable but may
(therefore) be preventively committed if (pre-crime) they are found to be 
dangerous to themselves or others? 
It seems that there is at least one way in which we can have our cake 
and eat it too—one way in which we can both preventively commit 
psychopaths whom we find to be dangerous (pre-crime) and criminally 
punish them if they are found guilty of crimes.  The key is to
recognize that psychopathy may very well be regarded as a mental 
illness and therefore a condition that makes psychopaths eligible for 
preventive commitment (as long as they are also dangerous) but is not 
severe enough to be regarded as insanity (that is, is not severe enough to
be considered an inability to know/appreciate right and wrong or to act 
in conformity with this knowledge/appreciation).  In other words, the 
story can be made a bit more complicated than Part X.A would suggest. 
And this additional complication makes room for a category of people 
176. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 83 (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention 
prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” (quoting United States 
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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who might, all else being equal, be simultaneously eligible both for 
preventive commitment (pre-crime) and for criminal punishment (post-
crime).  The people who fall into this category would satisfy two
conditions: (1) the psychiatric hospital conducting the preventive 
commitment evaluation would find them to be mentally ill and (2) the 
trial court would find them to be either not mentally ill at all or mentally 
ill but not insane.  This “middle” category—the category between sanity 
and insanity—is captured by the increasingly common “guilty but 
mentally ill” verdict.177 
The question, then, is not whether or not psychopathy is a form of 
insanity.  The question is whether or not psychopathy is a form of mental 
illness.  If it is, then psychopaths qualify for involuntary civil commitment if
they are deemed to be dangerous as well.178  If not, then psychopaths, no
matter how dangerous, may not be involuntarily committed. 
Psychologists and (therefore) the courts generally do not consider 
psychopathy to be a mental illness for two reasons—one historical/ 
intuitive, the other formal/technical.  The first—historical/intuitive— 
reason is that mental illness has historically been associated with false 
beliefs about reality—delusions—and psychopathy does not typically
involve delusional beliefs.  Even though this association between mental 
illness and delusional beliefs is flimsy—that is, even though there are
mental illnesses that do not involve delusional beliefs such as mood
disorders, anxiety disorders, and depression179—many are still
prejudiced by it. 
177. See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, “Guilty but Mentally Ill” Statutes: Validity 
and Construction, 71 A.L.R.4TH 702 (2011); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 38 (2008);
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 130 (2006).  Another way to dissolve the initial tension 
between preventively committable (pre-crime) and punishable (post-crime) is to show 
that there are other categories of people who might, all else being equal, be
simultaneously ineligible for both preventive commitment (pre-crime) and criminal
punishment (post-crime).  Once again, preventive commitment is involuntary civil 
commitment.  And involuntary civil commitment requires the defendant to be both
dangerous and mentally ill.  It follows that a person who is either not dangerous or not
mentally ill may be ineligible for preventive commitment.  But the same nondangerous 
or nonmentally ill person might still be deemed insane by a court after she is found guilty
of committing a crime.  These two descriptions (nondangerous or nonmentally ill (pre-
crime) and insane (post-crime)) are compatible—attributable to the same person, all else
being equal—if (1) the person was insane all along and went from being
nondangerous to dangerous; (2) the person became severely mentally ill or (insane) 
before committing the crime; or (3) the hospital conducting the preventive commitment 
evaluation and the court conducting the psychological evaluation disagree about the 
person’s mental status—with the hospital concluding that the person was not sufficiently
mentally ill for the purposes of involuntary commitment and the court concluding that 
the person was insane. 
178. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 179. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 52, at 345. 
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The second—formal/technical—reason that psychopathy is not generally 
regarded as a mental illness is because, as we have seen, it is not
included in the DSM-IV-TR.  We saw one reason for this omission in
Part II.D; again, while the DSM-IV-TR’s construct of ASPD focuses 
on the behavioral, psychopathy is largely about the internal.  Another 
reason is that the psychological community does not (yet) believe that 
psychopathy meets the DSM-IV-TR’s conception of mental disorder: 
[E]ach of the mental disorders [in the DSM-IV-TR] is conceptualized as a
clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that 
occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e.g., a
painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one or more areas of
functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, 
disability, or an important loss of freedom . . . .  Whatever its original cause, it
must currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or
biological dysfunction in the individual. Neither deviant behavior (e.g., 
political, religious, or sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between the
individual and society are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a
symptom of a dysfunction in the individual.180 
Apparently, then, although the psychological community recognizes
that psychopaths are deviant and antisocial, it does not regard psychopaths
as sufficiently distressed, disabled, dysfunctional, or vulnerable to qualify as
suffering from a mental disorder; although psychopaths may be highly
disposed toward antisocial behavior, they can still generally function 
well enough to be considered normal.181  I will argue in this section, 
however, that this conclusion is false; that although courts do not 
generally recognize psychopathy as a mental illness, they should not 
only (1) because it is (for all the reasons given in Parts II, V, and VII.C)
but also (2) because it will enable society to preventively commit the 
people in this group that are thought to be dangerous and thereby prevent 
them from engaging in criminal activity. 
180. Id. at xxxi (emphasis added). 
181. See supra note 141 and accompanying text; see also Hart, supra note 3, at 162 
(“A few theoretical models reject the notion that psychopathy is a mental abnormality at 
all.  First, some interpersonal and behavioral genetic theories view psychopathy as an
extreme variant of the same personality traits found in all people.  According to these
theories . . . any differences between people with versus without the disorder are 
quantitative rather than qualitative in nature—that is, a matter of degree rather than kind.
Second, some sociobiological and evolutionary theories view psychopathy as a specific
adaptation to environmental conditions. . . .  [T]he genetic disposition confers an 
advantage in terms of enhanced reproductive success for affected individuals.” (citations
omitted)).
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C.  Dangerous but Not Mentally Ill
It might seem at first as though we may easily preventively commit
dangerous psychopaths simply because they are dangerous.  Indeed, society 
has little problem quarantining individuals carrying rare and deadly
viruses simply because they present a danger of infecting others.182  Still, 
people who are dangerous in a different way—dangerous in the sense of 
being inclined toward antisocial behavior—may not be as easily
“quarantined” or preventively committed.  If a person is dangerous in
this latter sense—not by carrying a disease but simply by inclining
toward antisocial behavior—then we cannot preventively commit that 
person unless she is also mentally ill.183  And this conclusion itself leads
to a counterintuitive result: we cannot preventively commit nonmentally
ill people who clearly express their intention to harm or kill others!184 
Suppose, for example, that a twenty-five-year-old law associate, Angry, 
says to a fellow law associate, Confidant, that if Angry’s boss, Meanie,
yells at Angry one more time, Angry will kill him.185  Suppose also that
Confidant, like everybody else who has interacted with Angry, believes
that Angry is a sane, rational individual.  Confidant may conclude one of
two things: either that Angry means what he says or that Angry is simply 
exaggerating, blowing off steam, and would never actually dare to kill,
no less hurt, Meanie.  If Confidant believes the latter, she will likely do 
little more than try to calm Angry down.  In this case, Confidant should 
make sure that her belief is correct; if she is wrong, the consequences of
her failure to do anything more could be drastic.  If, however, Confidant 
believes the former, she has at least a moral obligation and possibly a
legal obligation (in jurisdictions that recognize the crime of misprision 
of felony or of bad-Samaritanism186) to take steps to ensure that Angry is
prevented from carrying out his threat.
182. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 264, 266 (2006) (codifying federal authority to detain
persons who may have been exposed to communicable diseases).
183. See supra note 172 and accompanying text; see also Edward P. Richards,
Dangerous People, Unsafe Conditions: The Constitutional Basis for Public Health 
Surveillance, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 27, 28, 31–32 (2009) (showing how the laws governing 
preventive commitment of people who exhibit dangerous behavior developed from the 
laws governing quarantine (people who present the danger of viral infection) and 
therefore why the former may be considered to fall under public health law). 
184. See Lippke, supra note 6, at 383 (“One of the more vexing problems faced by
authorities in the criminal justice system is the existence of individuals who have served 
their sentences for their previous crimes but seem very likely to commit further, quite
serious offenses involving violence against their fellow citizens if they are released from 
prison.”). 
185. For a similar example, see Morse, supra note 6, at 46. 
186. See Levy, supra note 68, at 616–21, 620 n.27 (noting that four states currently
criminalize bad-Samaritanism, five states criminalize failure to report ongoing crimes,
and several jurisdictions still recognize misprision of felony in one form or another). 
1382
KEN LEVY DANGEROUS PSYCHOPATHS REPLACEMENT122411 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/2012 9:56 AM      
  





















   
[VOL. 48:  1299, 2011] Dangerous Psychopaths 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
There are a number of different ways in which Confidant may attempt 
to prevent Angry from trying to hurt or kill Meanie.  Some are direct— 
physically incapacitating Angry by handcuffing him or taking all of his 
knives and other weapons away from him.  For obvious reasons, however, 
both of these approaches are impractical.  Regarding the latter approach, 
if Confidant openly tries to remove Angry’s weapons, she will probably
meet with Angry’s resistance, if not retaliation, and may also be guilty of 
theft or attempted theft.  Regarding the former approach, even if Confidant 
somehow manages to handcuff Angry, she may be guilty of false
imprisonment, and the handcuffs will have to be removed sooner or 
later, at which point Angry will still pose a threat to Meanie.  Instead, 
the more effective and more clearly legal approach is indirect: Confidant
should alert the authorities—most likely, the police—to Angry’s threat 
and then leave the prevention up to them. 
Suppose, then, that Confidant calls the police, tells them that Angry
has expressed his intention to kill Meanie, and asks them to investigate 
the situation.  It might at first seem that the police should lock Angry up 
until he renounces his desire to kill Meanie.  But this would be an
overreaction.  Angry might just have been “talking a good game”— 
fantasizing about killing Meanie or blowing off steam.  Or he might have
meant it at the time but, like many hotheads, needed only to calm down. 
Or he might have meant it but, as time went on, would have given up on 
his plan for whatever reasons—fear, laziness, change of attitude toward
Meanie, or advice from others. 
Suppose further that the police approach Angry and ask him what is 
going on.  If Angry denies that he expressed a genuine intention to kill, 
they may still have the right to search Angry’s person and possibly his
office or home for weapons.  Should they find any, they might have
probable cause to arrest Angry for illegal gun possession or even attempted
murder. But suppose that they do not find any further evidence of
criminal activity or corroborating evidence of Angry’s intent to kill
Meanie.  Because the police have no further grounds to doubt Angry’s 
denials, they must then terminate the questioning and release Angry from
this “custodial” detention.  With the exception of a minority of jurisdictions, 
there is no law, criminal or otherwise, prohibiting people from expressing 
violent fantasies or intentions in private communications to third
 1383








     
 




















    
 
   
 
parties—that is, to people who are not the fantasized or intended
victims.187 
Still, there are three situations in which the police might detain Angry
for a longer period of time in order to investigate the situation further 
and to minimize the danger, if only temporarily, that Angry poses to
Meanie.  The first situation: Angry has a history of violence or dangerousness,
as evidenced either by a criminal record or complaints filed against him 
by family, friends, or acquaintances.  The second situation: the police
legally obtain corroborating evidence—for example, pictures
underneath Angry’s desk depicting Meanie with crosshairs drawn over his
face and quotations such as “I will kill you!” and “Die!  Die!  Die!”
scrawled across.  The third situation: Angry actually admits to the police 
that he meant what he said, that he does intend to kill Meanie if Meanie
yells at him again.
Suppose that the third of these situations occurs.  Suppose, that is, that 
Angry admits to the police that he will kill Meanie if Meanie yells at him 
again.  The police may certainly detain Angry to ask him more questions 
and possibly, again, search his person and his property for weapons or
other evidence of the commission of a crime.  But what form may this
detention take?  Merely keeping him in his office?  Taking him down to
the station?  Imprisoning him?  Involuntarily committing him to a psychiatric 
hospital?  The answers to these questions will vary across jurisdictions 
and depend on the totality of the circumstances.  As a general rule,
however, the more likely it seems to the police that Angry will attempt
to hurt or kill Meanie, the more justified they are in detaining Angry for 
a longer period of time.  Still, in the end, the maximum amount of time 
that they may temporarily imprison Angry is generally two to three days. 
Some might argue that the police should be able to detain Angry 
beyond a few days—indeed, for as long as it takes to protect Meanie
187. There are a few courts that recognize these third-party statements as criminal 
threats.  Some of these courts require the threatmaker to issue the threat with the 
intention or expectation that the third party will then communicate this threat to the 
intended target. See, e.g., United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1984 (2009); United States v. Patillo, 431 F.2d 293, 297–98 (4th
Cir. 1970).  One court, however, has suggested that this intention or expectation is not 
necessary for the third-party statement to be criminal.  See Beard v. United States, 535
A.2d 1373, 1378 (D.C. 1988) (“The crime was complete as soon as the threat was 
communicated to a third party, regardless of whether the intended victim ever knew of 
the plot. . . .  Even granting that a threat must be uttered, transmitted, and communicated, 
it does not necessarily follow that the communication must be to the intended victim
rather than to a third party.” (citations omitted)); see also Alec Walen, Criminalizing 
Statements of Terrorist Intent: How To Understand the Law Governing Terrorist
Threats, and Why It Should Be Used Instead of Long-Term Preventive Detention, 101
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 834–46 (2011) (arguing for criminalizing mere 
statements of criminal intent).
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from him.  But this is not the law.  The law across all jurisdictions is that
the state may detain Angry—and thereby protect Meanie—beyond a few 
days only if they either arrest Angry or preventively commit him in a
mental hospital.  And in order to arrest Angry, they must have probable 
cause to believe that he committed, or is committing, a crime. Ex 
hypothesi, in this hypothetical, they do not have this probable cause. 
Again, expressing violent intentions to a third party is generally not a
crime.188  So arrest is out. 
Suppose further that there is no evidence that Angry is mentally ill. 
He has no history of mental illness, and when the police ask Angry why 
he is making such a self-destructive admission, he responds with two
seemingly “rational” points: (1) he has always believed that honesty is 
the best policy, especially during police investigations; and (2) Meanie is 
an “evil bastard” whom he will kill if Meanie once again unjustly abuses 
Angry.  In the absence of any other evidence of mental illness, both 
(1) and (2) seem rational enough, even if most people would not harbor 
the same thoughts and intentions under similar circumstances.  Most 
people, that is, either would not plan to kill Meanie or, if they did, would 
lie and tell the police that they did not intend to kill Meanie to “stay out 
of trouble” and make their goal, killing Meanie, that much easier to
attain.  The fact that Angry is more honest and more willing to sacrifice 
his freedom, either before or after killing Meanie, hardly indicates that he
is mentally ill.  At best, it indicates that he is either more honest or more 
self-sacrificing than most other prospective killers.  And neither honesty 
nor self-sacrifice is necessarily a sign of mental illness. 
This is an unfortunate situation for the police to be in.  They know that
Angry poses a genuine, fatal threat to Meanie.  Yet they cannot, merely
on the basis of this knowledge, hold Angry until he abandons his plan to 
kill Meanie.189  They must release him—again, within no more than a
few days. 
188. With the exceptions noted supra note 187. 
189. See Morse, supra note 6, at 46 (“For example, imagine a young male prisoner 
about to be released from his third incarceration for armed robbery who boasts that he 
will immediately do it again upon release and will kill any victim who might potentially
identify him.  There is nothing at present the law can do to prevent [t]his.  We can only
hope that the armed robber has some sort of conversion experience.”).
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D.  Society’s Interest in Safety vs. the Dangerous Individual’s      
Interest in Liberty
The reason why the authorities may not detain Angry for a longer 
period of time is because Meanie’s interest in safety yields to Angry’s 
liberty interest.  More generally, there are significant rights and interests
on each side of every decision to commit or not to commit.  The task is
to get the balance just right—to commit only those who would have 
gone on to commit serious crimes.  But much easier said than done. 
On the one hand, the price for allowing Angry—and people like
Angry—to remain free is significant.  First, the public’s knowledge that
people like Angry are roaming free itself causes a widespread sense of
diminished security.  Second, people like Angry too often injure or kill 
others.  So if we err on the side of allowing a dangerous psychopath to 
remain free and he then injures or kills another, we have unjustly allowed an
innocent person whom we could have otherwise protected to be 
victimized.190 
On the other hand, there are two reasons to think that Angry should
remain free.  And these happen to be the reasons that generally prevail in 
our society. First, the police’s suspicion at this point about the threat 
that Angry presents to Meanie is uncertain and defeasible.191  There is
190. See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 165–66 (2001) 
(“[S]uppose we are faced with an offender who has persistently engaged in serious 
criminal attacks on others, who has been unresponsive to his previous punishments, and
of whom we can plausibly predict that he will commit further such attacks if he gets the 
chance to do so. . . .  [W]e can predict that once released . . . he will commit further such 
crimes.  What then can we say to his next victim or to the family of a victim he now 
kills?  Can we honestly say to those whose lives have been destroyed that this new crime 
is a price that we (and especially they) must pay for the sake of maintaining a liberal
polity?  Might they not reasonably reply that this is to denigrate their rights to protection
against this kind of predictable attack?”); Morse, supra note 6, at 44 (“[A]chieving the 
safety that makes freedom possible inevitably requires substantial infringement on the 
liberty of dangerous agents.”). 
191. See HARE, supra note 5, at 189 (“We must . . . be aware of the fact that even if 
perfect diagnoses were possible (and they are not), their ability to accurately predict 
recidivism or violence is limited, simply because the variables that constitute a diagnosis 
represent only a fraction of the individual, social, and environmental factors that
determine antisocial behavior.”); Paul Gendreau, Claire Goggin & Paula Smith, Is the
PCL-R Really the ‘Unparalleled’ Measure of Offender Risk? A Lesson in Knowledge
Cumulation, 29 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 397 (2002) (arguing that the PCL-R should not
be used to predict recidivism); Lee, supra note 3, at 132 (“[Some] (including the U.S. 
Supreme Court in some instances) continue to cast doubt upon the reliability of mental 
diagnoses when predicting dangerousness in criminals.  According to the American
Psychiatric Association (APA), ‘[t]he large body of research in this area indicates that,
even under the best of conditions, psychiatric predictions of long-term future 
dangerousness are wrong in at least two out of every three cases.’” (footnote omitted));
Malatesti & McMillan, supra note 5, at 82–83 (“[A] central issue for PCL-R is whether it
predicts criminal recidivism. . . .  Without wishing to adjudicate on this debate, it is worth 
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still a very good chance—too good a chance—that, if left free, Angry 
will never attempt to harm Meanie.  Given this very good chance, our
remaining concern about Angry is simply too weak a basis on which to
commit Angry and thereby infringe on his presumptive right to liberty 
and freedom from undue state interference.  Of course, the police may
implement some other protective measures such as informing Meanie of
Angry’s intention, issuing a restraining order against Angry on Meanie’s
behalf, and warning Angry of the punishment that faces him if he should
even try to harm Meanie.  But legally—doctrinally—there is little else 
that they can do.  Despite their worries for Meanie’s safety, they cannot, 
at this point, infringe upon Angry’s presumptive liberty interest.192 
Second, it may sound encouraging at first to say that we are going to
round up and commit all dangerous psychopaths.  We will all feel safer 
—at least those of us who do not find ourselves on the wrong side of this 
witch hunt.  But that is just the point: too many people might just end up
on the wrong side of this witch hunt for the wrong reason: either (1) the 
state misjudged them as dangerous or (2) the state abused this new 
power, rounded up people it did not like for whatever reasons, and then 
labeled them dangerous to justify their commitment.193  Tyrannical states 
mentioning that some are less convinced about this correlation [between psychopathy and
recidivism].”); Ogloff & Wood, supra note 6, at 174–75 (suggesting that the PCL-R
should not be used to the exclusion of other “validated instruments” to “predict
recidivism, identify criminogenic needs for treatment, and measure treatment response”); 
Robinson, supra note 170, at 1444 (“Requiring the criminal justice system to distribute 
punishment according to predictions of future dangerousness rather than
blameworthiness for past crimes can only undercut the system’s moral credibility.”); id.
at 1452 (“It is difficult enough to determine a person’s present dangerousness—whether 
he would commit an offense if released today.  It is much more difficult to predict an 
offender’s future dangerousness—whether he would commit an offense if released at the
end of the deserved punishment term in the future.  It is still more difficult, if not 
impossible, to predict today precisely how long the future preventive detention will need 
to last.”).  For criticisms of this argument, see ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE
CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 104–46
(1987); Lippke, supra note 6, at 383–85; Slobogin, supra note 47, at 6–11.
192. See Morse, supra note 6, at 46 (“In the interest of liberty, we leave potential
dangerous people free to pursue their projects until they actually offend, even if their
future wrongdoing is quite certain.  Indeed, we are willing to take great risks in the name 
of liberty. . . .  Do we really believe that responsible, dangerous agents have a right to be
at liberty when their potential harmdoing is serious and quite certain?  In theory we 
do.”). 
193. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 380 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The 
sexually-dangerous-person proceeding . . . may not escape a characterization as ‘criminal’
simply because a goal is ‘treatment.’  If this were not the case . . . nothing would prevent 
a State from creating an entire corpus of ‘dangerous person’ statutes to shadow its 
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are notorious for labeling people who are suspected of disagreeing with,
or resisting, the regime as “enemies of the state” and “disappearing”
them.  There is no reason to think that the same injustices would not take 
place here if we granted the state the power to preventively commit
dangerous psychopaths without rigorous criteria, qualified experts, and
other due process safeguards.194 
E.  A Consequentialist Argument for Classifying    
Psychopathy as a Mental Illness 
Meanie, then, seems to be in a very vulnerable position, and there does 
not seem to be anything that the state can do to protect Meanie from
Angry for more than a few days.  But suppose now that Angry admits to
the police that he will kill Meanie if Meanie once again mistreats him 
criminal code.  Indeterminate commitment would derive from proven violations of criminal 
statutes, combined with findings of mental disorders and ‘criminal propensities,’ and
constitutional protections for criminal defendants would be simply inapplicable.  The
goal would be ‘treatment’; the result would be evisceration of criminal law and its 
accompanying protections.”); Hart, supra note 3, at 167–68 (“It is not entirely clear why
psychopathy generally is considered insufficient as a basis for short-term civil 
commitment. . . .  There are at least two possible explanations.  The first is that courts
may view short-term civil commitment as requiring a very high level of cognitive or
volitional impairment . . . to avoid excessive use of police powers by the state . . . .”);
Slobogin, supra note 47, at 17–18 (“The legality objection to preventive detention is that 
the meaning of dangerousness cannot be satisfactorily cabined, thus allowing the state 
too much power.”); id. at 26 (“[T]he legality principle is meant to control government 
discretion.  If the triggering act for preventive detention is not an immediate precursor to
the predicted harm (as with emergency commitment and investigative stops), it must be
linked to a statutorily defined crime, or the potential for government abuse becomes
enormous. . . .  [T]he government’s (over)reaction to the events of 9/11, including 
preventive detention of American citizens who remain uncharged, provides a potent 
counter-reason for applying the same legality constraints on preventive detention that 
apply to inchoate crimes.” (footnote omitted)).
194. See Morse, supra note 6, at 58 (“Assuming that [indefinitely committing 
psychopaths in specially secure hospital wings] was not a ruse, it would theoretically
satisfy constitutional constraints on commitment, but no American legislature seems at
present inclined to adopt such a scheme, which would of course be subject to abuse.”); 
Robinson, supra note 170, at 1444–45 (“The intense controversy surrounding the 
preventive detention legislation of the 1960s may help to explain this reluctance.  Critics 
denounced the legislation as ‘Clockwork Orange’ and ‘“Alice in Wonderland” justice’ in 
which the punishment precedes the offense and as introducing a ‘police state’ and 
‘fostering tyranny.’  Opponents described it as ‘intellectually dishonest,’ characterized it 
as ‘one of the most tragic mistakes we as a society could make,’ and feared that it ‘would 
change the complexion of American justice.’  Preventive detention was ‘simply not the 
American way.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting a number of critics)); id. at 1455 (“[T]here 
are understandable concerns about creating a broader system of explicit preventive
detention: the Gulag Archipelago potential for governmental abuse is real.” (footnote 
omitted)); Slobogin, supra note 47, at 17–18 (“The legality objection to preventive
detention is that the meaning of dangerousness cannot be satisfactorily cabined, thus 
allowing the state too much power.”).
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and the police have good reason to believe that Angry is a clinically 
diagnosed psychopath. Perhaps the police legally obtained Angry’s
psychological records, which indicate that Angry is a psychopath, or a 
licensed psychiatrist whom they consulted evaluates Angry and issues 
this diagnosis.  Do they now have sufficient grounds for preventively
committing Angry for more than a few days? 
If Angry were a sexual psychopath, the answer in an increasing 
number of jurisdictions would be yes.  Sexual psychopath—or sexually 
dangerous person—statutes generally allow the jurisdictions that have 
passed them to preventively commit sexual offenders, individuals who
have been either convicted of designated sexual offenses or diagnosed 
by licensed psychiatrists as (likely) sexual offenders, if they have good 
reason to believe that these individuals are also dangerous to themselves
or others.195 
Ex hypothesi, Angry is not a sexual psychopath.  He is a nonsexual 
psychopath, a “generic” psychopath who wishes “only” to kill Meanie, not 
to commit any sexual offense against him.  It is difficult to see, however, 
why this difference should matter, why we should permit the preventive
detention only of known sexual psychopaths, not of dangerous nonsexual 
psychopaths. After all, all else being equal, being killed is worse than being
sexually victimized.  So just as the danger presented by sexual psychopaths
is sufficient to preventively commit them, the danger presented by 
homicidal psychopaths should be sufficient to preventively commit them. 
One way, perhaps the most direct way, to achieve this reform is to 
classify psychopathy as a mental illness.196  There are two reasons, one
195. See Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 16901–16962 (2006); Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 16901 Et Seq., Its Enforcement Provision, 18 U.S.C.A § 2250, and 
Associated Regulations, 30 A.L.R. FED. 2D 213 (2008); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation,
Validity, Construction, and Application of Overt Act Requirement of State Statutes 
Providing for Commitment of Sexually Dangerous Persons, 56 A.L.R.6TH 657 (2010)
(“A number of states have enacted statutes relating to sexually dangerous persons, or
persons with psychopathic personality disorders. . . .  Statutes relating to sexually
dangerous persons usually provide for the commitment of such persons.”); Morse, supra 
note 6, at 58–59 (summarizing the main criteria of laws prescribing the commitment of
sexually violent predators). 
196. Some already regard psychopathy as a mental illness.  See, e.g., HARE, supra
note 5, at 184 (noting that Australian authorities declared a certain psychopath “and
others like him [as] mentally ill”); LINEDECKER, supra note 64, at 213, 215 (noting that 
John Wayne Gacy’s defense attorney described Gacy’s condition as a debilitating mental 
disease); Hart, supra note 3, at 164 (“[P]sychopathy meets the legal criteria for mental 
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formal, the other substantive.  The formal reason is that the Supreme
Court stated in Foucha v. Louisiana that a person may not be 
preventively committed unless that person is mentally ill.197  So even 
if certain diagnosed psychopaths are dangerous, they may not be
preventively committed unless their psychopathy is considered to be a 
mental illness.  Given this point together with both the very real danger 
that Angry presents to Meanie and the protection that would be afforded 
to Meanie by preventively committing Angry, psychopathy should be 
considered a mental illness.198  Moreover, given the very broad conception
of mental illness supported by the Supreme Court, this proposal is hardly
farfetched.199 
The substantive reason explains this formal rule.  If Angry admitted to
the police that he would kill Meanie if Meanie mistreated him again and 
Angry was clearly not mentally ill, the police would arguably not have
good reason to think that, when push came to shove, Angry would carry
through on this threat.  Most “normal”—nonmentally ill—people
get angry, and some of these people are honest—or stupid—enough to
admit the full extent of their anger to the police.  But it is safe to say that
most nonmentally ill people, no matter how angry they get, do not kill or
attempt to kill the people who anger them.  It is only when they are
mentally ill that we have better reason to think that they will act on their 
anger.  The probabilities go significantly higher.  Mental illness not only
often motivates the anger but also impairs judgment and self-restraint.200 
It tends to make the person irrationally or excessively angry and to act 
on this anger when a nonmentally ill person would have exerted self-
control and either “let it go” or channeled the anger in a healthier,
nonviolent direction.  In this way, mental illness and dangerousness are 
not just two separate and independent conditions.  It is mental illness 
disorder.  It is an abnormality of personality functions recognized in official nosological
systems.  It is persistent.  It reflects something more than simply social deviance or bad
choices.”); Lee, supra note 3, at 133 (referring to psychopathy as a “mental disorder”). 
197. See supra note 172 and accompanying text; cf. Slobogin, supra note 47, at 35 
(proposing that dangerousness and undeterrability be the two necessary and sufficient
criteria for preventive detention).
198. See Lee, supra note 3, at 134–35 (making the similar point that treating 
psychopathy as an aggravating factor will make it easier to incarcerate psychopaths 
longer and thereby protect society for longer periods of time). 
199. See Slobogin, supra note 47, at 2–3 (“In Kansas v. Hendricks, involving the 
constitutionality of a so-called ‘sexual predator’ statute, the Court permitted 
indeterminate confinement of dangerous individuals who have completed their sentences 
and have committed no new crime even when they are not seriously mentally
disordered—as long as they have a personality disorder that renders them unable to
adequately control their anti-social conduct. The Court recently affirmed its willingness 
to uphold the institutionalization of non-psychotic people who meet this ‘inability-to-
control’ threshold in Kansas v. Crane.” (footnotes omitted)).
200. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
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that usually makes dangerous people truly dangerous, not just angry, in the 
first place.  This is the reason why not merely apparent dangerousness but
also mental illness is required for preventive commitment.201 
The same holds true of psychopathy.  If Angry were not psychopathic, 
the probability that he is genuinely dangerous would be significantly
smaller.  There would be much less chance that he would actually attempt
to kill Meanie.  Conversely, if Angry is psychopathic, the probability is 
much greater that he presents a genuine danger to Meanie.  Because the
very same can be said of mental illness generally—because mental
illness, especially in conjunction with anger, also significantly raises the 
probability of antisocial behavior by persons afflicted with it—it follows 
that psychopathy is, or at least should be regarded as, a form of mental
illness. 
It is very important to point out that I have in mind here not all 
psychopaths but only the subset of psychopaths who are dangerous.  This
point itself assumes that not all psychopaths are dangerous, that there are 
indeed people in our society who (would) score between 30 and 40 on 
the PCL-R in Part II above but who do not harm others, at least not
criminally.202  So I am not suggesting that we preventively commit whoever 
201. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (“A finding of
dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify
indefinite involuntary commitment.  We have sustained civil commitment statutes when
they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such 
as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’  These added statutory requirements serve 
to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment 
rendering them dangerous beyond their control. . . .  The precommitment requirement of
a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ is consistent with the requirements
of . . . other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible 
for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness.” (citations
omitted)); Hart, supra note 3, at 163 (“[H]ow does the law determine when a person’s 
cognitive or volitional abilities are sufficiently impaired by mental disorder to trigger the
need for special care or control? . . .  [The third requirement is that] the impairment of 
cognitive or volitional functions must be due at least in part to the mental disorder—or, 
put differently, there must exist a discernible causal nexus between the mental disorder 
and the impairment of cognitive or volitional functions.” (citations omitted)); id. at 167 
(“Although statutes differ in terms of the specific type and quantum of risk that must be 
posed to justify commitment, a common element is that all require the state to 
demonstrate that the violence risk is due (at least in part) to mental disorder.  Before the
state can commit, it must prove that the person has a mental disorder that impairs
cognitive or volitional functions in a way that increases violence risk . . . .”).
202. See Hart, supra note 3, at 168 (“Perhaps courts . . . do not accept that
[psychopathy] is associated with an imminent risk of harm.”); Ogloff & Wood, supra
note 6, at 171 (“One might believe that working with psychopaths can be physically
dangerous—and it might be—although only very rarely.”).
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has been diagnosed as a psychopath.  Once again, I am suggesting
that we preventively commit only people who have been diagnosed with
this mental illness and have given us good reason to believe that they 
will, in the near future, injure themselves or others.  (Incidentally, by others, 
I include animals, but that is a different topic for a different paper.203) 
F.  Psychopaths Are Still Criminally Responsible for  
Their Behavior 
This last point brings us back to criminal responsibility.  One might 
argue that if we cannot trust dangerous psychopaths to avoid committing 
crimes, then we cannot regard them as criminally responsible for their 
actions.  Likewise, we generally do not regard dangerous and mentally ill
people who are involuntarily committed to be criminally responsible for 
their behavior.  If we did, then we likely would not commit them in the first 
place.  Instead, we would reiterate the threat of criminal punishment against 
them and hope, with good reason, that issuing this threat—rather than
locking them up—would suffice to deter them from committing a crime.
So I understand that there is a tension between my two positions—that 
psychopaths are criminally responsible for their criminal acts and that 
(pre-crime) dangerous psychopaths may be preventively committed.  But 
tension does not mean contradiction.  My two positions are still 
consistent.  I do not contradict myself when I say that a given person
may be dangerous and mentally ill enough to be preventively committed
and still not mentally ill enough to qualify as insane and therefore beyond 
criminal punishment.  The fact that individuals are mentally ill does not at 
all mean that they are not criminally responsible for their criminal
behavior.204  It means only that they have more difficulty abiding by the
moral and legal norms of their society.  And their difficulty abiding by
norms is not necessarily substantial, in which case the MPC version of the
insanity defense is not necessarily satisfied and the M’Naghten version 
of the insanity defense is certainly not satisfied.205 
203. See Taimie L. Bryant, Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals:  Legal Personhood
for Animals, the Status of Animals as Property, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans, 
39 RUTGERS L.J. 247, passim (2008) (arguing that, on balance, animals should be given 
the same legal standing as human beings). 
 204. Contrary to the Durham rule. See supra Part VI.B.
205. See supra Part IX.C. 
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XI. CONCLUSION
By definition and on the basis of empirical evidence, psychopaths are 
incapable of feeling compassion and therefore understanding how
concern for others, not just fear of punishment, generally motivates the 
“rest of us” to refrain from engaging in activities that would otherwise
maximize our self-interest.  Despite this psychological deficit, I have
argued that the threat or fear of punishment alone gives nonpsychopaths 
good enough reason to refrain from violating the criminal law.  So 
even if psychopaths (1) cannot act for moral reasons, therefore (2) cannot 
be morally responsible for their behavior, and (3) do not understand
why we have criminal laws or why the “rest of us” highly value the
considerations that motivate these laws (especially other people’s interests), 
they are still criminally responsible for violating these laws—just as
the “rest of us” are criminally responsible for violating drug-possession 
laws even though we may not morally or emotionally understand the 
basis, if any, of these laws. 
Because psychopaths are criminally responsible for their behavior, 
they should be criminally punished just like the “rest of us” when they
are found guilty.  This conclusion will probably satisfy most retributivists, 
at least retributivists who believe that psychopaths are indeed
criminally responsible for their criminal behavior.  It may, however, 
disappoint two other groups: (1) retributivists who believe that psychopaths
are not criminally responsible for their behavior; and (2) anybody who 
believes that individuals’ being criminally responsible for their behavior
makes them ineligible, prior to committing any crime, for preventive
commitment.  Regarding (2), however, I have argued that the mere fact
that psychopaths are criminally responsible for their behavior does not, and
should not, prevent us from preventively committing them prior to
their committing any crime when we have evidence that they present
a real danger to themselves or others. 
This last point is perfectly consistent with my central conclusion that 
psychopaths are not insane.  People need not be insane in order to be
subject to preventive commitment.  Instead, they need be only dangerous 
and mentally ill.  And although the DSM-IV-TR does not currently recognize
psychopathy as a form of mental illness, it should.  Psychopathy is a 
severe personality disorder.  Once again, a person who suffers from this 
condition is unlike the “rest of us” insofar as it renders him unable to feel
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genuine concern for others and thereby develop deep, rich, fulfilling 
relationships with other people.  This deprivation should make us 
feel bad for psychopaths—at least until they victimize us or give signs 
that they are about to victimize us.  Then we need to punish them or 
protect ourselves (respectively). 
One might argue that we should still feel bad for psychopaths who are 
criminally punished.206  But it is difficult to see why.  First, they presumably
committed criminal acts and therefore deserve criminal punishment for
these acts. Second, psychopaths do not suffer as easily or as intensely as
the rest of “us” nonpsychopaths.  Therefore, criminal punishment is 
likely to cause them much less suffering than it would, all else being 
equal, cause nonpsychopaths.207  As Robert Hare tells us: 
Psychopaths often give the impression that it is they who are suffering and that 
it is the victims who are to blame for their misery.  But they are suffering a lot
less than you are . . . .  Don’t waste your sympathy on them; their problems are
not in the same league as yours.  Theirs stem primarily from not getting what
they want, whereas yours result from a physical, emotional, or financial 
pounding.208 
206. See MOSS, supra note 12, at 257 (“The day of [Gacy’s] execution . . . . I kept 
thinking about Gacy.  I felt really sad.  I thought about how alone and scared he was 
probably feeling.”); RONSON, supra note 21, at 110 (“You have to feel sorry for
psychopaths, right?  If it’s all because of their amygdalae?  If it’s not their fault?” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Lee, supra note 3, at 133 (“[O]ne [c]ould argue that 
a mental disorder (here psychopathy in particular) effectively decreases the culpability of
the criminal who should therefore be treated with mercy and empathy. . . .  This 
approach sympathizes with the individual, placing blame not on the criminal but on the 
inevitable effects of psychopathy.” (footnotes omitted)).
207. See  HARE, supra note 5, at 195 (“Psychopaths don’t feel they have
psychological or emotional problems, and they see no reason to change their behavior to 
conform to societal standards with which they do not agree. . . . [P]sychopaths are 
generally well satisfied with themselves and their inner landscape, bleak as it may seem
to outside observers.  They see nothing wrong with themselves, experience little personal
distress, and find their behavior rational, rewarding, and satisfying; they never look back 
with regret or forward with concern.  They perceive themselves as superior beings . . . . 
Psychopaths are not “fragile” individuals.  What they think and do are extensions of a
rock-solid personality structure that is extremely resistant to outside influence.”); id. at 203 
(“[A]s far as we can determine, psychopaths are perfectly happy with themselves, and they
see no need for treatment.”); id. at 204 (“From society’s perspective, psychopaths have never
been on track; they dance to their own tune.”); LINEDECKER, supra note 64, at 220 (“[W]ho
deserves the pity?  The individual who has proven he is unfit to walk freely in society because 
he is dangerous to others, or potential victims who have caused injury to no one?”). 
 208. HARE, supra note 5, at 215–16.  But see Willem H.J. Martens, The Hidden 
Suffering of the Psychopath, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Dec. 31, 2001), http://www.
psychiatrictimes.com/print/article/10168/55051 (“[Psychopaths] have difficulty loving
and trusting the rest of the world. . . . [and] do suffer emotionally as a consequence of 
separation, divorce, death of a beloved person or dissatisfaction with their own deviant
behavior. . . .  [They] can be genuinely saddened by their inability to control [their 
behavior toward others]. . . .  Despite their outward arrogance, inside psychopaths feel 
inferior to others and know they are stigmatized by their own behavior. . . .  They see the 
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love and friendship others share and feel dejected knowing they will never take part in 
it.” (citations omitted)).
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